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Increasing premiums and the withdrawal of some kinds of coverage in
commercial liability insurance markets are widely believed to have led some
manufacturers to raise product prices and to withdraw certain products from
the market. These changes have been attributed to the expansion of manufac-
turer liability for product-caused injuries, and have been seen as evidence that
products liability law is in need of fundamental reform. This Article challenges
the theoretical and empirical foundations of that well-accepted view through
a careful examination of the work of Professor George L. Priest, one of the
most influential leaders of the tort reform movement. Croley and Hanson first
consider and reject the conventional explanation for the liability "crisis. "They
then argue that any expansion toward enterprise liability furthers the deter-
rence and insurance goals of tort law by forcing consumers to internalize the
full pecuniary and nonpecuniary costs of product-caused injuries. Finally,
Croley and Hanson argue that recent changes in commercial liability insurance
and consumer product markets may well represent the desirable consequences
of efficient changes in products liability law. They urge courts and legislatures
to continue the expansion toward enterprise liability.
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What Liability Crisis?
Introduction
A. The Current Consensus in Products Liability
Developments in products liability over recent decades have been character-
ized as a "revolutionary" shift away from principles of contract and negligence
toward the principle of enterprise liability.1 This shift can be understood as
the latest stage in the evolution of products liability. 2
Originally, determinations of liability for product injuries sounded in
contract. Injured consumers could recover only if they were in privity of
contract with a product's seller, and recovery was limited to the terms of any
express or implied warranties.' Privity and notice requirements together posed
an almost insurmountable bulwark for consumers seeking recovery in tort.4
In the second stage, courts gradually relaxed these contract requirements,
turning to tort law and its principle of negligence.' A plaintiff could recover
from a manufacturer of a defective product by showing that the manufacturer's
product caused the plaintiff's injury and that the manufacturer was negligent
1. See R. COOTER & T. ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 422 (1988); R. RABIN, PERSPECTIVES ON TORT
LAW 154-55 (2d ed. 1983) ("[C]ourts have effected a veritable revolution in products liability law during
the last decade, substituting strict liability in tort for a liability system based on the fault principle.");
Epstein, The UnintendedRevolution in Product Liability Law, 10 CARDOzO L. REV. 2193 (1989) [hereinaf-
ter Epstein, Unintended Revolution] (This shift "has not been incremental but revolutionary."); Huber,
Flypaper Contracts and the Genesis of Modem Tort Law, 10 CARDozo L. REV. 2263, 2270 (1989)
[hereinafter Huber, Flypaper Contracts] ("The revolution in the law of torts has been as profound and far-
reaching as any in the history of the common law."); Priest, The Invention ofEnterprise Liability:A Critical
History of the Intellectual Foundations ofModem TortLaw, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 461 (1985) [hereinaf-
ter Priest, Enterprise Liability] ("Since 1960, our modem civil liability regime has experienced a conceptual
revolution that is among the most dramatic ever witnessed in the Anglo-American legal system. Legal rules
that had been entrenched for decades ... were suddenly repudiated and replaced by rules ... radically
different."); TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP, AN UPDATE ON THE LIABIuTY CRISIS 54 (1987) [hereinafter
TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP, 1987 UPDATE] ("The recent expansion of tort liability doctrines has been
one of the most dramatic and far-reaching developments in modern American law .... The most active
and visible area of expanding tort liability has been that of product liability. "). See generally R. EPSTEIN,
MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW chs. 2-4 (1980); P. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND
ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988); Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance Market, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 645,
645, 654-69 (1985) [hereinafter Epstein, Insurance Market]; Epstein, Unintended Revolution, supra, at
2196-2213; Landes & Posner, A Positive Economic Analysis of Products Liability, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 535,
547-51 (1985).
"Enterprise liability" has been defined as follows: "Enterprise liability ... provides in its simplest
form that business enterprises ought to be responsible for losses resulting from products they introduce
into commerce." Priest, Enterprise Liability, supra, at 463; see also Blum & Kalven, The Empty Cabinet
ofDr. Calabresi: Auto Accidents and General Deterrence, 34 U. Cm. L. REV. 239, 245 n.14 (1967) (using
the term "enterprise liability" in this way). The authors' use of the term "enterprise liability," is consistent
with the above definition-that is, as a label for a products liability regime in which manufacturers are
absolutely liable for the costs of product accidents, notwithstanding exculpatory contracts. In other words,
"enterprise liability" denotes absolute manufacturer liability that cannot be altered by contract. See generally
S. Croley & J. Hanson, Understanding Products Liability (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter S. Croley
& J. Hanson, Understanding Products Liability].
2. The authors' intent here is simply to provide a general historical backdrop necessary for under-
standing the current thinking in products liability. For a more complete historical picture, see R. EPSTEIN,
supra note 1; Priest, Enterprise Liability, supra note 1.
3. See, e.g., Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (ex. 1842).
4. Priest, Strict Products Liability: The Original Intent, 10 CARDOzO L. REV. 2301, 2305 (1985)
[hereinafter Priest, Original Intent]; see also E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 20-27
(1948) (describing notice requirements).
5. See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916); Vandermark
v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 263, 391 P.2d 168, 172, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 900 (1964).
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for failing to discover or eliminate the product's defect. The importance of
contract remained, however, for courts continued to enforce the terms of
manufacturers' express warranties. In the third stage, courts abandoned
contract doctrines altogether,6 holding negligent manufacturers liable even
when the manufacturers had disclaimed liability through express warranties.7
Finally, in the 1950s and 1960s, courts substituted in place of negligence a rule
of strict liability.'
In two classic articles,9 Dean Prosser explained that courts adopted strict
liability because of their confidence that such a rule would best serve the two
primary goals of products liability, deterrence and insurance. 0 Courts be-
lieved that strict liability would provide an incentive for manufacturers to
prevent accidents that they could efficiently prevent (the "deterrence goal"")
and to spread the risk of unprevented accidents (the "insurance goal" 12). But
as Prosser recognized, the strict liability regime was less strict-that is, more
fault-based-than its name suggests.13 The strict liability rule did not make
manufacturers absolute insurers for purchasers of their products. 4
6. Epstein, Unintended Revolution, supra note 1, at 2200 (arguing that this stage stood for the
"rejection of freedom of contract").
7. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); see also
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701
(1963) ("the refusal to permit the manufacturer to define the scope of its own responsibility for defective
products makes clear that the liability is not one governed by the law of contract warranties but by the law
of strict liability in tort").
8. See Greenman, 59 Cal. 2d 57; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) (adopting
strict products liability standard). This major turn of events was anticipated in, if not instigated by, Justice
Traynor's 1944 concurring opinion in Escola, in which Traynor argued that "the manufacturer's negligence
should no longer be singled out as the basis of a plaintiff's right to recover . . . ." Escola v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). Traynor's opinion
has been called "the most prominent antecedent of our modem regime." Priest, Enterprise Liability, supra
note 1, at 498; see also P. HUBER, supra note 1, at 132.
On the development of strict products liability up to that time, see James, Products Liability, 34 TEX.
L. REV. 44, 192 (1955); Noel, Manufacturers of Products-The Drift Toward Strict Liability, 24 TENN.
L. REV. 963 (1957).
9. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960)
[hereinafter Prosser, The Assault]; Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50
MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966) [hereinafter Prosser, The Fall]. In these classic articles, Prosser borrows,
expands, and mixes Cardozo's citadel metaphor. (Cardozo observed that "It]he assault upon the citadel
of privity is proceeding in these days apace." Utramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 180, 174 N.E.
441, 445 (1931)). In general, the "citadel" is the fortress that resisted the early stages of the enterprise
liability offensive.
10. Deterrence and insurance have been widely accepted as the twin goals of products liability, indeed,
of tort law in general. See Huber, Flypaper Contracts, supra note 1, at 2272; Alan Schwartz, Proposals
for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 368-69 (1988) [hereinafter
Schwartz, Proposals].
11. See, e.g., Escola, 24 Cal. 2d at 462, 150 P.2d at 440 (Traynor, J., concurring); Greenman, 59
Cal. 2d at 63, 377 P.2d at 901.
12. Escola, 24 Cal. 2d at 461-62, 150 P.2d at 440-41.
13. See Prosser, The Assault, supra note 9, at 1114 ("[A]n honest estimate might very well be that
there is not one case in a hundred in which strict liability would result in recovery Where negligence does
not."). See generally Landes & Posner, Products Liability, supra note 1, at 553-66 (comparing modern
products liability doctrines to negligence).
14. Plaintiffs still had the burden of identifying a product defect and showing that it existed when the
product left the defendant's hands. And the judicial test for determining whether a product was defective,
many scholars have argued, was equivalent to the test for determining whether the manufacturer was
negligent. See, e.g., R. COOTER & T. ULEN, supra note 1, at 434; Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test
for Strict Liability in Tons, 81 YALE L. J. 1055 (1972); Session Three: Discussion of Paper by George
L. Priest, 10 CARDozo L. REV. 2329, 2335 (1989) [hereinafter Discussion Session Three] (remarks by
David Friedman); Landes & Posner, Products Liability, supra note 1, at 546, 549, 554; see also infra notes
What Liability Crisis?
Tort scholars believe that after 1964, until at least 1985, courts, offering
the same insurance and deterrence justifications that originally prompted their
shift to, "strict" products liability, have expanded manufacturer liability yet
closer to an enterprise liability regime-a regime in which manufacturers
would be absolutely liable for injuries caused by their products." Although
questions remain about the exact magnitude of this latest expansion,16 recent
scholarship reflects a consensus that the expansion, whatever its magnitude,
has generated much more harm than good. 7
This consensus emerged largely in response to the so-called "insurance
crisis," which peaked in the early months of 1986.18 Escalating commercial
liability insurance ,premiums at that time caused tremendous concern among
business leaders,' 9 policymakers,20 and insurance companies.21 Commenta-
17 and 88 and accompanying text (reviewing scholars' arguments that current products liability regime is
largely indistinguishable from a negligence regime). Even some courts recognize the equivalence. See, e.g.,
Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 184 (Mich. 1984) (stating explicitly that risk-utility test is
nothing other than a negligence test).
Moreover, a plaintiff had to demonstrate that the product's defect caused the injury. See R. EPSTEIN,
C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 638 (4th ed. 1984); Viscusi, Toward a
Diminished Role for Tort Liability: Social Insurance, Government Regulation, and Contemporary Risks
to Health and Safety, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 65, 69 [hereinafter Viscusi, Diminished Role]. And even then,
a defendant could avoid liability by showing that the plaintiff had assumed the risk, misused the product,
or been contributorily negligent.
15. See R. COOTER & T. ULEN, supra note 1, at 422 ("[Plroducts liability law.., from 1965 to the
present ... is characterized by the emergence of strict liability as the basis for recovery for harms arising
from product use, and the trend toward a standard of absolute liability for manufacturers."); Litan, Swire
& Winston, The U.S. Liability System, Background and Trends, in LIABIUTY: PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY
5-11 (R. Litan and C. Winston eds. 1988); Priest, Enterprise Liability, supra note 1, at 527 ("The unfolding
of enterprise liability since 1964 might be [viewed] as a struggle of courts to define some coherent
conception of manufacturers' liability short of absolute liability .... But the distance between prevailing
standards and a standard of absolute liability progressively narrows.").
16. See infra note 84 and notes 186-96 and accompanying text; see also Levmore, Rethinking
Comparative Law: Variety and Uniformity in Ancient and Modern Tort Law, 61 TUL. L. REV. 235, 245
(1986) (arguing that in current tort law, negligence is the general rule and strict liability the exception);
Rabin, Indeterminate Risk and Tort Reform: Comment on Calabresi and Klevorick, 14 J. LEGAL STUD.
633, 634-637 (1985) [hereinafter Rabin, Indeterminate Risk] (much of strict liability is essentially "tradition-
al risk-benefit analysis"); Gary Schwartz, Foreword: Understanding Products Liability, 67 CALIF. L. REV.
435 (1979) ("strict liability" as applied to design and warning defects is actually negligence); Gary
Schwartz, The Vitality of Negligence and the Ethics of Strict Liability, 15 GA. L. REV. 963 (1981)
(expansion of liability has been an expansion of negligence liability, rather than an extension of enterprise
liability); Gary Schwartz, New Products, Old Products, Evolving Law, Retroactive Law, 58 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 796 (1983) (modem law reflects a gradual evolution of the fault system); Viscusi, Wading Through
the Muddle of Risk Utility Analysis, 39 AM. U.L. REV. 573, 585 (1990) [hereinafter Viscusi, Wading
Through] ("strict liability [as applied] is not tantamount to absolute liability").
17. See, e.g., Epstein, Unintended Revolution, supra note 1, at 2196 ("The present rules of product
liability law are both inefficient and unwelcome. . . ."); Priest, Modern Tort Law and Its Reform, 22 VAL.
U.L. REV. 1 (1987) [hereinafter Priest, Modern Reform] ("[Miodern tort law as currently defined largely
thwarts the accident reduction and compensation objectives."); Schwartz, Proposals, supra note 10, at 384
("This regulation [i.e., the current control that courts and juries attempt to exert over product quality]...
has been unfortunate. ").
18. Priest, Modern Reform, supra note 17, at 2-3.
19. Business leaders have expressed concern since the mid-1970s over the effect of tort law on
commerce. Today, business groups and commercial liability insurers continue to lobby for pro-defendant
products-liability reforms. See Epstein, Insurance Market, supra note 1, at 668 ("[Alutomobile companies
have been very active ... in trying to alter the dominant rules of products liability."); Priest, The Current
Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1588 (1987) [hereinafter Priest, Insurance
Crisis] (noting support of "business and insurance interests" for tort reform statutes); see, e.g., American
International Group (AIG) Issues Forum, Why Reforming Our Liability System Is Essential If America Is
to Succeed in Overseas Markets, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 26, 1990, at 32-33; Labaton, Product Liability's 'Quiet
Revolution,' N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1989, D2, col. 1 (describing reaction of "[mlanufacturers and their
insurers" to insurance crisis and attributing recent changes in products liability to their influence).
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tors offered various explanations for the crisis, including the popular claim that
insurers were colluding to maximize profits.22 But each explanation left com-
ponents of the radical changes in liability insurance markets unexplained. Legal
economists provided the most persuasive explanation when they linked the
insurance crisis to the expansion of manufacturer liability. What was initially
viewed as an insurance crisis came to be viewed as fundamentally a tort
crisis' or, to capture its cause, a "liability crisis. " 2  It is now widely be-
lieved that changes in products liability caused the insurance crisis, and that
the insurance crisis is evidence of a crisis in products liability.
25
20. See infra note 41.
21. See generally TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP, 1987 UPDATE, supra note 1, at ch. 4. In 1984,
the insurance industry instituted a campaign to convince policymakers and business leaders that tort law
was to blame for the drastic increases in insurance premiums. Maher, LLL Launches NewAd Campaign,
NAT'L UNDERWRITER (Prop. & Casualty ed.), Dec. 21, 1984, at 2, col. 1. For example, the Insurance
Information Institute spent more than six million dollars to advertise the message that the insurance crisis
was the consequence of a tort crisis. Comment, Rumors of Crisis: Considering the Insurance Crisis and
Tort Reform in an Information Vacuum, 37 EMORY L.J. 401, 404 (1988). To understand why commercial
insurance carriers have opposed expansions in products liability, see infra Part IV(D)(2).
22. See, e.g., Goldberg, Manufacturers Take Cover, A.B.A. J., July 1, 1986, at 52, 55 (quoting Jay
Angoff, National Insurance Consumer Organization, describing insurance industry manipulations of policies
and premiums).
Another theory is the "insurance cycles" hypothesis. Clarke, Warren-Boulton, Smith & Simon, Sources
of the Crisis in Liability Insurance: An Economic Analysis, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 367, 384-85 (1988). Both
Danzon and Abraham argue that the "insurance cycles" hypothesis cannot fully account for the increase
in insurance prices and decrease in availability. P. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 107 (1985);
Abraham, Making Sense of the Liability Crisis, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 399, 400-01 (1987) [hereinafter Abraham,
Liability Crisis]. Another explanation is that state regulation was so severe that it caused a breakdown in
the market for liability insurance. Clarke, Warren-Boulton, Smith & Simon, supra, at 386-89. This
explanation is implausible, however, since state regulation did not change in any systematic way prior to
the insurance crisis. Id. at 388-89.
23. TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP, 1987 UPDATE, supra note 1, at 2, 97 (linking the crisis to
changes in tort law); Trebilcock, The Role of Insurance Considerations in the Choice of Efficient Civil
Liability Rules, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 249 (1988) [hereinafter Trebilcock, Insurance Considerations]
(same); Clarke, Warren-Boulton, Smith & Simon, supra note 22, at 389-95 (1988) (same); Epstein,
Shooting the Insurance Messenger, Chi. Tribune, May 30, 1986, § 1, at 25, col. 1 (same).
24. It is tempting to call what others have deemed the "liability crisis" the "liabilityjuncture," because
authors sometimes seem to rely on the term "crisis" to carry the normative burden of their arguments. Cf.
T. MARMOR & J. MASHAW, SOCIAL SECURITY: BEYOND THE RHETORIC OF CRISIS 4 (1988) ("Our
governmental institutions fragment attention in an already diverse polity, making regular incremental
adjustment difficult and thoughtful reassessment nearly impossible .... Thus those who want action...
resort to cries of 'crisis' to prompt action."). Because the term is now widely accepted, however, we will
continue to use it.
A few have resisted characterizing recent changes in tort law and insurance markets as a "crisis."
Indeed, Viscusi has written:
The so-called liability "crisis" of the 1980s is simply a reflection of the market response to the
increased costs imposed by tort liability. Decisions to discontinue products that are the subject
of litigation are rational responses to changing economic circumstances. Such changes are not
necessarily evidence of a crisis. The analysis needed to determine whether a crisis exists, or
whether an efficient redistribution of risky activities is taking place, must involve an evaluation
of the tort system and of how the liability insurance market functions.
Viscusi, Diminished Role, supra note 14, at 82. The purpose of this Article is to provide just such an
analysis.
25. Expressing the latter belief, scholars frequently offer the insurance crisis as evidence of the
inefficiencies of our products liability regime. See R. COOTER & T. ULEN, supra note 1, at 447; Priest,
Compensation for Personal Injury in the United States, in COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY IN
SWEDEN AND OTHER COUNTRIS 127-28 (J. Hellner ed. 1988) [hereinafter Priest, Compensation]; TORT
POLICY WORKING GROUP, REPORT ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT, AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT
CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILrrY AND AFFORDABILITY 30 (1986) [hereinafter TORT POLICY WORKING
GROUP, 1986 REPORT].
What Liability Crisis?
Today, no one seems to doubt that products liability is in need of
drastic reform.26 The energetic, theoretical debate over the comparative deter-
rence effects of different products liability standards has all but disappeared.27
The energies of tort theorists have been devoted instead to articulating the
sources of the crisis and proposing specific reforms.28 Although their specific
recommendations differ, scholars are now telling lawmakers that the move-
ments toward enterprise liability have, contrary to the predictions and good
intentions of the "founders,"29 thwarted the deterrence and insurance goals
of modern products liability. They argue that these goals can be realized only
by moving away from enterprise liability back toward principles of contract
and negligence.3" These scholars are, to revive Prosser's metaphor, urging
courts to rebuild the Citadel."
Among others, Kenneth Abraham,32  Patricia Danzon," Richard
Epstein,34  Peter Huber,35  George Priest, 6  Alan Schwartz,37  Michael
26. Epstein, Insurance Market, supra note 1, at 645. (present products liability regime not supported
by "adequate theoretical foundation"); TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP, 1987 UPDATE, supra note 1, at
3-4 (recommending "fundamental reforms of tort law"). See generally LIABILITY: PERSPECTIVES AND
POLICY (R. Litan & C. Winston ed. 1988) [hereinafter LIABILITY: PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY] (essays
describing and attempting to explain the crises in tort law and in the market for commercial casualty
insurance and proposing reform); P. HUBER, supra note 1 (1988). Numerous law journal articles have
addressed this topic. Indeed, several law journals have dedicated symposium issues to it. See, e.g.,
Symposium, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 399 (1987); Tort Reform Symposium, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 795 (1987);
Perspectives on the Insurance Crisis: Symposium, 5 YALE J. ON REG. (1988); 1987 Texas Tort Reform:
The Quest for a Fairer and More Predictable Texas Civil Justice System, 25 Hous. L. REv. 59 (1988).
27. Contributions to that debate include Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL
STUD. 323 (1973); Diamond, Accident Law and Resource Allocation, 5 BELL J. ECON. 366 (1974); Grady,
A New Positive Economic Theory of Negligence, 92 YALE L.J. 799 (1983); Landes & Posner, The Positive
Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851 (1981) [hereinafter Landes & Posner, Tort Law];
Shavell, Strict Liability versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980) [hereinafter Shavell, StrictLiability].
28. Indeed, the American Law Institute is reviewing and developing proposals for reform of the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COMPENSATION AND
LIABILITY FOR PRODUCT AND PROCESS INJURIES: PROGRESS REPORT 26-27 (April 13, 1987).
29. See P. HUBER, supra note 1 (using the term "founders" to refer to the previous generation of
products liability scholars, who endorsed and perhaps instigated the shift toward enterprise liability); Priest,
Modem Reform, supra note 17, at 5 (same).
30. Scholars disagree about what the optimal liability rule would be, and, for any given liability rule,
they disagree about the extent to which manufacturers and consumers should be permitted to contract around
the liability rule. In general, however, most believe that the liability rule should be more like negligence
and less like absolute liability than it now is, and that contract should play a more important role than it
now does. For an analysis of several scholars' views on these issues, see S. Croley & J. Hanson, Under-
standing Products Liability, supra note 1.
31. See supra note 9 (explaining Prosser's citadel metaphor).
32. Abraham, Liability Crisis, supra note 22; Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of
Insurance, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 942 (1988) [hereinafter Abraham, Environmental Liability].
33. See P. Danzon, A Second Look at Tort Reform (paper prepared for the Round Table on Tort
Reform, sponsored by the Institute for Law and Economics, University of Pennsylvania, April 27, 1990)
[hereinafter P. Danzon, Second Look at Tort Reform]; see also Danzon, Tort Reform and the Role of
Government in Private Insurance Markets, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 517 (1984) [hereinafter Danzon, Tort
Reform] (volatility of legal rules creates nondiversifiable risk which in turn substantially raises costs of
liability insurance); Danzon, Comments on Landes & Posner: A Positive Economic Analysis of Products
Liability, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 569, 574 (1985) ("[Tlhe costs of insurance are unnecessarily high because
the courts have, misguidedly, used the tort system as a vehicle for social insurance.").
34. Among other things, Epstein argues that there is a "tension between the customary judicial belief
that liability insurance justifies extended tort liability [and] the recent failures of insurance markets."
Epstein, Insurance Market, supra note 1, at 645.
35. Huber summarizes his view as follows:
The legal system, often as random and capricious as the accident itself, yields less insurance
and-perversely-still more accidents.... A cure is at hand, if we can find judges willing to
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Trebilcock, 8 and Ralph Winter39 have, based on a set of related arguments,
provided courts and legislators with blueprints for the Citadel's reconstruc-
tion.4" These commentators have had a powerful influence on the shape and
direction of products liability, 4' yet their views have received surprisingly
little criticism.42
B. Challenging the Consensus
In the hope of reviving the debate about the direction that products liability
should take, this Article critically examines the arguments for products liability
reform. It provides an alternative explanation for the empirical phenomena that
appear to have convinced commentators, courts, and legislatures that there has
been a liability crisis and that there is need for reform. This Article concludes
that courts should complete the shift toward enterprise liability. This subject
administer it ....
What's to be done? ... [For] fundamental change, we must rebuild the law of accidents
around ancient time-tested principles of consent, cooperation, and a robust law of contract.
Huber, Insurance, Not Lawsuits, for the Accident Prone, Wall St. J., Sept. 28, 1988, at 24, col. 3; see
P. HUBER, supra note 1, at 224-27.
36. See infra note 47.
37. See Schwartz, Proposals, supra note 10. After criticizing current doctrines and proposing reform,
Schwartz concludes that "U]udges should recognize the imprudence of driving further along what may be
the wrong road." Id. at 415.
38. See Trebilcock, The Social Insurance-Deterrence Dilemma of Modem North American Tort Law:
A Canadian Perspective on the Liability Insurance Crisis, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 929 (1987) [hereinafter
Trebilcock, Insurance-Deterrence Dilemma].
39. See Winter, The Liability Crisis and the Dynamics of Competitive Insurance Markets, 5 YALE J.
ON REG. 455, 458 (1987) (concluding that the "onus of improving performance of the liability insurance
markets lies with stabilizing the environment of the market through tort reform, not insurance regulation.").
40. See also S. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW (1989); Berger, The Impact
of Tort Law Development on Insurance: The Availability/Affordability Crisis and its Potential Solutions,
37 AM. U.L. REV. 285 (1988); Clarke, Warren-Boulton, Smith & Simon, supra note 22; Litan, Swire &
Winston, supra note 15, at 1-15; O'Connell, A Correct Diagnosis of the Ills of Liability Insurance--and
a False Cure: A Comment on the Reports of the Federal Tort Policy Working Group, 63 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 161, 172 (1988); Siliciano, Negligent Accounting and the Limits of Instrumental Tort Reform, 86
MICH. L. REV. 1929 (1988); TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP, 1986 REPORT, supra note 25; S. 100, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 5, 6 (1985); Viscusi, Diminished Role, supra note 14, at 67; Viscusi, Wading Through,
supra note 16.
41. See, e.g., Henderson & Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability:An Empirical Study
of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REV. 479 (1990) (providing evidence that courts have been quietly moving
back toward more traditional products liability rules since the mid-1980s); Labaton, supra note 20, at D2
(quoting Epstein: "There is no question that at the appellate level, there has been some winding down in
the last three years. Plaintiffs don't walk over defendants anymore. It's a different game now."); Rabin,
Indeterminate Risk, supra note 17, at 635-36 ("the process of retrenchment has already begun"); Courts
May Have to Lead Product Liability Reform, Wall St. J., Nov. 9, 1989 (discussing impact of scholarship
on increasing the chance of fundamental judicial restructuring of products liability). In addition, almost
every state has passed legislation in response to the crisis. Priest, Modem Reform, supra note 18, at 3-5
(describing state reform statutes); Sanders & Joyce, "Off to the Races": The 1980s Tort Crisis and the Law
Reform Process, 27 Hous. L. REV. 207, 218-23 (1990) (summarizing provisions of tort reform legislation
adopted in 48 jurisdictions between 1985 and 1988).
42. In a review of Huber's book, Sugarman states: "I find Huber's portrayal pretty convincing....
Since his case depends upon a factual assessment of the impact of tort law we now need defenders of the
system to paint a contrasting picture." Sugarman, Damage Control (Book Review), A.B.A. J. 130-31 (May
1989) (reviewing P. HUBER, supra note 1). Huber's book, however, is not without its critics. See Haga,
Civil Compensation and its Discontents: A Response to Huber (Book Review), 42 STAN. L. REV. 539
(1990); Page, Deforming Tort Reform (Book Review), 78 GEO. L.J. 649 (1990).
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is of more than historical interest; products liability remains an "explosive"
area.
43
The alternative explanation that this Article provides can be summarized
roughly as follows. Recent events in consumer product markets-in particular,
the withdrawal of some products and price increases for others-are largely
the welcome result of efficient changes in products liability law. Expanded
manufacturer liability has resulted in the internalization of two significant
externalities. Before the expansion of liability, consumers and manufacturers
did not take into full account the nonpecuniary costs of product-caused injuries.
Those costs were, in effect, externalized upon the unlucky consumers who
happened to suffer product-caused injuries. Similarly, prior to the expansion,
consumers did not take into full account the pecuniary costs of product acci-
dents for which they were insured. That was true because first-party insurers
rarely and imperfectly adjust premiums according to a consumer's decisions
about which and how many products to consume, and about how carefully to
consume them. Consequently, consumers externalized part of the costs of their
consumption choices upon their fellow first-party insureds. This second
externality, like the first, led consumers and manufacturers to under-invest in
accident prevention.
Following the expansion of manufacturer liability, injured consumers more
often recovered from manufacturers for the nonpecuniary as well as the pecuni-
ary costs of product accidents. To avoid liability, manufacturers increased their
investments in safety, driving up the nominal price of their products. And to
cover their liability costs for any accidents that they could not efficiently
prevent, manufacturers had to raise prices. Consequently, product prices rose
to reflect more closely real costs. Once price increases forced consumers to
internalize the full costs of product accidents, consumption patterns changed,
and the market for some products disappeared altogether.
Recent reverberations in the liability insurance market represent welcome
market responses to the efficient expansions in manufacturer liability. Greater
use of policy exclusions and copayment mechanisms, for instance, reflects
insurers' efforts to combat moral hazard by ensuring that manufacturer-
insureds make all cost-justified investments in accident prevention. The move-
ment of insureds to alternative forms of liability insurance such as mutuals (or
risk retention groups) does not reflect a "breakdown" in liability insurance
43. See Wald, The Realpolitik of Judicial Review in a Deregulation Era, 5 J. POL'Y ANAL. & MGMT.
535, 544 (1986).
Although reforms have already occurred in most jurisdictions, see supra note 41, the reforms have
been neither systematic nor comprehensive. See Rabin, Some Reflections on the Process of Tort Law, 25
SAN DIEGo L. REV. 13, 19 (1988). But systematic change may be imminent. Even Vice President Dan
Quayle is calling for federal laws to limit products liability awards. See Meier, Product Dead-Ended by
Liability Fears, N.Y. Times, May 19, 1990, § 1, at 50, col. 3. And recently there has been "[a] titanic
struggle under way in Congress over legislation that would overhaul product-liability law." Abramson,
Product-Liability Bill Provides OpportunityforLong-Term Milking of PACs by Congress, Wall St. J., June
21, 1990, at A16, col. 1.
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markets. On the contrary, changes in products liability law altered the relation-
ship between liability insurers and their insureds, such that mutuals became
the most efficient form of insurance for some insureds. Simply put, these
alternative forms of organization provided insureds (that is, member manufac-
turers) with a superior means of coping with moral hazard and socio-legal
uncertainty. This alternative explanation is presented more fully in Parts III
and IV below.
C. Overview
In developing its criticism of the current reform movement, this article
focuses mainly on the scholarship of Professor George L. Priest. In his promi-
nent academic career, Professor Priest has written many articles criticizing the
premises upon which the shift toward enterprise liability was originally
based," describing the adverse effects of that shift,45 and calling for judicial
reform of the current regime.' There is little question that Priest has provid-
ed the most comprehensive account of the liability crisis,47 and he is duly
44. See, e.g., Priest, Modem Reform, supra note 17, at 1 ("Today we are beginning to learn that the
presuppositions upon which [modern tort law] was built are flawed, and that this transformation of the law
has adversely affected the welfare of U.S. citizens."); id. at 10 ("IThe modem implementation of the goals
of accident reduction and compensation insurance is built upon two empirical presuppositions which the
founders thought to be true but which, regrettably, are false, indeed dangerously false.").
45. See, e.g., id. at 5 ("[Allthough the founders of our modem tort regime embraced the goals of
accident reduction and compensation, the elaboration of modem law in recent years has lost sight of these
goals, and has ignored what can and what cannot be effectively accomplished through common law rules.
As a consequence,... modem tort law as currently defined largely thwarts the accident reduction and
compensation objectives."); id. at 5-6 ("[A]lthough modem tort law is committed to accident reduction
and compensation, it does a scandalously poor job of controlling the accident rate and an even poorer job
of providing compensation to the injured."); id. at 8 ("[Tlhe goals of the [modem] law are unexceptionable,
but the methods through which the law is to be implemented are counterproductive and reduce the welfare
of consumers and the welfare of poor and low-income consumers most of all.); id. at 10 ("[M]odern law
: * . has disrupted liability insurance markets and has led to a reduction in the total level of accident
insurance available in the society.").
46. See, e.g., Discussion Session Three, supra note 14, at 2330 (remarks by Priest) ("I hope to
delegitimate the regime by showing the mundane sources of the revolution. The revolution owed its origin
to ideas that ought to be reconsidered."); Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1589-90 ("In my view,
modem tort law provides inadequate controls on the accident rate and simultaneously creates a tort law
insurance regime that disrupts insurance markets and harms the poor. The objectives of tort law reform
are uncontroversial: to reduce the accident rate and to provide a more coherent and comprehensive regime
of compensation insurance. [To achieve these objectives,] modem tort law must be reformed systematically:
by a complete redefinition of liability standards to better achieve accident reduction and insurance."); Priest,
Modem Reform, supra note 17, at 5-6 ("If our society is seriously interested in accident reduction and
compensation insurance, modem tort law must be vastly reorganized. . .).
47. Priest's articles that are relevant to the topic include the following: Priest, A Theory of the
Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297 (1981) [hereinafter Priest, Warranty]; Priest, Punitive
Damages and Enterprise Liability, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 123 (1982); Peterson & Priest, The Civil Jury:
Trends in Trials and Verdicts, Cook County, Illinois, 1960-79, 32 FED'N INS. COUNSEL Q. 361 (1982);
Priest, Will Uniform Legislation Increase or Decrease the Rate of Injuries from Product Defects?, in
PRODUCT LIABILTY AND TORT LAW REFORM 7 (1982); Priest, The Best Evidence ofthe Effect of Products
Liability Law on the Accident Rate: Reply, 91 YALE L.J. 1386 (1982); Priest, Law and Economics and
Law Reform: Comment on Barth's Cancer Compensation Proposal, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 587 (1984); G.
Calabresi & G. Priest, Commentary on the Dodd and Gorton Amendments to S-100 (The Kasten Bill)
(Program in Civil Liability, Yale Law School, Working Paper No. 34, June 1985) (unpublished manu-
script); Priest, Enterprise Liability, supra note 1; Priest, Compensation Systems and Tort Law: A Prelimi-
nary Comparative Approach, in RISK, COMPENSATION AND LIABILrrY: THE PoLiCY CHOICES 161 (1986);
Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19; Priest, Puzzles of the Tort Crisis, 48 OHIO STATE L.J. 497 (1987)
[hereinafter Priest, Puzzles]; Priest, Modem Reform, supra note 17; Priest, The Liability Crisis, 34 YALE
10
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recognized as one of the most influential scholars in the field." Therefore,
this Article takes Priest's scholarship as its focal point. But because other
scholars of the crisis movement offer arguments very similar to Priest's and
rely on many of his conclusions, what follows largely applies to them as well.
By calling into question the prevailing view of the "liability crisis," this
Article aims to unsettle the current consensus. Disarming those calling for
reform is, however, a secondary goal. The primary objective of this Article
is to show that where products liability law has shifted toward enterprise
liability, the changes brought about by that shift have been efficient. If it is
not too late for the law to move still closer to an enterprise liability regime,
this Article concludes, it should move in that direction with confidence.
Part I begins by distinguishing two products liability regimes-enterprise
liability and negligence. It then presents. and critically assesses three compo-
nents common to most explanations for the liability crisis: (1) the high admin-
istrative costs of an enterprise liability regime; (2) the inefficiencies of award-
ing damages for nonpecuniary losses; and (3) the inability of manufacturers
and third-party insurers to combat the problem of moral hazard.
Part II focuses on the core of Priest's theory, his characterization of insur-
ance risk pools-what they are, how they are maintained, and why they have
recently "unravelled." Part II scrutinizes Priest's argument concerning the
negative effects of adverse selection in the context of insurance risk pools and
his claim that the crisis is primarily the result of such unravelling.
Parts III and IV offer an alternative explanation for the insurance crisis.
Part III argues that recent events were not a "crisis" but rather a welcome
consequence of efficiency-enhancing changes in the law. Part IV then evaluates
the competing explanations-Priest's "unravelling theory" and the alternative
L. REP. 2 (1987) [hereinafter Priest, Liability Crisis]; Priest, Satisfying the Multiple Goals of Tort Law,
22 VAL. U.L. REV. 643 (1988); Priest, Products Liability Law and the Accident Rate, in LIABILITY:
PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY, supra note 26, at 184; Priest, Compensation, supra note 25; Priest, Under-
standing the Liability Crisis, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN LBLITrY LAW 196 (W. Olson ed. 1988) [hereinafter
Priest, Understanding the Crisis]; Priest, The Disappearance of the Consumer From Modem Products
Liability Law, in THE FRONTIER OF RESEARCH IN THE CONSUMER INTEREST 771 (Maynes ed. 1988); Priest,
Statement Dissenting and Concurring, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO
IMPROVE THE LIABILITY INSURANCE SYSTEM at F-1 (1989); Priest, The Antitrust Suits and the Public
Understanding of Insurance, 63 TUL. L. REV. 999 (1989); Priest, Original Intent, supra note 4; Priest,
La Controrivoluzione nelDirittoDella Responsibilita 'da Prodotti Negli Stati Uniti dAmerica, 114 IL FORO
ITALANO 119 (1989) (The Counter-Revolution in ProductsLiability in the United States); Priest, Insurability
and Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1009 (1989); Priest, The Modem Irony of Civil Law: A Memoir
of Strict Products Liability in the United States, 9 TEL-AvIv. U. STUD. IN LAW 93 (1989); Priest, The
Continuing Crisis in Liability, 3 PROD. LIABILITY L. REV. 243 (1989); Priest, Crisis Comes to the Insurers:
The Modem Misunderstanding ofinsurance Policy, in VOLUME III, INSURANCE LAW ANTHOLOGY (1988);
Priest, Tort Law, Insurance, and the Insurance Crisis, in MAKINO SENSE OF TORT LAW, THE WORLD AND
I at 522 (Criner ed. 1988); Priest, The New Legal Structure of Risk Control, 119 DAEDALUS 207 (1990)
[hereinafter Priest, Risk Control]; Priest, Tort-Reform Legislation... Is Only a Start, Wall St. J., Feb.
11, 1987, at 26; Commentary, The (Pop-Gun) WarAgainst the Insurers, Hartford Courant, June 26, 1988,
at CI; Priest, How to Control Liability Costs, FORTUNE, April 24, 1989, at 323 [hereinafter Priest, Liability
Costs].
48. Priest is commonly named as the most, or one of the most, important participants in this literature.
See S. SUGARMAN, supra note 39, at 80-82 (1982); Ayres & Siegelmani The Economics of the Insurance
Antitrust Suits: Toward an Exclusionary Theory, 63 TuL. L. REV. 971, 972 (1989); Schwartz, Proposals,
supra note 10, at 354 n.2; Sanders & Joyce, supra note 41, at 223-26.
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"internalizing theory" presented in Part III-by comparing their respective
abilities to explain the empirical phenomena associated with the "crisis."
I. First-Party Insurance versus Manufacturer-Provided Insurance
A. Introduction to Part I: Distinguishing Regimes
Most legal economists agree that an efficient products liability regime
would accomplish two economic goals. First, it would encourage parties to
prevent all accidents that can be efficiently prevented (the "deterrence" goal).
Second, it would efficiently allocate the risk of unprevented accident costs (the
"insurance" goal)."
In Priest's view, the trend away from negligence toward enterprise liability
has not helped to deter injuries caused by manufacturers' products.5° Theoret-
ically at least, deterrence would be optimal under either a negligence or an
enterprise liability regime, because manufacturers have sufficient incentives
under either regime to prevent all accidents that they can efficiently prevent.5"
Priest believes that the only difference between the two regimes is which party
bears the burden of insuring against accidents that manufacturers cannot
efficiently prevent: under negligence, consumers bear the burden of insuring
against such accidents, and they respond by purchasing first-party insurance,
whereas, under enterprise liability, manufacturers provide insurance with their
products which consumers pay for as part of a product's price. Thus, the
choice between liability rules amounts to little more than a choice between
insurance mechanisms.
The question becomes crucial, then, whether first-party or manufacturer-
provided insurance is more efficient. According to Priest, those who promoted
the expansion of manufacturer liability wrongly presumed that manufacturer-
provided insurance is more efficient. 2 Courts believed that "risk spreading
can best be provided by manufacturers, rather than by consumers in private
insurance markets, because manufacturers can easily collect a small insurance
49. Legal economists commonly emphasize the distinction between the deterrence and insurance
components of a liability rule. See, e.g., P. DANZON, supra note 22, at 3; Calfee & Winston, Economic
Aspects of Liability Rules and Liability Insurance, in LIABILITY: PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY, supra note
26; Danzon, Tort Reform, supra note 33, at 518 (1984); Graham & Pierce, Contingent Damages for
Products Liability, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 441, 441 (1984); Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1537.
50. Indeed, Priest has suggested that the trend may have caused an increase in the number of accidents.
Priest, Warranty, supra note 47, at 1350-51. This is not to say, however, that Priest considers the old
regime to be the most efficient of all possible regimes. See infra note 88.
51. Priest, however, does not consider research and development issues sometimes emphasized by
proponents of enterprise liability. Priest, Modem Reform, supra note 17, at 9-10. See generally Calabresi
&Hirschoff, Toward a TestforStrictLiabilityin Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1063 (1972) (discussing effects
of liability rules on research and development); R. COOTER & T. ULEN, supra note 1, at 367 (same).
52. See Priest, Understanding the Crisis, supra note 47, at 204 ("The extension of liability to achieve
insurance ends ... is the most likely explanation for the tremendous growth in tort litigation.").
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premium in the price charged for the product. "5 3 Because manufacturers were
believed to have provided inadequate insurance coverage in their warranties,
courts decided that the law should require them to provide adequate coverage.
Priest argues, however, that recent "crisis" phenomena belie courts' earlier
assumptions about the efficiency of manufacturer-provided insurance.
According to Priest, manufacturer-provided insurance is, for several reasons,
less efficient than first-party insurance.54 First, by forcing manufacturers to
compensate consumers for injuries that manufacturers cannot efficiently
prevent, the current regime forces manufacturers to provide consumers with
insurance5 that consumers do not demand."6  Consumers neither need nor
want manufacturer-provided insurance because they have their own health and
disability insurance57 and are thus covered if they suffer a product-related
injury.
Furthermore, Priest argues that the shift from first-party to manufacturer-
provided insurance actually impaired insurance markets." Although courts
and legal scholars assumed that manufacturers could either self-insure or buy
commercial liability insurance and then simply add the cost of legal exposure
to the price of their products and services, Priest argues that such an assump-
tion reflected a naive over-simplification of the relationship between tort law
53. Priest, Enterprise Liability, supra note 1, at 520; see also Priest, Modem Reform, supra note 17,
at 7, 14-15.
54. Others also have argued that products liability law is an undesirable form of insurance. See, e.g.,
P. HUBER, supra note 1, at 98-115; Atiyah, No-Fault Compensation: A Question That Will Not Go Away,
54 TuL. L. REV. 271, 280-88 (1980); Epstein, Insurance Market, supra note 1; Fleming, Is There a Future
for Tort?, 44 LA. L. REV. 1193, 1203-07 (1984); Sugarman, Doing Away With Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L.
REV. 558, 592-96 (1985); Viscusi, Product Liability and Regulation: Establishing the Appropriate
Institutional Division of Labor, 78 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS) 300, 303-04 (1988)
[hereinafter Viscusi, Product Liability and Regulation]; Viscusi, Wading Through, supra note 16, at 10.
55. Priest writes: "If the [court] determines that neither party could have prevented the loss in a cost-
effective manner, then the resolution of the dispute in favor of the plaintiff or the defendant serves only
to determine which party is to be the insurer for the loss . . . . Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19,
at 1537.
56. Discussion Session Three, supra note 14, at 2338 (remarks by Priest).
57. For the sake of argument, this Article accepts Priest's assumption that consumers have first-party
insurance against the risks of product-related injuries. Priest claims that only a tiny fraction of the American
population is without some form of basic health and disability insurance, and that fraction-consisting of
"occasional workers, transients, and the homeless"-is not central to the policy issues at stake. Priest,
Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1552, 1586-87; see also Priest, Modem Reform, supra note 17, at 5,
18-20; Priest, Liability Crisis, supra note 47, at 4-5; Priest, Understanding the Crisis, supra note 47, at
204-07; Priest, Compensation, supra note 25, at 133-38; Priest, Liability Costs, supra note 47, at 323-24.
Tort scholars generally seem to accept the proposition that consumers are, for the most part, insured against
the pecuniary costs of product injuries. See, e.g., P. DANZON, supra note 22, at 14; W. LANDES & R.
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987); Viscusi, Product Liability and Regulation,
supra note 54, at 303 (rationale for strict liability is anachronistic, inasmuch as it "was developed before
the advent of Medicare and Medicaid, the increase in workers' compensation benefit levels, and the
extensive health and life insurance coverage of the American work force. "). However, first-party insurance
may be much less widespread than these scholars assume. See Gold, The Struggle to Make Do Without
Health Insurance, N. Y. Times, July 30, 1989, at 1 (37 million persons in America lack medical insurance,
and 88% of the uninsured are working people and their families); Moyer, A Revised Look at the Number
of Uninsured Americans, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Summer 1989, at 102, 104-05 (31.1 to 36.8 million persons
uninsured in America); Waldman, The Insurance Mess, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 23, 1990, at 46.
58. Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1550-61; Priest, Liability Crisis, supra note 47, at 5-6;
Priest, Liability Costs, supra note 47, at 323.
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and third-party insurance markets.5 9 The "extension of tort law," Priest
argues, has "led to a withdrawal of commercial insurance capacity. "60 Priest
believes that third-party insurance provided through the tort system
differs systematically from first-party insurance in ways that work to
undermine insurance markets: [1] third-party insurance is much more
costly to administer; [2] it provides far more and different coverage
than consumers would choose to buy voluntarily; and [3] perhaps most
important, it disrupts efforts to distinguish high-risk from low-risk
customers, a distinction that makes the business of insurance possi-
ble.61
For these three reasons, Priest urges courts to adopt his proposed cost-benefit
negligence standard. 2 These purported differences between first-party and
manufacturer-provided insurance are examined in turn.
B. Three Purported Shortcomings of Manufacturer-Provided Insurance
1. Administrative Costs
Critics of the current regime commonly argue that manufacturer-provided
insurance is much more costly to administer than first-party insurance is.
Professor Priest writes:
The administrative costs of insurance delivered through tort law are
vastly greater than the administrative costs of any first-party insurance
regime. Blue Cross-Blue Shield first-party health insurance administra-
tive costs are 10% of benefits; SSI disability insurance administrative
costs are 8% of benefits; Workers' Compensation disability insurance
administrative costs are (a much-criticized) 21 % of benefits. In con-
59. Priest explains:
The failure of the insurance enterprise is tragic because it appears to be an artifact of the form
of insurance delivery.... It appears... to be the consequence of a misguided attempt of judges
to increase insurance capacity by enlisting the tort system as an additional insurance source. The
expansion of tort system insurance, however, has not significantly broadened insurance coverage;
it has undermined it.
Priest, Liability Crisis, supra note 47, at 7; see also Priest, Modern Reform, supra note 17, at 14-15.
60. Priest, Understanding the Crisis, supra note 47, at 204.
61. Id. at 207; see also Priest, Accident Rate, supra note 47, at 185-86 (making similar claim); Priest,
Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1526 (same); Priest, Modern Reform, supra note 17, at 10 (same);
Priest, Liability Costs, supra note 47, at 323 (same).
62. "It is these basic differences between first- and third-party compensation insurance coverage that
account for the recent insurance availability crisis in the United States." Priest, Compensation, supra note
25, at 140; see also Priest, Liability Costs, supra note 47, at 323 (same). Sugarman too has called for a
substitution of first-party insurance in place of manufacturer-provided insurance. See Sugarman, Taking
Advantage of the Torts Crisis, 48 01110 ST. L. 1. 329 (1987).
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trast, tort law administrative costs are estimated to be 53 % of net
plaintiff benefits.63
Although these statistics show that administering tort law is currently costly,
indeed more costly than administering first-party insurance,64 they do not
support the conclusion that a negligence regime is less costly to administer than
an enterprise liability regime.
As noted above, Priest believes that negligence and enterprise liability each
provide optimal deterrence because each encourages parties to prevent all
preventable accidents (that is, all accidents that can be prevented cost-justifi-
ably). Accordingly, when comparing the administrative costs of the insurance
provided under the two regimes, he focuses on the costs of administering
claims for unpreventable accidents that occur under either regime. In compar-
ing administrative costs, in other words, Priest is concerned with only the
following question: Which regime between enterprise liability qua insurance
and first-party insurance administers unpreventable accident claims less expen-
sively?
Before examining Priest's answer to this question, it is important to point
out that he construes the term "preventable" narrowly, to include only those
accidents that can be cost-justifiably prevented through investments in care
("care-unpreventable" accidents).65 This definition is not standard. Legal
economists typically apply the label "preventable" to accidents that can be
prevented through cost-justifiable reductions in activity levels as well as to
accidents that can be prevented through cost-justifiable investments in care.66
At any rate, Priest's administrative-cost analysis can be criticized on
several grounds. One stems from the well-accepted argument that, as a
63. Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1560 (citing J. KAKALIK & N. PACE, COSTS AND
COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT LITIGATION (1986)); see also Priest, Compensation, supra note 25, at 140;
Priest, Liability Costs, supra note 47, at 323 (third-party insurance is "perhaps five to ten times as costly"
as first-party insurance; "[diespite the belief that third-party tort-law insurance is more efficient than first-
party coverage .... experience has shown its administrative costs to be much more substantial-by a
magnitude estimated a 2.75 to 5.75 times."); Rabin, Indeterminate Risk, supra note 16, at 639 (administra-
tive costs of tort system are "enormous"); Trebilcock, Insurance Considerations, supra note 23, at 259
(same); Viscusi, Product Liability and Regulation, supra note 54, at 304 (same); Viscusi, Wading Through,
supra note 16, at 16 (same); Viscusi, Diminished Role, supra note 14, at 95 ("product-specific insurance
within the constraints of the tort system" involves greater administrative costs). A study by Tillinghast,
an insurance industry consultant, came to the same conclusion. See Koretz, Litigation Cost is Rocketing-Its
Efficiency Isn't, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 6, 1989, at 34.
64. "Of the $29 to $36 billion total national expenditure [on tort litigation] in 1985, plaintiffs received
$21 to $25 billion in total compensation, or about $14 to $16 billion in net compensation, after deducting
all their litigation costs." J. KAKALIK & N. PACE, supra note 63, at 68.
65. See infra Part lIl(B)(2)(b) (describing difference between, and Priest's view of, activity-level effects
and care-level effects of a liability rule).
66. The accidents that Priest refers to as "unpreventable" will be referred to in this Article as "care-
unpreventable." "Unpreventable" accidents cannot be efficiently prevented through either additional
investments in care or reduced levels of activity, whereas "care-unpreventable" accidents cannot be
efficiently prevented through additional investments in care alone. When Priest argues that the number of
"unpreventable" accidents is independent of the liability rule, he means that the number of "care-
unpreventable" accidents is independent of the liability rule. As argued below, there would be fewer
accidents in an enterprise liability regime because of a decrease in activity levels. See infra Part IHl(B)(2)(b).
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theoretical matter, it is impossible to say whether a negligence regime or an
enterprise liability regime would be cheaper to administer. The argument is
straightforward. The administrative cost per case would be less in an enterprise
liability regime than in a negligence regime, because in an enterprise liability
regime courts must determine only whether the product caused the consumer's
injury, whereas in a negligence regime courts also have to determine whether
the manufacturer or the injured consumer could have prevented the accident
at least cost.67 Yet there would be a larger number of cases litigated in an
enterprise liability regime, assuming as Priest does that both regimes left the
same number of accidents unprevented. Analytically, it is unclear whether the
"cost-per-case effect" would outweigh the "quantity effect."68
A second shortcoming of Priest's conclusions regarding administrative costs
is that it is incomplete in that it fails to consider the total administrative costs
of the regimes in question. The total administrative costs of any liability regime
include the costs of negotiation, settlement, and litigation, as well as the costs
of processing first-party and third-party insurance claims. Priest, however,
focuses solely on the administrative costs of litigation, and then only on the
administrative costs of litigating liability for care-unpreventable accidents.
Furthermore, the cost of administering the current tort system may not be
an accurate measure of the costs of administering an enterprise liability regime.
After all, the current regime is administered much like a negligence regime
in which expensive cost-benefit analyses must be conducted.69 If courts fully
adopted an enterprise liability rule (under which the administrative cost per
case would be reduced) the total administrative costs of the tort system could
well decline.
Additionally, adoption of a clear and stable liability standard would further
reduce administrative costs by alleviating uncertainty among interested parties
67. R. COOTER & T. ULEN, supra note 1, at 367-68; P. DANZON, supra note 22, at 16, 49; R.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 164, 528-29 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter R. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS]; S. SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 263-64 (1987); Coleman, The Structure
of Tort Law, 97 YALE L.J. 1233, 1234 n.5 (1988); Epstein, Unintended Revolution, supra note 1, at 2202;
Landes & Posner, Products Liability, supra note 1, at 550; Posner, StrictLiability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL
STUD. 205, 205-212 (1973); Schwartz, Proposals, supra note 10, at 395, 399; cf. Viscusi, Diminished Role,
supra note 14, at 72 (less information needed when "fault" need not be determined).
68. The argument that this quantity effect will be significant depends on two debatable assumptions.
First, it assumes that potential consumer-plaintiffs under a negligence regime can, without engaging the
litigation process, know when the manufacturer was not the least-cost preventer of the accident. See infra
text accompanying notes 71-73. Second, it assumes that there would be the same number of unprevented
accidents under a negligence regime as under an enterprise liability regime; otherwise, there could be a
large enough number of injuries prevented under an enterprise liability regime-injuries that would not
have been prevented under a negligence regime-to overcome the increased quantity of product-caused
injuries that would be litigated under an enterprise liability regime. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS,
supra note 67, at 164; Landes & Posner, Tort Law, supra note 1, at 550.
69. Priest, Accident Rate, supra note 47, at 195-96. The point is even stronger given that Priest
proposes that courts adopt a "more rigorous formulation of cost-benefit standards for products liability law"
which presumably would be more costly than our current regime to administer. Id. at 222; see also Epstein,
The Political Economy of Product Liability Reform, 78 AM. EcON. REV. (PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS) 311,
313 (1988) (arguing that our current regime is very costly to administer largely because'no legislative
reform can overcome the special interests of both plaintiffs' lawyers and defendants' lawyers who benefit
by maintaining the administrative complexity of the current common-law system).
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about future liability. Certain types of products liability cases would become
routinized and their outcomes would become more predictable, so potential
litigants would develop routine ways of disposing of claims. Fewer cases
would go to trial and the cost of handling settled claims would decrease. Thus,
insofar as our products liability regime has been expanding or changing
unpredictably, the current costs of administering that regime overstate the cost
of administering the same regime if it were stable.70
Finally, the costs of administering first-party insurance include more than
the costs of administering care-unpreventable accidents under a negligence
regime. Because it is rarely clear whether an accident was care-unpreventable,
courts are often called upon to decide this issue.7" Some litigation costs can
be properly characterized as a necessary investment in acquiring information.
That is, litigation is often the only way for injured consumers to know whether
the manufacturer could have cost-justifiably prevented the injury.72 As a
result, care-unpreventable accidents would involve substantial litigation and
settlement expenses under a negligence regime, in addition to the expense of
processing first-party insurance claims.73 Priest's comparison, however, disre-
gards the litigation costs under a negligence regime.
2. Damage Awards for Nonpecuniary Losses
The second source of the liability crisis, according to Priest, is that courts,
by awarding damages for nonpecuniary losses, have forced upon consumers
an undesirable insurance contract.74 Yet Priest does not recommend that
nonpecuniary-loss damage awards be prohibited altogether.
70. See Miller & Sarat, Grievances, Claims and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW
& Soc'y REV. 525 (1980-1981). Such a routinization process took place, for example, in workers'
compensation cases in the early 1900s. See Friedman, Civil Wrongs: Personal Injury Law in the Late 19th
Century, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 351, 375-77. Similarly, automobile accident cases eventually came
to be handled in an almost ministerial fashion. L. Ross, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS
OF INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENT 60-61 (1970).
71. See J. HENDERSON & A. TWERSKI, PRODUCTS LIABILITY: PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 78-79 (1987)
("The negligence standard is necessarily vague, and even reasonable persons can disagree over whether
manufacturers have been negligent. And proof regarding what actually happened is frequently not available.
Thus, trials are necessary . . . . "); Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95 HARV.
L. REV. 1717, 1720 (1982) ("It is ... rarely easy to identify the cheapest-cost avoider.").
72. Only after a consumer has filed suit does the consumer enjoy access-under the supervising power
of the court-to information necessary to determine whether a manufacturer could have cost-justifiably
prevented the injury. Rule 26(b)(1), for example, provides that "[plarties may obtain discovery regarding
any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved ... including the existence,
description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things."
FED. R. CIrv. P. 26(b)(1). Rules 27, 30, 31, 33, 34, and 36 provide for the discovery of information to
which a non-litigating consumer generally does not have access.
73. See infra notes 244-45 and accompanying text; see also Hanson & Logue, The First-Party
Insurance Extemality:An Economic Justificationfor EnterpriseLiability, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 123, 169-70
(1990) (discussing the difficulty of determining negligence). Epstein has argued that "Itihere is no question
that [enterprise liability] has advantages over the alternative negligence view of the subject. One factual
issue is removed from consideration at trial, and the defendant has a clearer sense of the net expenses that
it could incur from the product in question." Epstein, Unintended Revolution, supra note 1, at 2202.
74. See also P. HUBER, supra note 1, at 121-27, 137; S. SUGARMAN, supra note 39, at 39.
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Table 1
Treatment of Nonpecuniary Losses Under Negligence





Nonpecuniary Approach 1 Approach 2
Negligence Losses
Determination Exclude
Nonpecuniary Approach 3 Approach 4
Losses
To understand Priest's position, it is necessary to consider the different
ways that nonpecuniary losses can be treated under a negligence liability rule.
Applying any liability rule requires determining, first, who is liable for an
injury and, second, if someone other than the victim is held liable, how much
should be paid. Because Priest proposes a negligence standard, there are four
approaches to nonpecuniary losses that he could possibly support. They are
depicted in Table 1. Approach 1 would include nonpecuniary losses in deter-
mining whether a manufacturer was negligent (the "negligence determina-
tion")-that is, it would count nonpecuniary losses as costs in the cost-benefit
calculation to determine negligence-and it would include nonpecuniary losses
in the damage award if a manufacturer were found to have been negligent.
Approach 2 would also include nonpecuniary losses in the negligence determi-
nation but would exclude them from the measure of damages. Approach 3
would exclude nonpecuniary losses from the negligence determination, but
would include them in the measure of damages if the manufacturer were found
negligent. Finally, Approach 4 would exclude nonpecuniary losses from both
the negligence determination and the calculation of damages. If courts ignore
nonpecuniary losses either when when determining negligence or when
calculating damages, then manufacturers will not take nonpecuniary losses fully
into account in their production decisions.7' Put slightly differently, if manu-
facturers are not held liable for all of the nonpecuniary losses that they can
cost-justifiably prevent, then they will have suboptimal incentives to prevent
75. See R. COOTER & T. ULEN, supra note 1, at 367.
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Table 2
Deterrence Effects of Four Approaches in Table 1
Probability of Size of Level of
Being Held Liable Damage Award Deterrence
Approach 1 Optimal Optimal Optimal
Approach 2 Optimal Suboptimal Suboptimal
Approach 3 Suboptimal Optimal Suboptimal
Approach 4 Suboptimal Suboptimal Suboptimal
them.76 For this reason, courts can optimize manufacturer care only by plac-
ing on manufacturers the full costs of accidents, including the nonpecuniary
costs.' As Priest recognizes: "To obtain optimal incentives for injury preven-
tion, a party that has violated a legal standard must pay full losses to the
victim, including both pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses."78
Table 2 outlines the deterrence effects of the four approaches. Only
Approach 1 would optimize deterrence. Approach 4 would be the least efficient
because under Approach 4 manufacturers would too rarely be found negligent,
and, for those cases in which they were found negligent, damages would be
too low. Although it seems clear that Priest does not recommend Approach
76. If markets were perfect, manufacturers would have optimal incentives to prevent nonpecuniary
losses regardless of the liability standard. Even under a "no-liability" regime, manufacturers would make
all efficient investments in product safety, so long as markets were perfect. That insight, however, does
not bear on this discussion. The same point can be made regarding the treatment of pecuniary losses, yet
not even Priest recommends that courts adopt a no-liability regime. If he believed markets were perfect
he would presumably favor a no-liability regime over negligence: a no-liability regime would have zero
administrative costs, and would create none of the adverse insurance effects that Priest believes our current
regime creates. Priest must believe that market incentives, by themselves, are insufficient to ensure optimal
deterrence.
Few tort scholars have enough faith in markets to argue on behalf of a no-liability regime. Even
Chicago School legal economists Such as William Landes and Richard Posner argue that negligence or strict
liability is to be preferred to no-liability in this context. For a more complete discussion of this issue, see
S. Croley & J. Hanson, Understanding Products Liability, supra note 1.
77. W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 57, at 186-87; S. SHAVELL, supra note 67, at 133-34;
Haddock, McChesney & Spiegel, An Ordinary Economic Rationale for Extraordinary Legal Sanctions,
78 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1990); Rea, Nonpecuniary Loss and Breach of Contract, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 35,
36 (1982) [hereinafter Rea, Nonpecuniary Loss]; Trebilcock, Insurance Considerations, supra note 23, at
249; Viscusi, Diminished Role, supra note 14, at 79.
78. Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1553; see also Priest, Modem Reform, supra note 17,
at 16; Priest, Compensation, supra note 25, at 139.
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2 or Approach 3,79 his choice between Approach 1 and Approach 4 is less
obvious.
On one hand, consistent with Approach 4, Priest clearly believes that
awarding damages for nonpecuniary losses has led to significant inefficiencies
in the current regime. According to Priest, products have been withdrawn from
the market because their manufacturers have been subject to strict liability for
nonpecuniary losses and therefore have been forced to provide insurance that
consumers do not demand. 0 Priest writes:
[T]ort law third-party insurance provides coverage at excessive levels
relative to consumer demand. On average, 47 percent of a tort law
damage award represents coverage of pain and suffering. No consumers
in the world, however, want (or are willing to pay for) insurance
coverage of nonpecuniary pain and suffering. Pain and suffering does
not affect the marginal value of wealth, the equalization of which is the
purpose of insurance ....
If pain and suffering awards comprise almost half of modern tort
judgments, then, for this reason alone, tort law insurance judgments
are almost twice the magnitude that any consumer would prefer."
Thus, Priest apparently believes that nonpecuniary-loss damage awards should
be prohibited under the current regime.82
79. When scholars discuss the question of whether nonpecuniary losses should be included or excluded,
they generally consider only Approaches 1 and 4. Because no scholar has ever recommended that courts
adopt Approach 2 or Approach 3, it is unlikely that Priest implicitly supports either of these approaches.
Presumably, he would have stated such a novel proposal clearly if had he been chosen to support one of
them. If he had supported Approach 2, he would have been careful to say that he wanted nonpecuniary
losses to be included in the negligence determination; if he had supported Approach 3, he would have
indicated that he wanted damage awards to include nonpecuniary losses but wanted courts to ignore
nonpecuniary losses in making negligence determinations.
The reason for the distinction here between the negligence determination and the damages determi-
nation will become clear in Part III. See infra notes 174-82 and accompanying text.
80. Here again, Priest is joined by others. See P. HUBER, supra note 1, at 137 ("[Tjhe rate of
exchange [between injuries and dollars] is quite indeterminate for pain and suffering and loss of society
For precisely this reason, first-party insurance never covers such things .... The new rules thus
demanded ever-increasing amounts of coverage for losses that no insurer could ever accurately assess in
advance."); Trebilcock, Insurance Considerations, supra note 23, at 259 ("[The insurance rationale for
the current liability system] is ... inefficient ... because it provides forms of coverage that people would
not voluntarily buy or be provided with in first-party insurance markets.").
It is argued below that consumers may in fact demand insurance for nonpecuniary losses. See infra
Part llI(B)(2)(a).
81. Priest, Liability Crisis, supra note 47, at 5; see also Priest, Understanding the Crisis, supra note
47, at 207-08 (making similar argument); Priest, Liability Costs, supra note 47, at 323 (same).
82. See Priest, Liability Costs, supra note 47, at 324; Priest, Modem Reform, supra note 17, at 37.
Similarly, Priest argues that legislative efforts to reform products liability, including caps on nonpecuniary
losses, "constitute only partial contributions toward solutions of the problems caused by modern tort law."
The crisis will continue until these "issues are dealt with more systematically":
The insurance function must be excised from tort law altogether. None of the recent statutory
reforms achieves that effect.
A cap on non-economic [i.e., nonpecuniary] damages, for example, does shift tort damage
awards to more closely resemble levels of insurance purchased in first-party markets. In first-
party markets, however, no one purchases any coverage of non-economic losses. Thus, even if
non-economic damages in tort law are capped . . . . tort law continues to provide a very
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On the other hand, Priest clearly sees that deterrence can' only be optimized
if manufacturers are required to compensate accident victims for both pecuni-
ary and nonpecuniary losses. Priest therefore appears to propose a liability rule
consistent with Approach 1. If a manufacturer could have prevented an acci-
dent (that is, if the accident was care-preventable), then it would pay all
damages including nonpecuniary-loss damages; if the manufacturer could not
have prevented an accident, then it would pay nothing. By taking this position,
Priest can maintain his commitment to optimizing deterrence and avoid impos-
ing a strict liability rule.
3
By taking this position, however, Priest also raises difficult questions
regarding his explanation for the crisis. If he wants courts to award nonpe-
cuniary-loss damages under his proposed negligence regime, how can he argue
that courts should not have awarded them under the current regime? If it is
true that liability insurance markets broke down in part because courts began
awarding nonpecuniary-loss damages, how can we be confident that those
markets would not suffer the same problems under a negligence regime?84
substantial level of excess insurance coverage.
Similarly, limitations on punitive damages may reduce risk pool variance to some extent.
In my view, however, it is appropriate not only to restrain, but to prohibit, punitive damage
awards in product liability and other tort contexts.
Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1589; see also Priest, Compensation, supra note 25, at 141
(making same basic argument and concluding that "[c]ompensation insurance can only be stabilised and
restored in the U.S. if the insurance function of tort law is excised altogether. In today's judicial climate,
this conclusion calls for a radical reconceptualization of the basis of tort law.").
83. Priest has emphasized his commitment to the deterrence goal of products liability law. See, e.g.,
Priest, Modem Reform, supra note 17, at 5 ("Much of the debate over tort law has involved accusations
that those advocating tort reform are indifferent to the accident rate. There ought to be no grounds for battle
on this point. An unquestioning commitment to the desirability of minimizing the accident rate still compels
a drastic reorganization of the law."); see also Priest, Accident Rate, supra note 47, at 221. Others agree
that deterrence is the most important goal of the liability system. See, e.g., P. DANZON, supra note 22,
at 9 ("[Tlhe primary economic rationale for tort liability is deterrence.").
84. Priest advocates a cost-benefit negligence regime and contends that the pre- 1960s negligence regime
was not a cost-benefit negligence regime. Priest, Accident Rate, supra note 47, at 220-22. However, other
scholars disagree. See, e.g., W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 57, at 85-87; R. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS, supra note 67, at 147-60. If they are correct, then Priest's proposed cost-benefit negligence
system is equivalent to the old negligence regime.
Priest also argues that his proposed cost-benefit negligence regime would be different from the current
"strict liability" regime. Priest, Accident Rate, supra note 47, at 220-22. Yet on this point, too, other
scholars have taken a different position. See R. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 83; R. POSNER, supra note 67,
at 165 ("[Tihe term strict liability is something of a misnomer here, because in deciding whether a product
is defective or unreasonably dangerous in design or manufacture the courts often use a Hand Formula
approach, balancing expected accident costs against the costs of making the product safer."); Calabresi
& Klevorick, Four Tests for Liability in Torts, 14 J. LEGAL STuD. 585, 585 (1985) ("Taken literally,
product defect would seem to imply liability for any and all injuries that are causally linked to the product
.... Yet... that is not the thrust of strict product liability."); Landes & Posner, Products Liability, supra
note 1, at 546 ("[Mjuch of what is called strict products liability really is negligence liability .... In these
cases the analysis . . . is identical to that in negligence cases."); Schwartz, Proposals, supra note 10, at
384-88; see also authorities cited supra at notes 14, '16 and text accompanying notes 186-96.
More important, Priest's call for the adoption of his proposed negligence standard is somewhat
confusing: On one hand, he emphasizes that the standard he proposes is significantly different from the
previous negligence standard, while, on the other hand, he argues that the liability "crisis" was the
consequence of courts' deviation from the previous negligence standard. The empirical phenomena that
Priest argues constitute a "crisis" are not per se evidence of a problem, if the previous negligence standard
was not itself optimal. See P. Danzon, Second Look at Tort Reform, supra note 33, at 12. For examples
of where Priest implies that the'phenomena associated with the "crisis" constitute evidence of a crisis, see
Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1522, 1567-68.
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Priest could answer these questions only by stating explicitly the empirical
assumption upon which his "crisis" explanation implicitly depends: Most
nonpecuniary-loss damage awards made under our current regime have been
for care-unpreventable accidents. However, to the extent that nonpecuniary-loss
damage awards granted under the current regime have been for care-
preventable accidents, they would also be granted under the cost-benefit
negligence regime that Priest proposes. Priest's proposed liability rule would
significantly decrease the total amount of compensation awarded for nonpecuni-
ary losses only if the current regime awards damages for nonpecuniary losses
mainly in cases involving care-unpreventable accidents. If in fact Priest
believes that the bulk of the nonpecuniary-loss damage awards have been for
care-unpreventable accidents, then he is assuming by implication that our
current regime has had little beneficial deterrent effect.8 5
It may be helpful to make this point in slightly different terms. Priest
argues that, for insurance reasons, manufacturers should not be liable for any
nonpecuniary losses. But as he understands, optimal deterrence will often
require that the nonpecuniary costs be imposed on the manufacturer. Any
recent trend toward such an imposition is thus perfectly consistent with the
85. This implication follows from Priest's assumption that "[wihen a manufacturer has made all
practicable investments in the manufacturing process and in quality control, liability for remaining defects
involves only insurance." Priest, Accident Rate, supra note 47, at 209. Priest has expressed the empirical
assumption that our current regime has had little beneficial deterrent effect as follows: "As is well known,
[manufacturers] are very commonly held liable even though there was no effective alternative investment
that could have been made to prevent the accident." Priest, Modem Reform, supra note 17, at 12; see also
Priest, Compensation, supra note 25, at 138 ("Since the mid-1960's, the individual state courts have steadily
expanded tort liability, especially corporate tort liability in contexts of product or service use, in order to
provide a form of compensation insurance for consumers tied to the sale of the product or service."); Priest,
Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1550; Priest, Understanding the Crisis, supra note 47, at 204; Priest,
Accident Rate, supra note 47, at 222; Priest, Risk Control. supra note 47, at 222-23.
Priest and others calling for products liability reform tend to emphasize only the insurance justifications
for legal doctrines that could instead be justified primarily on deterrence grounds. See Priest, Modem
Reform, supra note 17, at 36 ("The only grounds that can justify absolute liability . . . are insurance
grounds."); Rea, Comment on Epstein, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 671, 671-673 (1985) (criticizing Epstein for
his one-sided analysis of products liability doctrines); Trebilcock, Comment on Epstein, 14 J. LEGAL STUD.
675, 676 (1985) (same). Indeed, even punitive damages can be justified on deterrence grounds. For Priest's
view of punitive damages, see supra note 82. In situations where the number of victims bringing suit is
less than the number of individuals who actually suffer injuries due to a defendant's activity-for example,
where those injured have imperfect information about the link between the defendant's activity and their
injuries-punitive damages help maintain proper incentives for defendants. Moreover, what are nominally
punitive damages might, at least in some cases, serve a compensatory function.
It appears that the Internal Revenue Service understands punitive damages in this way. The receipt
of punitive damages constitutes income for tax purposes, unless the plaintiff-taxpayer received punitive
damages arising out of a personal injury. When a plaintiff-taxpayer recovers punitive damages as well as
damages for personal injury, the former, like the latter, are not taxed under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2). Otherwise,
where a plaintiff taxpayer receives punitive damages arising out of an injury to property or in the antitrust
context, punitive damages are considered income on the ground that they constitute windfall to the plaintiff-
taxpayer. Compare Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955), with Roemer v. Commis-
sioner, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983). See also REV. RuL. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47. Because the I.R.S. does
not tax personal injury damages on the ground that such damages simply return the plaintiff-taxpayer to
the status quo ante, and because the I.R.S. does tax punitive damages (where there is no personal injury)
on the ground that such damages constitute a windfall gain for the plaintiff taxpayer, the I.R.S.'s approach
to punitive damages in the personal injury context would be anomalous unless punitive damages in such
cases were considered to serve, at least in theory, some compensatory purpose.
What Liability Crisis?
goal of optimizing deterrence.86 Priest's explanation for the liability crisis
apparently overlooks the real possibility that most of the nonpecuniary-loss
damage awards of our current regime could also have been awarded under a
cost-benefit negligence rule. The recent changes in third-party insurance
markets and consumer product markets that Priest characterizes as a "crisis"
might well have still occurred. To substantiate his characterization, Priest
would have to show that manufacturers have been held liable for nonpecuniary
losses most often for accidents that were care-unpreventable. But Priest offers
no such empirical demonstration. And such a demonstration would not be
easily made, not only because the empirical data related to this issue are
difficult to obtain, but also because our current regime, as many scholars have
concluded, is largely equivalent to a negligence regime (that is, manufacturers
are held liable only for initially preventable accidents).87 Absent support for
his implicit assumption, it is not clear why Priest objects to the fact that courts
have included nonpecuniary awards in products liability damages.
3. The Moral Hazard Consequences of Manufacturer-Provided Insurance
The third source of the liability crisis according to Priest is that manu-
facturer-provided insurance, unlike first-party insurance, cannot cope with the
standard insurance perils88 of adverse selection and moral hazard.89 Adverse
selection occurs when the expected accident costs of new entrants into an
insurance pool exceed those of the average pool member, and therefore exceed
the premium charged to all members. In effect, the process of adverse selection
causes relatively low-risk members to pay a larger subsidy to the relatively
high-risk members of the pool.9" Part II below explores in detail Priest's
arguments concerning adverse selection. This subsection focuses on the other
insurance peril, moral hazard.
"Moral hazard" is the term used to describe the tendency of insured
individuals to engage in risky activities that they would avoid but for the fact
86. Indeed, recent evidence suggests that products-liability awards have actually undercompensated
injured consumers for nonpecuniary losses. See, e.g., Viscusi, Diminished Role, supra note 14, at 83-85
("[Tiort liability is often not an efficient deterrent because tort awards are less than private valuation of
risk."); id. at 95-97 ("The actual value of court awards and settlements is ... often less than the actual
losses suffered by the victim.").
87. See supra note 84. To be sure, one can point to cases in which courts use the language of "strict
liability," but such language does not imply that those cases would have been decided differently under
a negligence regime. See Landes & Posner, Products Liability, supra note 1, at 546.
88. Epstein, Insurance Market, supra note 1, at 646.
89. Priest, Modem Reform, supra note 17, at 16-17; see also P. HUBER, supra note 1, at 136-37
(changes in the law have reduced insurers' ability to combat adverse selection, "every insurer's night-
mare"); Epstein, Insurance Market, supra note 1, at 653 ("[Tlhe problem of moral hazard is all perva-
sive"); Schwartz, Proposals, supra note 10, at 405 ("[Tlhe problems of moral hazard, adverse selection,
and cross-subsidization that accompany manufacturer-supplied insurance make strict liability seem less desir-
able."); Trebilcock, Insurance Considerations, supra note 23, at 246 ("Imposing [absolute] liability ...
would ignore moral hazard considerations to which private insurers would be sensitive. It would also ignore
adverse selection considerations .... ).
90. High-risk individuals are those individuals for whom expected damages are greatest, because the
probability of an accident is high, or because damages in the event of an accident will be high, or both.
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that they are insured. Insofar as insurance cushions insureds from the full costs
of their risky activities, insureds will be less reluctant to engage in those
activities."
To Priest and others, it is clear that first-party insurance is superior to
enterprise liability qua insurance in coping with moral hazard.92 According
to Priest, under a system of enterprise liability moral hazard would abound
because "[t]ort judgments never incorporate the deductibles and coinsurance
that typify first-party insurance arrangements, under which victims bear a share
of costs."" Deductibles and coinsurance, by requiring insureds to include
some portion of the accident costs in their decision calculus, help to align the
incentives of insureds and insurers and thereby to mitigate moral hazard.94
And because, according to Priest, manufacturer-provided insurance does not
incorporate deductibles or coinsurance, it provides a higher level of compensa-
tion than does first-party insurance and thus exacerbates the moral hazard
problem under manufacturer-provided insurance.95
To illustrate this point, Priest calculates the percentage of "excess cover-
age" that tort law purportedly provides. Following one empirical study, for
the injury represented in the median tort judgment, Priest estimates that had
the victim been compensated through first-party insurance, the victim would
have received a total of $79,916. This, Priest claims, "is the amount for which
the victim ex ante was willing to pay. In contrast, third-party tort insurance
provided $187,000 coverage which is 2.34 times greater than the first-party
amount." 96 Priest goes on to argue that, even if tort awards are reduced by
91. For a more complete explication of these phenomena, see Hanson & Logue, supra note 73, at
138-39.
92. See authorities cited supra note 89.
93. Priest, Understanding the Crisis, supra note 47, at 208. A deductible is a provision requiring an
insured to pay up to some set amount of her accident expenses, say, the first $175, before the insurer will
pick up all or some fraction of the remainder. Coinsurance, on the other hand, is a provision under which
the insurer agrees to pay only a fraction, say, 75%, of an insured's total losses, whatever the amount of
those losses might be.
94. K. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK 15 (1986); Danzon, Tort Reform, supra note 33, at 526.
95. See Priest, Modem Reform, supra note 17, at 19 ("[Uinlike all forms of first-party insurance,
third-party tort law insurance never incorporates victim deductibles or coinsurance to constrain moral
hazard. Victim moral hazard is just as serious a problem in third-party as in first-party contexts. It follows
that third-party premiums will be necessarily higher than first-party premiums for the same level of
coverage.'); Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1553 ("[Djeductibles and co-insurance are features
of every first-party insurance contract. Third-party insurance through the tort system, in contrast, never
incorporates deductibles or co-insurance to control victim moral hazard."); Priest, Compensation, supra
note 25, at 139 (making substantially the same argument); Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1555
("[Ulnder third-party insurance provided through tort law, there is little reason for the beneficiary of
insurance-the tort plaintiff-to engage in difficult decisions about appropriate levels of medical treatment
.... The tort plaintiff ... loses nothing by requesting (or asserting as essential) all available advanced
methods of medical treatment regardless of cost."); see also Schwartz, Proposals, supra note 10, at 405
(making similar argument); Viscusi, Wading Through, supra note 16, at 587 (same).
96. Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1556. It is from this calculation that Priest concludes
that "tort-law insurance provides much more coverage than first-party insurance-2.34 times as much, on
average, for the identical injury." Priest, Understanding the Crisis, supra note 47, at 207. Priest assumes,
however, that the only form of insurance from which consumers receive compensation in the event of an
accident is health insurance. But accidental injury insurance, which consumers buy to supplement their
health insurance, is not uncommon. See, e.g., All American Life Insurance Company's Accidental Death
and Dismemberment Insurance, Master Policy No. ADD-1 (on file with authors); Mutual of Omaha's
Travel Accident Insurance, Policy Form T20T [hereinafter Travel Accident Insurance plan] (on file with
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thirty percent to cover attorneys' fees, the above award "would still be 1.64
times the comparable first-party insurance award."
9 7
But even that figure overstates the relative amount of compensation injured
consumers received through tort-law mechanisms vis-A-vis first-party mecha-
nisms. First of all, the tort judgments that Priest cites for purposes of compari-
son may significantly exceed the compensation actually paid by manufacturer-
defendants to the median injured consumer. This is true for several reasons.
First, only a small percentage of product injuries are litigated to a judgment.98
This fact is important because the cases most likely to be litigated to a judg-
ment are those with the largest damages.99 Moreover, claims are likely to be
settled at an amount much lower than the expected damage award, especially
in categories for which the award is highly variable." ° Priest's sample for
estimating the amount of compensation received by injured consumers from
manufacturers therefore seems to be biased upward.
Priest's sample may be biased for other reasons as well. Trial courts and
appellate courts overturn jury awards"0 1 and defendants sometimes have
authors). Moreover, proceeds from life insurance policies are sometimes paid to the beneficiaries of victims
of product accidents through first-party mechanisms. Priest's figures may thus understate the compensation
received by injured consumers under first-party insurance.
97. Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1556.
98. Pollock & Felsenthal, Federal Civil Cases Rarely Reach a Trial, Wall St. J., June 27, 1990, at
B6, col. 1 ("Almost 95% of all private civil cases filed in federal courts never reach trial, ending instead
in settlements or other pretrial dispositions according to a study by Rand Corp. Moreover, the percentage
of cases tried appears to be declining steadily."); Peterson & Priest, supra note 47, at 363 ("[A]s many
as 95 percent of filed lawsuits are either settled or dropped without reaching trial."). Of the two percent
of cases that are litigated, only five percent are litigated to a verdict. See Litan, Swire & Winston, supra
note 15, at 7.
Describing typical patterns of claim disposition in medical malpractice and products liability cases,
Danzon states: "About 43 percent of the claims were dropped without payment, while 50 percent were
settled out of court with an average payment to the plaintiff of $26,000. Of the remaining 7 percent that
were litigated to verdict, the plaintiff won roughly one in four, with an average award of $102,000." P.
DANZON, supra note 22, at 32; see also id. at 37 ("[C]laims that are tried to a verdict are predicted to
involve atypically large dollar amounts and more uncertainty about liability. Consequently, this small subset
of claims will be an unreliable basis for predicting potential verdicts for cases actually settled or for
evaluating how well the system functions for the great majority of cases that are settled out of court.");
id. at 51 ("[T]he cases that are actually litigated to a verdict constitute a small, atypical subset, 'self-
selected' to that stage of disposition precisely because the outcome was unpredictable to the litigants, the
potential award was large, and the evidence for the plaintiff was weak. Thus we get a very biased
impression of the operation of the malpractice system from observing the minority of more visible cases
that are litigated to a verdict rather than the great majority of cases that are settled out of court.").
99. Cf. Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1557 n.151 (explaining that, all else equal, the larger
the claim, the more likely it is that the claim will be "filed, pressed and successfully recovered.")
100. Viscusi, Products Liability Litigation with RiskAversion, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 107-08 (1988)
[hereinafter Viscusi, Risk Aversion]. This analysis does not even take account of the fact that consumers
are probably risk averse-especially with regard to large nonpecuniary losses-which would probably lower
settlement amounts further relative to expected damages. See Schwartz, Proposals, supra note 10, at 379;
see also Viscusi, Risk Aversion, supra, at 118 (risk-averse claimants often settle for less than their expected
award); cf. Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REv. 3, 8-9 (1986) ("Wary of
risks, delays, and costs, litigants do not act as if propelled by an unappeasable appetite for contest or public
vindication. For plaintiffs and defendants alike, litigation proves a miserable, disruptive, painful experience.
Few litigants have a good time or bask in the esteem of their fellows-indeed, they may be stigmatized.
Even those who prevail may find the process very costly." (citations omitted)).
101. See, e.g., Earl v. Bouchard Transp. Co., 917 F.2d 1320 (2d Cir. 1990) (upholding district court's
remittitur of jury's "excessive award"). Indeed, jury awards would be more likely to be overturned when,
all else equal, those awards are particularly large. The evidence supports this assumption. D. HENSLER,
M. VAIANA, J. KAKALIK & M. PETERSON, TRENDS IN TORT LITIGATION: THE STORY BEHIND THE
STATISTIcs 22 (1987) (Rand Corp.) (finding that 80% of trial verdicts were not reduced on appeal, but
that the larger the verdict, the more likely the court would reduce the award; for verdicts under $100,000,
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inadequate resources with which to pay damages. 0 2 Consequently, the
amount that is ultimately paid by defendants is roughly thirty percent less than
the amount originally awarded at trial court. 103 Because Priest uses trial court
statistics, he may overstate by thirty percent the damages that manufacturers
actually pay to injured consumers.
Finally, Priest's sample of litigated cases does not reflect the fact that tort
claimants must, ex ante, take into account the probability that they will lose
their cases." 4 Priest's statistics reflect only the damages paid to injured con-
sumers who won in court. But a large percentage of injured consumers who
litigated their cases to a verdict lost them. Indeed, Priest has noted that from
1960 to 1979 plaintiffs won in only thirty-eight percent of products liability
trials.105 The other sixty-two percent received nothing from manufacturers.
Assuming more realistically that the median tort claimant in Cook County
had hired a lawyer on a thirty-three percent contingency fee, that there had
been thirty-eight percent chance of the claimant's winning in the lower court,
and that any lower court awards were ultimately reduced by thirty percent
(either because they were overturned or because the defendants were judgment
proof), the claimant's expected third-party tort insurance coverage, prior to
trial, would have been $32,830. "° This estimate indicates that the expected
coverage under third-party insurance is less than half of the comparable
coverage under first-party insurance. Because it is based on a sample of cases
litigated to a judgment (and does not include cases in which consumers settled
or failed to litigate), this estimate may overstate the average amount received
by injured consumers from manufacturers..0 7
Priest concludes that the moral hazard problem is more severe under
manufacturer-provided insurance because "[tiort law insurance coverage levels
are in the range of 64% to 134% greater than first-party coverage levels."' 8
As argued here, however, the moral hazard problem may well be less severe
under manufacturer-provided insurance: first-party coverage levels may be
143 % greater than tort law insurance coverage levels."
reductions averaged 7%, but for verdicts over $1,000,000, reductions averaged 40%; for all cases where
there was a reduction, the reduction averaged 47 % of jury verdict); see also P. Danzon, Second Look at
Tort Reform, supra note 33, at 5 (there is a "greater percentage [of] reductions in large awards" than there
is in small awards).
102. It also seems safe to suppose that defendants would be less likely to be able to pay damage awards
when, all else equal, those damage awards are particularly large.
103. See Litan, Swire & Winston, supra note 15, at 7.
104. For a more complete discussion of this point, see Hanson & Logue, supra note 73, at 143-44.
105. Peterson & Priest, supra note 47, at 365 (citing Broder, Characteristics ofMillion-DollarAwards:
Jury Verdicts and Final Disbursements, 11 JUST. SYs. J. 353 (1986)).
106. (.67)(.701.38($187,000)]) = $32,830.
107. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
108. Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1556.
109. (100)[($79,916 + $32,830) - 1] = 143.
It has been assumed throughout this Section that first-party insurance claimants do not incur legal
expenses to secure their compensation. However, Priest emphasizes that in practice first-party insurers
sometimes contest insureds' claims, causing the insureds to pay the costs of litigation or settlement. See
Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1556. Thus Priest recognizes that injured plaintiffs incur litigation
costs that may serve to limit the amount of manufacturer-provided compensation and thereby mitigate moral
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C. Summary of Part I
To summarize, Priest and others believe that much of the insurance crisis
stems from three differences between first-party insurance and manufacturer-
provided insurance: (1) the administrative cost of manufacturer-provided
insurance is higher than that of first-party insurance; (2) manufacturer-provided
insurance, unlike first-party insurance, compensates injured consumers for pain
and suffering and other nonpecuniary losses; and (3) manufacturer-provided
insurance compensates claimants in full, without requiring them to pay any
deductibles or copayments, and therefore heightens the moral hazard problem.
Consequently, manufacturer-provided insurance supposedly "provides coverage
at excessive levels relative to consumer demand"' and therefore should be
abandoned in favor of first-party mechanisms. Part I challenged each of these
purported differences between first-party and manufacturer-provided insurance.
But there remains, according to Priest, a much more serious problem with
manufacturer-provided insurance. This problem stems from the fact that "it
is provided in a manner that makes it extremely difficult for the insurer to
segregate high-risk insureds in the underwriting process.""' Because of that
difficulty, he argues, manufacturer-provided insurance is plagued by adverse
selection and unravelling. This "unravelling theory" constitutes Priest's most
important contribution to the products liability literature. Part II challenges
Priest's unravelling theory and lays some of the groundwork for the alternative
"internalizing theory" that will be presented in Parts HI and IV.
hazard. But he argues that these costs are analogous to the costs incurred by consumers in bringing first-
party insurance claims. He concludes that even taking litigation costs into account, tort law insurance
provides excessive compensation relative to first-party insurance. This conclusion ignores two points.
While litigation costs do exist under first-party insurance, it seems clear that they are lower than those
that exist under a third-party tort system. When a first-party claimant files for compensation the insurer
typically pays its portion of the bill without requiring the insured to litigate. Indeed, insurers sometimes
compensate insureds even when they are not bound by contract to do so. See L. Ross, supra note 70, at
233-42. Insurance companies, interested in maintaining their "good hands" reputations, have incentives
to avoid contesting insureds' claims. See id.; R. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (forthcoming 1991).
In contrast, the tort system is adversarial by design. Unlike the insurance claimant, the tort claimant must
be prepared to prove at least that the defendant in question manufactured the offending good and that the
good in question caused the injury. These burdens introduce a need for legal counsel and decreased
likelihood of receiving compensation.
Moreover, to the extent that the litigation costs accompanying first-party insurance are substantial,
these costs must be taken into account when comparing the administrative costs of a first-party scheme to
those of a third-party scheme. Either these first-party legal expenses are so trivial that they should be
ignored entirely, or they are sufficiently significant that they should be included in estimates of the
administrative costs of the first-party system. In Priest's analysis, however, these costs are minimized when
administrative costs of first-party insurance are measured, but emphasized when the copayment features
of first-party insurance are measured.
110. Priest, Liability Crisis, supra note 47, at 6.
111. Id. at7.
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II. The Unravelling of Risk Pools
A. Introduction to Part II Priest's Principal Contribution
To begin, it is necessary to review Professor Priest's influential explanation
of how risk pools have unravelled. According to Priest, while the expansion
of tort liability precipitated the crisis, "what has devastated commercial insur-
ance markets is not simply the increase in tort claims but one particular aspect
of that increase": adverse selection.' 12 In Priest's view, "[tihe varied phe-
nomena of the recent liability crisis are all manifestations of the effects of
adverse selection."13 He writes:
Increases in risk correlation alone do not explain why insurers have
reduced levels of insurance coverage including the refusal to offer
coverage at any premium in some commercial casualty lines. Similarly,
increases in insurance premiums cannot fully explain why providers
have removed products and services from the market. . . .[A]dverse
selection in both consumer and provider insurance pools, however,
does explain these and other phenomena of the insurance crisis. 4
Priest argues that the expansion of liability led to the unravelling of both
consumer risk pools and manufacturer risk pools. 15
Priest's argument, in brief, is that the inclusion of nonpecuniary losses in
damage awards not only raised the average expected costs of members of risk
pools but, more importantly, also increased the variance of risks among mem-
bers within those pools. Higher variance, in turn, heightened the propensity
of those pools to unravel. Low-risk members exited the pools because their
premiums-reflecting the average expected losses of each pool-were too high.
In response, insurers raised premiums to cover the higher average expected
losses of the pools' remaining members. This increase, however, caused the
new low-risk members to exit the pool, thereby necessitating another premium
increase, and so on. Priest attempts to demonstrate the prevalence of the effects
of unravelling in both consumer and manufacturer risk pools, and hence to
establish "that contemporary tort law has restricted rather than expanded
insurance availability."116 The following two sections scrutinize the various
components of Priest's theory of the unravelling of consumer risk pools (Sec-
tion B) and manufacturer risk pools (Section C).
112. Priest, Understanding the Crisis, supra note 47, at 198.
113. Priest, Liability Crisis, supra note 47, at 6.
114. Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1563.
115. Id. at 1550-53.
116. Id. at 1550.
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B. The Unravelling of Consumer Risk Pools
1. Two Versions of the Consumer Risk Pool Unravelling Story
Priest's presentation of the unravelling of consumer risk pools seems to
take two forms-a weaker, more conventional version and a stronger, more
original version. The weaker version employs the classic view that asymmetric
information between manufacturers and consumers led to the unravelling of
consumer risk pools." 7 Reacting to an increase in variance within consumer
risk pools brought about by expanded manufacturer liability, low-risk consum-
ers were unwilling to pay the larger cross-subsidies for the benefit of their
high-risk counterparts. Accordingly, they exited consumer pools and thereby
caused those pools to unravel.
This version of the unravelling theory has an important shortcoming. For
adverse selection to occur, consumers must know both how much risk they
present as well as how much risk is presented, on average, in the consumer
risk pool for any given product. Without such knowledge, high-risk consumers
would not know enough to self-select into pools where they pose above-average
risk." 8 And low-risk consumers would not be aware that they were cross-
subsidizing high-risk consumers and therefore would not respond by exiting
the pool. Put simply, consumers must know whether they are the benefactors
or the beneficiaries of cross-subsidies in a consumer risk pool. It is unlikely,
however, that consumers have such information."
9
Priest can avoid this criticism by arguing instead that the unravelling of
consumer risk pools is due to nothing more than consumers' reactions to
changes in product prices. This version of the unravelling story proceeds as
117. See generally Akerlof, The Marketfor Lemons: Quality, Uncertainty, and the Market Mechanism,
84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) (explicating unravelling phenomena due to asymmetric information in the used
car market; "lemons" force quality cars out of the market).
118. See id. at 489-90 (explaining that unravelling depends on asymmetric information); see also
Epstein, Insurance Market, supra note 1, at 651; Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities, 18 J. LEGAL
STUD. 209, 226-28 (1989) (presenting story of adverse selection based on asymmetric information.).
119. Ayres & Siegelman, The Economics of the Insurance Antitrust Suits: Toward an Exclusionary
Theory, 63 TuL. L. REv. 971, 984-85 (1989) (criticizing Priest's "scenario of competitive unraveling"
on this basis).
It is possible that there has been an increase in the variance of the size of actual damage awards ("ex
post variance"). But for unravelling to occur, there also must have been an increase in the variance of
expected damage awards from consumers' ex ante perspectives ("ex ante variance"). Otherwise, consumers
would have no reason to exit or to adversely select into risk pools. Consumers' motivations for exiting risk
pools and for adversely selecting into risk pools depend in part upon their comparisons between the prices
they must pay for insurance and the awards they would expect to receive in the event of an accident.
Without an increase in ex ante variance, all consumers would expect to receive the average damage award
in the event of an accident, and ex post variance would have no effect on consumer behavior. Priest has
not explained why there has been an increase in the variance of consumers' expected damage awards.
Although Priest's analysis may accommodate more than one interpretation, his discussions of unravel-
ling in consumer risk pools suggests that he has in mind the second version of the unravelling story and
not the first. Perhaps he adopts the second version to avoid basing conclusions on the strong assumption
that consumers are asymmetrically informed. In any case, both versions depend upon several dubious
empirical assumptions. For simplicity, this section focuses on the second version. Nevertheless, the same
or similar criticisms apply to the first version as well.
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follows. Because of expanding liability rules, manufacturers were forced to
raise the prices of their products in order to cover new liability costs. But once
manufacturers raised prices, the products were no longer worth their prices
to low-risk consumers, who were more sensitive to price increases than were
high-risk consumers. 120 Low-risk consumers therefore exited product pools.
In response, manufacturers were forced to raise prices again, this time in order
to reflect the higher average expected loss of those who remained in the pool.
But when manufacturers increased prices again, those who became the lowest-
risk members of the pool after the departure of the first group now exited for
the same reason. The cycle continued; the pool unravelled.
2. Dubious Empirical Assumptions
The empirical assumptions upon which Priest's unravelling story depends
include the following: (i) as courts began increasing damage awards, there was
an increase in the variance of expected products liability awards across con-
sumers; this occurred because (ii) there is a positive correlation between
consumers' levels of income and the size of consumers' expected pecuniary
loss awards, and because (iii) there is a positive correlation between consum-
ers' levels of income and the size of consumers' expected nonpecuniary loss
awards; and finally, (iv) manufacturers could not prevent adverse selection and
unravelling because manufacturers cannot adequately segregate consumers into
different risk pools according to the different degrees of risk consumers pose.
These assumptions are examined in turn.
Priest claims that the variance in expected risks presented by consumers
increased as a result of expanding liability rules. To support this claim he
makes the following argument:
The increase in the level of insurance coverage from the shift to
the third-party tort mechanism is not likely to be uniform over all
cases. The empirical observation that pain and suffering awards consti-
tute 47 % of total damages is an average figure. Pain and suffering and
other nonpecuniary amounts comprise a much higher proportion of
large damage judgments [than of small damage judgments]. For this
reason, risk pool variance is likely to be greater under third-party tort
insurance than under first-party insurance.1 2'
120. As explained below, Priest claims that low-income consumers tend to be more sensitive to price
changes and also tend to be low-risk members of consumer risk groups. Thus, as price increases, low-in-
come (that is, low-risk) consumers are the first to withdraw from the pool. See infra notes 121-35 and
accompanying text.
121. Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1557.
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Priest offers no empirical support for his contention that nonpecuniary-loss
damages comprise a greater proportion of large damage judgments.122 How-
ever, even if his contention is accurate, an increase in the variance of damage
judgments would have an effect on the variance of expected awards in risk
pools" only if there is a correlation between some characteristic, X, pos-
sessed by each consumer and the size of his or her expected damage awards.
To provide this necessary characteristic, Priest asserts that high-income con-
sumers receive disproportionate amounts of both pecuniary- and nonpecuniary-
loss damage awards relative to low-income consumers. That is, Priest assumes
that there is a positive correlation both between consumers' income levels and
the size of their pecuniary-loss damage awards, and between consumers'
income levels and the size of their nonpecuniary-loss damage awards. 124 For
Priest, then, X is income. Because this income-damages correlation is the
source of greater variance within consumer risk pools, his unravelling story
depends entirely upon it.
Damage awards for pecuniary losses consist primarily of compensation for
medical expenses and for lost income. With respect to the former, it is not
clear that there is a positive correlation between a given consumer's income
and the amount of damages that consumer receives for medical expenses.
While there may be evidence that suggests that, in general, high-income
individuals spend more on medical care than do low-income individuals-that
is, that medical care is a normal good-it seems doubtful that this generality
applies in the products liability context. " First, it seems that emergency
medical care would account for a significant portion of medical expenses for
injured victims of product-caused accidents. And, in that setting, it is less
likely that injured consumers would make carefully calculated spending deci-
sions about how much medical treatment to purchase, or, indeed, that they
would be given much choice.'26 Second, where product-caused injuries re-
quire longer-term medical treatment for which manufacturer-defendants pay
prospectively, it seems unlikely that juries would award higher damage awards
for such care to high-income consumers than they would to low-income consumers."
122. See P. DANZON, supra note 22, at 40 ("[l~t is impossible to determine whether the courts tend
to award proportionately greater non-economic damages in cases where economic losses are greater.");
id. at 57 ("[Clompensation for pain and suffering increases less than in proportion to economic
loss . . ").
123. See supra note 119.
124. Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1558-59 ("The largest items of damages in most third-
party personal injury contexts, especially those involving permanent disability, are lost income and pain
and suffering, which are highly correlated with individuals' expected income streams.").
125. See infra note 127.
126. Cf. A. ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN 8 (1980) (suggests that emergency medical care is atypical
inasmuch as patients have little discretion with regard to the timing or type of care they receive).
127. If it is true that even in the products liability context low-income consumers spend less on medical
care than do high-income consumers, that fact supports the argument above that moral hazard is no more
severe under manufacturer-provided insurance than it is under first-party insurance. Priest argues that
"under third-party insurance provided through tort law, there is little reason for the beneficiary of the
insurance-the tort plaintiff-to engage in difficult decisions about appropriate levels of medical treatment.
. . . The tort plaintiff. . . loses nothing by requesting (or asserting as essential) all available advanced
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With respect to the supposed correlation between income and damage
awards for lost income, the assumption that expected pecuniary awards would
correlate positively with consumers' incomes seems plausible, given that lost
wages often constitute a substantial portion of economic damages. As an
empirical matter, however, this assumption finds surprisingly little support.t2 '
Jury awards do not seem to be positively correlated with income. Perhaps
juries implicitly apply a reasonable-person standard when calculating the size
of damage awards.129 Whatever the explanation, the assumption that income
correlates with pecuniary awards appears to be incorrect.
The assumption that there is a positive correlation between income and
nonpecuniary-loss damage awards is less explicable. According to Priest,
[Tihe liability insurance premium tied to the sale of a product or
service must be set according to the average expected liability payout.
Tort judgments comprise medical expenditures, which are typically
greater for high income patients; past and future lost income; and
damages representing pain and suffering, which are highly correlated
with lost income. The high correlation of these damage elements with
income, however, means that the premiums set equal to the average
damage payout will undercharge high income consumers and over-
charge low income consumers. The provision of liability insurance tied
to the sale of products and services requires the low income to subsi-
dize the high income. 3
Again, by connecting nonpecuniary losses with lost income in this way, Priest
can argue that members of consumer risk pools with low expected costs are
those with low incomes. But there is no reason to believe that for a given
injury low-income consumers would receive lower nonpecuniary-loss damage
awards than would high-income consumers. And Priest provides no evidence
in support of this claim. He argues that pain and suffering awards correlate
with a plaintiff's income solely on the grounds that "it is typically sustained
methods of medical treatment regardless of cost." But according to his argument regarding the correlation
of tort awards and income, an injured consumer's decision about how much medical care to purchase does
not seem to be affected significantly by the expectation of being reimbursed for medical expenses through
tort law. Otherwise, low-income consumers would also demand top-quality medical care no matter the price.
128. Cf. P. DANZON, supra note 22, at 31 ("[T]he National Association of Insurance Commissioners
concluded from their analysis of malpractice claims that there is no statistically significant relation between
the amount paid to plaintiffs and their tangible or 'economic' loss (wage loss; medical and other expenses)."
(citation omitted)); id. at 40-42 ("We found no strong statistical evidence . . . that awards are related to
the actual earnings of the plaintiff prior to the injury . . .[This] suggests that juries tend to disregard the
intent of the law to place a higher value on lives with higher earning power.").
129. See also infra notes 219-22 and accompanying text.
130. Priest, Puzzles, supra note 47, at 502 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added); see also Priest,
Modem Reform, supra note 17, at 17 ("Tort law damages are dominated by lost income and by pain and
suffering, which is highly correlated with lost income. The expected damage recovery of a low-income
: I * individual is substantially less than that of a high-income . . . individual. Thus, the poor and low-
income are the low-risk members of tort law insurance pools.").
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job loss, rather than short though intense hospital expense, that signals disrup-
tion of the victim's life." 3 ' This argument, however, is unpersuasive. First,
Priest provides no support for the claim that sustained job loss "signals"
disruption of a plaintiff's life more than a short but intense hospital stay would.
Nor does he provide support for the implied premise that pain and suffering
awards are based on "disruption" of a victim's life. But, more important,
assuming there were such support, Priest's argument does not lead to the
conclusion that pain and suffering losses correlate with a person's income at
the time of the accident. At most, the argument leads to the conclusion that,
for low-income and high-income consumers alike, damage awards for lost
income will correlate with damage awards for nonpecuniary losses. In short,
Priest offers no reason to believe that, for a given injury, low-income consum-
ers would receive lower nonpecuniary-loss damage awards than high-income
consumers would.
Indeed, if, as Priest argues, it is true that high-income consumers spend
more on medical care even in the products liability context, 132 it seems likely
that greater expenditures on medical care would, all else equal, lead to more
effective medical care and ultimately to faster and more complete recovery for
injured parties. If that is true, then high-income consumers would tend to
experience less pain and suffering than would low-income consumers, who will
spend less on medical care. If so, pain and suffering damages will correlate
negatively with a victim's income.
Another empirical assumption necessary to support Priest's unravelling
story is that manufacturers cannot adequately segregate consumers into risk
pools. 33 Only to the extent that manufacturers cannot distinguish among
131. Priest, Understanding the Crisis, supra note 19, at 210; see Priest, Risk Control, supra note 47,
at 225.
132. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
133. According to Priest, under an enterprise liability regime, adverse selection would abound because
manufacturers cannot segregate consumers according to the consumers' expected damages:
It is very difficult for providers to segregate risk in the insurance offered through tort law. First-
party insurers, through the insurance application process, obtain large amounts of information
about individuals which allows substantial risk segregation. For example, in the context of
insuring injuries from auto accidents, first-party insurers create risk pools according to the
driver's age, driving level, and by moving violation and accident experience. None of these
distinctions, however, can be implemented by the third-party auto manufacturer providing
insurance for non-preventable accidents in the price of the auto. Tort law insurance must be
provided indiscriminately, at the same premium to high-risk and low-risk alike.
Priest, Modem Reform, supra note 17, at 16-17; see also Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1557
(first-party insurers can "define risk pools of very narrow scope"); Priest, Compensation, supra note 25,
at 130 (first-party auto insurers segregate insureds efficiently); id. at 140 ("Finally, and most seriously,
insurers face substantially greater difficulty in segregating risks to increase insurance availability in third-
party tort than in first-party insurance contexts": first-party insurers implement a host of distinctions,
manufacturers can implement "none."); Priest, Modern Reform, supra note 17, at 17 (same); Priest, Under-
standing the Crisis, supra note 19, at 208-09 (same).
Priest argues further that because first-party insurers can segregate risks better than manufacturers
can, enterprise liability also has adverse distributional effects. See Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19,
at 1558-60, 1585-86; Priest, Liability Crisis, supra note 47, at 7; Priest, Compensation, supra note 25,
at 1040-41; Priest, Puzzles, supra note 47, at 502. But see Epstein, Unintended Revolution, supra note 1,
at 2215-16 (reviewing Priest's argument about distributional effects but concluding that "[gleneralizations
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consumers according to the different risks they pose can consumers exploit
information asymmetries. It is unrealistic, however, to assume that manufac-
turers cannot design, package, and market their products to ensure that the
products are consumed by individuals with fairly homogeneous risk-related
characteristics.' 34 Moreover, modern marketing techniques, including cou-
pons and consumer rebates, are easily and often directed at particular sub-
groups of consumers and have the effect of offering the same products to
different consumers at different prices."'
3. Theoretical Shortcomings of the Unravelling Theory
Even if the strong empirical assumptions required by the unravelling theory
were all true, there remain several theoretical shortcomings of Priest's presen-
tation of the unravelling of consumer risk pools.
First, his analysis conflates the meanings of "low-risk" and "low-income,"
and likewise the meanings of "high-risk" and "high-income." Were Priest
correct that there is some positive correlation between income and damage
awards, it does not follow that all low-risk consumers are low-income consum-
ers and all high-risk consumers are high-income consumers. A consumer's
"risk" has to do not only with the size of a consumer's expected damage award
in the event of an accident, but also with the probability of an accident occur-
ring in the first place. There is no reason to assume that all consumers are
equally accident-prone. Consider the matrix in Table 3, which grants the
assumption that income is positively correlated with the size of damage awards.
In this matrix, there are four categories of consumer riskiness. The most risky
consumers are those with high incomes and high probabilities of being injured
in a product-caused accident (Category 1). The least risky consumers are those
with low incomes and low probabilities of being in an accident (Category 4).
Low-income, high-probability consumers (Category 2) and high-income, low-
probability consumers (Category 3) fall somewhere in the middle.
on the regressive effects of the tort law are not sustainable as a matter of theory, nor at present verifiable
by any empirical evidence.").
Until very recently, most legal economists, consistent with Priest's view, believed that first-party
insurers-because of their ability to screen risks and in some cases to do experience ratings-were better
able to segregate consumer risks than manufacturers would be under an enterprise liability regime.
Calabresi, First Party, Third Party and Product Liability: Can Economic Analysis of Law Tell Us Anything
About Them? 69 IowA L. REV. 833, 836-37 (1984); Epstein, Insurance Market, supra note 1, at 652,.660;
see also R. COOTER & T. ULEN, supra note 1, at 427.
It has recently been argued, however, that-without better empirical evidence-one cannot justifiably
conclude that first-party insurance is superior to manufacturer-provided insurance at segregating consumers
into risk pools. Hanson & Logue, supra note 73, at 145-59.
134. Hanson & Logue, supra note 73, at 154-58. Indeed, there is now some concern that manu-
facturers can target homogeneous consumer groups much too well. Consider, for instance, the public
concern over the proposed introduction of "Dakota" cigarettes and "Uptown" cigarettes by R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co. See Conley, Target Marketing Lights Smoky Fire, Chi. Tribune, Mar. 16, 1990, § C, at 4.
135. Hanson and Logue, supra note 73, at 154-58. (discussing manufacturers' ability to differentiate
among consumers for pricing purposes). See infra Part IV(B) (discussing specific product examples).
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Table 3
Four Categories of Consumer Riskiness
Consumer's Income
High Low
High Category 1 Category 2
Probability of
Accident Low Category 3 Category 4
Distinguishing between low-probability and high-probability high-income
consumers, and similarly between low-probability and high-probability low-
income consumers blunts Priest's explanation of consumer risk pool unravel-
ling. Priest's unravelling story implies that consumers in Category 4 and
Category 2, both groups being low-income consumers, would be the first to
leave a pool because of a price increase. The withdrawal of Category 4
consumers would necessitate a price increase, but the withdrawal of Category
2 consumers would have no predictable effect on price. It is possible that
relatively low-income consumers would, on average, have a high probability
of being in an accident. 36 To the extent that this is true, the withdrawal of
low-income consumers will have no obvious effect on the product prices. At
any rate, of the consumers remaining in any given risk pool as Category 4 and
Category 2 consumers exit the pool, Category 3 consumers, who by hypothesis
are not so sensitive to price increase, would subsidize Category 1 consumers.
Thus, unravelling seems less plausible once the distinction is made between
consumers who pose a high risk because their incomes are relatively high and
136. It may be the case, in other words, that low-risk consumers tend to have the greatest probability
of being in an accident. See Epstein, Unintended Revolution, supra note 1, at 2215-16 (making similar point
with regard to worker injury cases). Low-income individuals may have less aversion to risk than high-
income consumers do and, therefore, may be more willing to engage in risky activities. Cf G. STIOLER,
MEMOIRS OF AN UNREGULATED ECONOMIST 10 (1988) (suggesting that economically disadvantaged groups
may tend to be less risk-averse); Keeton & Kwerel, Externalities in Automobile Insurance and the Underin-
sured Driver Problem, 27 J.L. & EcoN. 149 (1984) (drivers may underinsure if they do not stand to lose
more than the sum of their assets and their insurance coverage); Alan Schwartz, A Reexamination of
Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L. REV. 1053, 1058-59 (1977) (poor consumers may be
somewhat more willing than middle-class consumers to bear more purchase risks in exchange for lower
prices).
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consumers who pose a high risk because for them the probability of having
an accident is relatively high.137
Another theoretical weakness of Priest's consumer risk pool unravelling
theory is that it assumes "high-risk" consumers would be attracted to consumer
risk pools in which they are cross-subsidized. At first blush, it might seem
rational for high-risk consumers to join product risk pools in which they pose
a greater-than-average risk.13 All else equal, it seems that everyone would
prefer to be on the receiving end of a subsidy. But because nonpecuniary losses
are, by definition, not fully compensable,'39 high-risk consumers may not
want to be cross-subsidized in a pool where nonpecuniary losses constitute a
significant portion of the risk. Consumers are not indifferent between the state
of the world in which they suffer a nonpecuniary loss and receive damages and
a state of the world in which they suffer no nonpecuniary loss and receive no
damages. Because damage awards will not fully compensate them, victims of
a nonpecuniary loss will prefer the non-injury state of the world. This prefer-
ence for avoiding injuries gives consumers an incentive to avoid consuming
products for which they pose above-average risk. This is true because from
these consumers' perspectives, manufacturers of such products will be invest-
ing insufficiently to prevent nonpecuniary losses.
A product manufacturer will not, even when liable for the injuries caused
by its product, have an incentive to make its product as safe as the relatively
high-risk consumers of that product would be willing to pay. 4o To understand
137. This theoretical objection to Priest's unravelling theory might be clarified with an example.
Imagine that the world contains two types of lawn-mowing individuals: careful mowers, who observe all
safety instructions on their equipment and pay close attention to the rocks and bumps in their lawns, and
careless mowers, who disregard all instructions and hurry the job heedless of safety. There are high-income
and low-income mowers of both types, and thus four sets: careful, high-income mowers; careful, low-
income mowers; careless, high-income mowers; and careless, low-income mowers.
As Priest's analysis suggests, high-income mowers pose a high risk to their lawn mower manu-
facturers because, if injured, they will tend to collect high damage awards; similarly, low-income mowers
pose a low risk to their manufacturers because, if injured, they will tend to collect lower damage awards.
But Priest's analysis does not capture the "if injured" dimension of risk; that is, the probability of a lawn-
mowing accident occurring in the first place. Careless mowers-whether high-income or low-income-pose
a higher risk to their manufacturers because the probability is relatively high that they will, for example,
leave their lawn mower blades running as they stoop for a drink from the hose. In contrast, careful
mowers-whether high- or low-income-pose a lower risk to manufacturers since the probability of a
mowing accident is for them relatively small. Now, the effect of a given low-income consumer exiting an
insurance pool depends on whether that low-income consumer was a careful mower or a careless mower.
The exodus of low-income, extremely careless mowers may actually lower the average premium a
manufacturer must charge. In any case, there is no reason to think that the exodus of low-income mowers
would cause a pool to unravel, in absence of information about whether (and to what extent) those
individuals were careful or careless.
138. Legal economists generally assume that this form of adverse selection is rational. See, e.g.,
Schwartz, Proposals, supra note 10, at 405-06.
139. Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1559; see P. DANZON, supra note 22, at 10 ("Harder
to measure but no less real are the pain and suffering and the diminution in the quality of life that result
form physical impairment. These are irreplaceable losses that cannot be recompensed by monetary
compensation."); Epstein, Insurance Market, supra note 1, at 653 ("[Mloney is an unsatisfactory substitute
for health or wholeness."); Priest, Modern Reform, supra note 17, at 8 ("[No personal injury can ever
be fully compensated . . ").
140. See generally L. Bebchuk & S. Shavell, Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of
Contract (April 1989) (unpublished manuscript on file with authors); cf. Schwartz, Proposals, supra note
10, at 371 ("Firms commonly are responsive to the preferences of consumer groups, rather than the
preferences of every consumer.").
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why this is true, consider the argument made by Judge Posner in his analysis
of the incentive effects of allowing a high-risk photographer to recover full
damages for a manufacturer-caused loss: "The manufacturer of the film will
probably take no additional precautions . . . because he cannot identify the
films whose loss would be extremely costly, and [therefore] . . . it may not
pay to take additional precautions on all the films ... "141 Even if manufac-
turers are strictly liable, they still will have inadequate incentives to invest in
product safety up to the point where the cost of accidents is minimized for
high-risk consumers. Consequently, high-risk consumers may not want to
remain in a pool in which they are subsidized, even though they could receive
money damages for their injuries. Instead, they would prefer to pay "extra"
to join a pool consisting only of high-risk insureds, because only in such pools
would manufacturers have the proper incentives to invest in preventing nonpe-
cuniary losses.142
Another theoretical shortcoming of the unravelling theory is that it is not
clear that low-risk consumers would be as willing to give up consuming a
given product-thus causing the pool to unravel-as Priest suggests. To be
sure, the better their available substitutes, the less tolerant low-risk insureds
will be of cross-subsidizing high-risk insureds, and the more likely they would
therefore be to choose alternatives. (Such a consumer might substitute either
products that are less risky themselves or products for which the average risk
of the pool is closer to the risk posed by that consumer.) In some product
markets, however, substitutes may be scarce or non-existent. In those markets,
low-risk consumers may be unwilling to exit the insurance pool because the
cost of giving up the product would outweigh the benefit of avoiding an
unfavorable insurance arrangement.
141. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 67, at 114 (emphasis in original); see also Epstein,
Beyond Foreseeability: Consequential Damages in the Law of Contract, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 105, 134-36
(1989); Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules.
99 YALE L.J. 87, 101-02, 108-18 (1989) (providing more sophisticated version of same argument);
Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615
(1991) (same); L. Bebchuk & S. Shavell, supra note 140 (same); see, e.g., Mieske v. Bartell Drug Co.,
92 Wash. 2d 40, 593 P.2d 1308 (1979) (film processor destroyed plaintiff's home movies; plaintiffawarded
$7,500 for the loss of 32 50-foot rolls of home movies taken over many years).
142. Alan Schwartz provides another possible reason why unravelling may not be so significant in
the context of high nonpecuniary losses:
Nonpecuniary harms are not replaceable by insurance payments or damage judgments; rather,
these transfers are used to purchase substitutes that make up for or assuage the pain of accidents.
Because substitutes rather than replacements are at issue, the value people attach to the risk of
incurring nonpecuniary harm is a function of people's income. This follows from the diminishing
marginal utility of money theory, which holds that a poor person would miss the marginal dollars
required to purchase substitutes more than a rich person, and so the former would pay more to
avoid having to purchase substitutes-that is, pay more to-reduce the risk of harm.
Schwartz, Proposals, supra note 10, at 408 (footnote omitted). Schwartz seems to suggest here that even
if low-income individuals receive less compensation than high-income individuals for the same injury, the
fact that both sets of consumers must pay the same premium for the insurance may not cause the pool to
unravel, because low-risk insureds have a greater willingness to pay for that insurance than their high-risk
counterparts do.
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4. Comparing Consumer Risk Pools to First-Party Insurance Risk
Pools
Finally, even if all the empirical assumptions that Priest makes were valid,
and even if his unravelling analysis were theoretically sound, the unravelling
theory would still contain an important weakness: Priest advocates greater
reliance on first-party insurance as a solution to unravelling without showing
that first-party insurance would be less susceptible to the unravelling problems
than manufacturer-provided insurance has been. Priest's conclusions depend
on the propositions that consumer risk pools, especially those of products that
have recently been withdrawn from the market, were broader than they would
have been had manufacturer liability not expanded, and broader than the
variance within first-party risk pools. But he offers no support for either
proposition. It is quite possible that consumer risk pools may contain less
cross-subsidization between low-risk and high-risk consumers than they did
before the "crisis," and less than first-party insurance pools contain.
1 43
But even if consumer risk pools were found to be broad relative to first-
party insurance pools, that would not imply that the former would be more
likely to unravel than the latter. This is true simply because for a given level
of variance, a pool's tendency to unravel is greater the larger the benefits of
exiting the pool are to low-risk members. If the size of the subsidy and the
gains from avoiding it are relatively small, low-risk consumer-insureds may
have less of an incentive to alter their consumption patterns to avoid subsidiz-
ing high-risk consumer-insureds in consumer risk pools than they do in first-
party insurance pools.'" Put differently, the gains from adversely selecting
to a high-risk consumer, and from unravelling to a low-risk consumer, might
be relatively insignificant in consumer risk pools as compared to those in first-
party insurance risk pools, because the absolute size of the cross-subsidy in
most consumer risk pools is relatively small. 14' Hence, to induce the same
level of unravelling, all else equal, the variance would have to be greater in
consumer-product pools than it would in first-party insurance pools.
Lastly, it is worth noting that the same cross-subsidization and unravelling
problems that Priest believes plagued consumer risk pools under the current
143. First-party insurance pools are far from perfect. See Hanson & Logue, supra note 73, at 141-53,
164-68; Akerlof, supra note 117, at 492-94 (health insurance suffers significant adverse selection problems);
Feldman, Health Insurance in the United States: Is MarketFailure Avoidable? 54 J. RISK & INS. 298 (1978)
(group insurance produces non-trivial moral hazard and adverse selection problems).
144. Cf. Epstein, Insurance Market, supra note 1, at 668-69 (maintaining that insurance premiums
in product prices are a "small fraction of the total cost of most goods").
145. See infra text accompanying note 307. This proposition is related to the proposition that
consumers invest in more "search" when shopping for expensive items than they do when shopping for
inexpensive items. See G. BECKER, THE ECoNoMIc APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 6-7 (1976);
Westbrook & Fornell, Patterns of Information Source Usage Among Durable Goods Buyers, 16 J. MARKET-
ING RES. 303 (1979); see also G. EADS & P. REUTER, DESIGNING SAFER PRODUCTS: CORPORATE
RESPONSES TO PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW AND REGULATION 47 (Rand Institute for Civil Justice, 1983)
(summarizing point); cf. J. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS &THE LAw217-39 (1988) (describing economic
incentives of plaintiffs in class action settlements).
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regime might also plague consumer risk pools under his proposed negligence
regime. At its most fundamental level, Priest's unravelling theory turns on the
size and variance of the damage awards granted, not on the liability rule
employed. Yet Priest's proposed negligence regime, in which injured consum-
ers would be compensated for negligently caused pecuniary and nonpecuniary
losses, would have no predictable effect on the size of damage awards.
C. The Unravelling of Manufacturer Risk Pools
According to Priest, expanding liability has led to the unravelling of manu-
facturer risk pools because "[i]ndividual firm riskiness and the variance of
individual riskiness among firms both increase as the scope of liability
expands. " " As explained above, the unravelling of insurance pools is pre-
cipitated by an increase in the variance of risks posed by pool members. An
increase in variance means that, all else equal, there is an increase in the cross-
subsidization of high-risk pool members by low-risk pool members. As the
cross-subsidies increase, so do the incentives for high-risk insureds to select
adversely into risk pools and for low-risk insureds to exit risk pools. The
question arises, then, of what causes the increased variance in manufacturer
risk pools. The subsections that follow argue that Priest has not provided a
satisfactory answer to that question.
1. The Uncertain Effects of an Increase in Individual Firm Riskiness
Priest's first explanation for the unravelling of manufacturer risk pools,
just like his explanation for the unravelling of consumer.risk pools, depends
upon his claim that the variance within consumer risk pools has increased:
"[T]he increase in corporate tort liability has increased the variance in risk
pools comprising consumers of corporate products and services. This increased
variance, of course, increases the individual riskiness of each corporate
provider, requiring an increase in the corporate casualty premium. "147 How-
ever, as shown above, Priest's claim that there has been an increase in the
variance of risks presented to manufacturers by consumer groups is empirically
unsubstantiated and theoretically implausible. 4 '
But even if it were true that the variance within consumer risk pools
significantly increased, it would not follow that manufacturer risk pools would
unravel as a result. If, as Priest contends, consumer risk pools did unravel,
then the variance of risks faced by manufacturers should have become
narrower as a result. Indeed, if Priest is correct that the unravelling of
146. Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1562.
147. Id. at 1561 (emphasis added).
148. See supra Parts II(B)(2)-(4).
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consumer risk pools often continued until a product was completely withdrawn
from the market, it must also be true that such unravelling often reduced the
variance of manufacturer risk pools to a level lower than it was before the
alleged expansion of manufacturer liability. In short, the unravelling of con-
sumer risk pools should have led to a smaller variance within manufacturer
risk pools and should thereby have eliminated the variance that Priest suggests
plagued manufacturer risk pools.
Moreover, Priest does not explain how an increase in the riskiness of
individual firms itself could have any negative effect on corporate liability
insurance. Again, according to Priest's theory, risk pool unravelling is pre-
cipitated by an increase in the variance of risks posed by member insureds.
Thus, an increase in the riskiness of individual manufacturers could have led
to unravelling only if that increase caused an increase in the variance within
manufacturer risk pools. But an increase in expected liability costs for a given
manufacturer (say, from $20 before the expansion to $35 after the expansion)
does not imply an increase in variance among manufacturers. In Figure 1, the
variance within the manufacturer risk pool (a standard deviation of 15) was
unaffected by the expansion. Priest acknowledges that an increase in variance,
an increase in expected liability costs would not adversely affect manufacturer
risk pools."49 Thus, when Priest refers to an increase in individual corporate
riskiness, he is apparently not referring to an increase in the expected liability
costs of corporations that may have resulted from the change in the liability
rule.
To understand better what Priest does mean when he speaks of an increase
in corporate riskiness, consider the probability distributions depicted in Figure
2. The expected liability is the same in both cases ($35), but because the
spread of possible liability outcomes is greater after the alleged expansion of
liability, the corporation is riskier. Before the expansion, the probability
distribution has a standard deviation of 15; after the expansion, the standard
deviation is 30. It is in this sense that Priest argues that individual corporate
riskiness has increased.5 °
149. Priest writes:
[Some] forms of expanding liability . . . will not affect insurance markets. . . . [including]
increases in the level of damage judgments .... Other things equal, a scalar (proportionately
equal) increase in the level of tort judgments and settlements will not affect the degree of
insurability of any risk. A scalar increase in tort payouts, other things equal, will not change the
ratio of the premium to an insured's expected loss. The premium set equal to the average risk
brought to the pool will increase by exactly the same proportion as will the expected loss to the
insured.
Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1551.
150. That increase in variance matters only if corporations are risk averse, as Priest implicitly assumes
they are. Otherwise, it is not clear that they would mind this risk. See Epstein, Insurance Market, supra
note 1, at 649 (adopting view similar to Priest's); Gary Schwartz, Directions in Contemporary Products
Liability Scholarship, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 763, 775 (1985).
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But there is little reason to think that insurers would raise premiums in
response to this form of risk. An increase in the variance of expected liability
costs among members of a pool of uncorrelated insureds need not create any
significant increase in the variance of the pool itself. Indeed, elsewhere in his
argument Priest emphasizes that "risk spreading" or the "reduction in the
coefficient of variation of the probability function of average loss," is
"achieved by the aggregation of independent risks."151 This aggregation
"lowers the effective risk to each member of the pool."1"2 He emphasizes
further that "risks can be spread efficiently over very small numbers of the
population. "153 Because Priest has not shown why an increase in the variance
of individual firm riskiness would lead to an increase in the variance of the
pool itself, he has not shown why an increase in individual firm riskiness
would cause commercial casualty premiums to rise."5 4
2. Variance of Riskiness Among Firms
Priest's second explanation for the breakdown of manufacturer risk pools
is the increase in "the variance of individual riskiness among firms in insur-
ance pools." He writes:
The increase in corporate riskiness affects the commercial casualty
insurance market in an additional way. The effect of the expansion of
corporate liability varies for different companies, depending upon the
risk characteristics both of a company's product or service and of its
consumers. The shift to greater third-party tort insurance coverage
increases these differences among firms. 5'
151. Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1543.
152. Id.
153. Id.; see Priest, Modem Reform, supra note 17, at 15 ("[E]ffective risk spreading can occur with
very low numbers of risks aggregated into a single pool, as long as the risk of injury of each member of
the pool is uncorrelated. Thus, it is not necessary to aggregate pools of the dimension of the total set of
product consumers to achieve optimal spreading."); see also S. Ross & R. WESTERFIELD, CORPORATE
FINANCE 152 (1988) ("In general, if assets are not perfectly positively correlated, diversification can reduce
portfolio variability.").
154. While Priest argues that the increased correlation of corporate risks can explain the increase in
corporate insurance premiums, the problem is that he offers increased firm riskiness and increased risk
correlation as two independent reasons for premium increases. If by the former explanation he means only
to be giving the latter explanation, then the two converge into one. In any event, neither of these explana-
tions locates the source of increased variance necessary for manufacturer risk pools to unravel.
155. Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1562.
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This description of corporate riskiness raises several important questions. For
example, why has the expansion increased manufacturer risk pool variance?
Priest asserts that the expansion of tort liability has affected different firms
differently, causing some firms' risk of liability to increase enormously and
other firms' risk to increase to a smaller extent. He then suggests that the
variance within manufacturer risk pools-that is, the disparity between the
high-risk member firms and low-risk member firms-has therefore increased,
leading to adverse selection and ultimately to unravelling. 15 6 However, he
provides no evidence for this empirical claim. And without an injection of
variance into manufacturer risk pools, it is not clear how these risk pools could
have unravelled.
But assuming for the sake of argument that the expansion of tort liability
has caused an increase in the variance within manufacturer risk pools, it is not
at all clear how such an increase could have led to adverse selection by manu-
facturers. An increase in the variance of expected risks among firms is neces-
sary, though not sufficient, to generate unravelling in manufacturer risk pools.
For adverse selection to occur, (1) low-risk firms must recognize that they
have relatively low expected liability costs; and (2) third-party insurers must
be unable to distinguish the high-risk from the low-risk members of the
pool. 157 Priest, apparently aware of these other necessary conditions (in addi-
tion to an increase in variance), completes his unravelling argument as follows:
If commercial casualty insurers are able to predict how firms differ
in riskiness, then they can tailor an insurance premium appropriately
for the risk that underwriting the particular corporation adds to the
insurer's portfolio. The sale and purchase of commercial casualty
insurance, however, requires a convergence of risk estimates by the
insurer and the corporation. When the insurer believes that the risk
level of a firm is greater than the firm believes it to be, the firm is
likely to find self-insurance more attractive than market insurance.
156. Id. Whether increased variance within manufacturer risk pools would actually lead to adverse
selection is discussed immediately below.
157. Priest recognizes that insureds must be asymmetrically informed for adverse selection to occur:
"[l1f firms have better knowledge of their underlying level of riskiness than insurers, these differences in
expectations will lead relatively low-risk firms to drop out of the insurance pool and relatively high-risk
firms to stay in the insurance pool. This is adverse selection in the commercial casualty market." Priest,
Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1562.
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The shift to corporate tort liability increases the extent of adverse
selection. . . . [The] increases in the range of potential liability out-.
comes across firms increase the likelihood of differences in insurers
and corporate estimates of underlying corporate riskiness. As a con-
sequence, adverse selection is likely to increase. Low-risk firms are
increasingly likely to withdraw from the commercial casualty market
leading to an increase in the premiums and an increase in the likelihood
that the commercial casualty pool will unravel.' 58
Assuming there were rapid changes in the law, it may have been the case that
neither insurers nor manufacturers knew which manufacturers were low-risk
members of the insurance pool. Priest seems to take this view when he argues
that "increases in the range of potential liability outcomes across firms" have
led to an increase in "the likelihood of differences in insurer and corporate
estimates of underlying corporate riskiness."' 59 However, that argument does
not suggest that the increased variance among firms causes the sort of asymme-
try of information necessary to spawn adverse selection. Rather, that argument
suggests that both groups-manufacturers and insurers-are uninformed in their
attempts to estimate "corporate riskiness." And, due to the wider range of
potential risks facing each manufacturer, there is an increased chance that
insurers and manufacturers will fail to agree on a premium that is acceptable
to both. According to this view, insureds who exit the pool are those who
believe themselves to be less risky than insurers believe them to be, not those
who are, in fact, less risky than their premiums suggest. Ultimately, Priest
provides no support for the claim that insurers are asymmetrically uninformed.
He does not explain what information insureds possessed that insurers did not
158. Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1562.
159. Id.
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also possess.160 Absent such an explanation, it simply does not follow that
greater uncertainty increases adverse selection and unravelling.'
160. It would seem that information regarding the relative riskiness of manufacturers is at least as
easily available to insurers as it is to individual manufacturers. Arguably, either (1) insurers have better
information than manufacturers do about manufacturers' changing risk of tort liability, or (2) both insurers
and manufacturers are uninformed about manufacturers' changing risk of liability, such that there is not
the sort of asymmetrical information that can lead to adverse selection and unravelling.
Broadly speaking, there are two types of information necessary for an insurer to determine a manufac-
turer's risk of liability: (1) information regarding the expected costs of injuries caused by the manufacturer's
products; (2) information regarding the likelihood that courts will hold the manufacturer liable for those
accidents. For simplicity, these two types of information shall be referred to as "risk information" and
"liability information," respectively.
What has changed recently in commercial casualty insurance markets is not that insurers suddenly
know less about their insureds. According to Priest's description, there was no decline prior to the "crisis"
in the amount of information insurers had about their insureds. Following the expansion of liability,
however, insurers might have needed to know additional risk information about their manufacturer-insureds.
For instance, since the new regime awards nonpecuniary-loss damages, insurers have had to gather
information on the size and frequency of nonpecuniary losses caused by manufacturers' products. Without
that information, insurers would have been unable to segregate their insureds according to risk. Even if
this is true, however, it does not support Priest's proposal for drastic reform of products liability, because
the insurers' information deficit would last only as long as it took insurers to gather the new information.
Moreover, even if insurers had little information about newly relevant characteristics of their insureds, it
would seem that insureds themselves would have been equally ignorant about characteristics that had previ-
ously been irrelevant to the insureds' prospects for liability. Showing that insurers were uninformed about
newly relevant risk information does not support Priest's unravelling story unless it can also be shown that
insurers were uninformed asymmetrically.
A second possibility for the unravelling of manufacturer risk pools might be that insurers, because
of the changes that had already occurred, were considerably less certain about how the law might change
in the future regarding the injuries caused by its insureds' products. Insurers, in other words, might have
had the same amount of risk information but less liability information. But liability information also does
not seem to be the sort of information that would be asymmetrically distributed to insureds. Indeed, it seems
reasonable to assume that insurers would have better information than insureds regarding the current legal
regime as well as its likely direction. Third-party insurance carriers have legal staffs devoted to processing
tort claims, and would seem to have a comparative advantage over the typical manufacturer-insured at
understanding changes in tort law and estimating the effect of these changes. Moreover, insurers have a
much larger incentive to become informed of changes in the law than individual insureds do. That is true
because insureds, once they obtain insurance, are relatively indifferent to changes in the law. The benefits
of knowing the law and anticipating changes in the law are much higher to insurers, who are responsible
for entirepools of insureds, than to any one of their individual insureds. As one commentator observed
prior to the expansion, "In some instances, the manufacturers apparently do not even inform themselves
of the final resolution of these claims, and for these manufacturers it is obvious that a court decision will
have no direct effect on product design or warning decisions." Whitford, Law and the Consumer Transac-
tion: A Case Study of the Automobile Warranty, 1968 WIs. L. REV. 1006.
But even if manufacturers had some information that their insurers did not, it is not clear that that
would have led to adverse selection. Low-risk insureds would have a strong incentive to disclose that
information to insureds to prove that they were in fact low-risk insureds. Their alternative would be to
withhold information and pay the pool rate. Hence, insurance pricing may act as a "penalty default,"
through which information is passed to insurers, because good risks disclose while bad risks do not, and
insurers can thereby measure or infer each insured's relative riskiness. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note
141, at 95-107. Accordingly, insurers will offer such manufacturers a lower premium. Adverse selection
and unravelling in manufacturer risk pools, at least of the magnitude that Priest describes, seems unlikely.
161. Priest's analysis of whether firms and liability insurers will strike a bargain is much like the
standard economic analysis of whether potential litigants will reach a settlement rather than go to trial. The
bargain, in either case, depends in large part on each party's estimate of the size and the probability of
loss and on the costs of not reaching a bargain. See R. CooTER & T. ULEN, supra note 1, at 484-87; R.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 67, at 522-528; Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A
Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55
(1982). Priest's analysis is interesting inasmuch as it suggests that there may be fewer insurance contracts
because of divergent estimates of corporate risk. But the analysis does not support his conclusion, because
it does not explain why there would be unravelling of low-risk insureds.
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3. Systematic Misestimations of Manufacturer Risk
Priest's theory of the unravelling of manufacturer risk pools is still more
problematic because it requires the implausible empirical assumption that third-
party liability insurers systematically underestimated the riskiness of high-risk
manufacturer-insureds. This empirical assumption is a necessary implicit
premise of the argument given Priest's description of how liability insurers
determine what premiums to charge their insureds. He writes:
Much of the insurance coverage implicated in the recent crisis consists
of what is called special risk underwriting: the provision of insurance
in a highly individualized manner to insured firms, with premiums set
according to the particular characteristics of the insured firm itself.'62
Much of the insurance business involves literally individual assessment
and pricing of risks. . . . "Special risk underwriting" . . . -which is
more predominant in some of the commercial casualty lines affected
by the insurance crisis-involves risk estimates by the insurer on an
individual risk-by-risk basis, with the premium (rather than a rate) set
with the particular characteristics of the insured in mind.'63
Here Priest makes clear that products liability insurance premiums are based
upon an insurer's assessments of the risk posed by individual insureds. If
liability insurers engage in "special risk underwriting," then an insurer's
"pool" is simply the set of its insureds, who do not necessarily share anything
in common with one another other than a common insurer.
This conception of an insurance "pool" is different from the classic concep-
tion of an insurance pool as a collection of insureds about whom an insurer
does not have individualized information and therefore charges every pool
member the same premium, a premium which reflects the average expected
damages of all pool members. Employment-based group health insurance is
a paradigmatic example of this type of insurance pool. Members of these pools
not only share a common insurer but also pay the same premium. Consumers
of a given product, about whom the product's manufacturer does not have
individualized information, also constitute such a pool, and Priest seems to
invoke this conception of an insurance pool in his discussion of consumer risk
pool unravelling. The problems of adverse selection and risk pool unravelling
stem from the fact that in the classic insurance pool the premium charged to
every member of the pool reflects the average risk of all members of the pool.
162. Priest, Antitrust Suits, supra note 47, at 1006.
163. Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1544; see also Abraham, Environmental Liability,
supra note 32, at 954 (describing "risk assessment" and "risk management" in "pollution liability insurance
field").
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As Priest explains, however, liability insurers are charging manufacturers'
premiums based not on averages but on the particular characteristics of the
insured firm. Under these circumstances, adverse selection would occur only
if the insurer systematically undercharged high-risk insureds. And low-risk
insureds would exit the pool only if they were systematically overcharged.
Yet there is no reason to believe that insurers would systematically over-
estimate the risks posed by their low-risk insureds or systematically underesti-
mate the risks posed by their high-risk insureds. One would expect insurers
engaged in "special risk underwriting" to estimate their insureds' risks
correctly on average. That is, insurers might over- or under-estimate the risks
posed by both high-risk and low-risk insureds, but presumably the insurers'
estimates would be distributed normally around the correct value of insureds'
risks.
But even if insurers systematically undercharged high-risk insureds and
overcharged low-risk insureds, that would not support Priest's unravelling
story. Once it is recognized that each insurer sets premiums for insureds on
the basis of the insurer's estimate of the risks that each insured poses, it
becomes difficult to imagine how risk pool unravelling would proceed. If an
insurer were to overestimate the risk posed by its low-risk insureds, those low-
risk insureds might exit the insurer's pool. But this would not cause other
insureds' premiums to rise since, by hypothesis, the insurer is setting premi-
ums based on individualized assessments of each insured and not according
to the average risk posed by all insureds in a given risk pool.
4. Accounting for the Increase in Liability Premiums
Priest criticizes other explanations of the crisis for failing to account fully
for the increase in liability premiums. For instance, he writes:
The Justice Department's study ... does report case-law trends in
fields subjected to substantial premium increases or withdrawals of
insurance coverage. Yet the Justice Department's study falls far short
of documenting the source of the current crisis. The increase in rates
of claims and size of damage awards reported by the Justice Depart-
ment are far smaller than reported increases in insurance premiums.
•.. No trial or settlement statistics... have shown increases that even
remotely correspond to the increases in insurance premiums at multiples
of four, five, ten, fifteen, and more over a period of a few months. 64
164. Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1533-34; see also Priest, Understanding the Crisis,
supra note 47, at 198 ("The rise in [liability] insurance costs, especially when policy terms are taken into
account, clearly outpaced recent claims and judgments, just as it far outpaced interest-rate changes.").
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These unusual premium increases ... are the most damaging evi-
dence to the Justice Department's effort to link the crisis to tort law,
since there is no conceivable correspondence between changes in past
tort judgments (and little correspondence to plausible future judgments)
and premium increases of four, ten, twenty, and more.
165
According to Priest, the most plausible explanation for these increases in
liability insurance premiums is as follows:
The extraordinary increases in premiums within an exceptionally short
period are the best evidence of the effect of expanding tort law on the
constitution of commercial casualty insurance pools. The most plausible
explanation for these unusual increases is the rapid departure of low-
risk members from commercial casualty pools. As the low-risk mem-
bers drop out, the unraveling process begins. Premiums skyrocket. 
166
For Priest, the data on premium increases constitute a significant anomaly for
other theories but provides "the best evidence" for his unravelling story.
However, evidence of increase in overall tort judgments is only relevant to the
average increase in insurance premiums 167 That there was an aggregate
increase of a moderate amount across all pools says nothing about how sub-
stantial the increases in the pools most seriously affected were. Priest's argu-
ment would be more plausible if the increases in the average size and number
of tort judgments affected all insurance pools equally.
But surely the increase in the average size and number of tort judgments
affected different insurance pools differently. Indeed, it is Priest who argues
that the effect of this liability expansion "varies for different companies,
depending on the risk characteristics both of a company's product ... and of
its consumers."168 Moreover, the fact that premiums increased by varying
amounts, by multiples of "four, ten, twenty, and more," shows that the
increases in the average number and size of tort judgements affected different
pools differently. Similarly, the fact that the "crisis has occurred only in
selected commercial casualty lines," as Priest emphasizes, suggests that what
was true on average was not necessarily true for each insured. And finally,
the fact that "[miuch of the insurance coverage implicated . . in the recent
crisis consists of. . . special risk underwriting: the provision of insurance in
a highly individualized manner to insured firms, with premiums set according
165. Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1577-78.
166. Id. at 1578; see also Priest, Tort Law, supra note 47, at 537 (making similar argument); Priest,
Antitrust Suits, supra note 47, at 1014 n.45 (summarizing argument).
167. One analyst estimates that the cost of general liability insurance rose 44% from 1985 to 1987.
See Strasser, Both Sides Brace for Tort Battle; 1987 Focus on States, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 16, 1987, at 1.
168. Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1562.
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to the particular characteristics of the insured firm itself" further suggests that
an increase in expected liability costs across all insureds would have varying
implications for the premiums of each individual insured. In short, it is no
surprise that Priest could find some insurance premiums which had increased
by more, even substantially more, than the average increase in federal tort
judgments.
D. Summary of Part II
Part II challenged the plausibility of Priest's primary contribution to the
products liability reform movement: the theory of unravelling risk pools. This
Part challenged the empirical and theoretical bases for both tiers of the unravel-
ling theory. With respect to the consumer risk pool tier, Part II questioned the
plausibility of the following empirical assumptions: consumers are asymmetri-
cally informed vis-A-vis manufacturers about the risks they pose relative to
other consumers; consumers' income levels correlate with the amount of
pecuniary damages they can expect to receive through products liability
damages; consumers' income levels correlate with the amount of nonpecuniary
damages they can expect to receive through products liability damages; and
manufacturers are unable to segregate consumers according to the risks they
present. Part II has also argued that even if those assumptions held, the risk
posed by a particular consumer is a function not only of the consumer's income
but also of a product injury, and, therefore, that the exodus of low-income
consumers from consumer risk pools would not necessarily spawn unravelling.
Moreover, it is unclear as a theoretical matter whether high-risk consumers
would prefer to join product risk pools in which they enjoyed an insurance
subsidy rather than join pools in which there is no cross-subsidy but in which
the products' manufacturers make greater investments in safety. Similarly, it
is not clear that low-risk consumers would give up products merely because
those consumers are on the wrong end of an insurance subsidy. Finally, even
if unravelling were a problem in consumer risk pools, it is not clear that it
would not be just as much or more of a problem in first-party insurance pools.
With respect to manufacturer risk pools, Part II pointed out that to the
extent that consumer risk pools really have unravelled, the variance within
manufacturer risk pools should have decreased, not increased. This Part also
questioned how the expansion of manufacturer liability could possibly have
increased the variance within manufacturer risk pools, and, moreover, how
an increase in variance would have led to adverse selection by manufacturer-
insureds in light of the fact that there is little reason to believe that commercial
liability insurers were asymmetrically uninformed. Part II also pointed out that
in light of the fact that the commercial insurance pools that Priest claims
"unravelled" were "pools" where the premiums had been set through "special
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risk underwriting" (that is, on an "individual risk-by-risk basis"), even the
theoretical possibility of adverse selection or unravelling is eliminated. Finally,
this Part argued that the phenomena that Priest views as "the best evidence"
for his unravelling theory-the extraordinary increases in certain liability insur-
ance premiums-are not inconsistent with the more moderate increase in the
number of claims and size of damage awards, and hardly constitutes persuasive
evidence of unravelling.
Part III below takes up a more constructive project, providing a set of
arguments that constitute an alternative explanation for recent events in prod-
ucts liability.
III. An Alternative Explanation For The Liability "Crisis"
A. Introduction to Part III: The Crisis Phenomena
This Part argues that there has been no crisis in products liability. The
recent phenomena associated with the "liability crisis" can be attributed not
to the unravelling of insurance pools but rather to two efficiency-enhancing
developments-the internalization of the nonpecuniary costs of product acci-
dents and the internalization of the first-party insurance externality-as well
as to an increase in socio-legal uncertainty.
Section B argues that the inclusion of nonpecuniary losses in damage
awards has caused consumers (and therefore manufacturers) to internalize the
full costs of accidents resulting from product use. Section B also explains the
insurance and deterrence effects of including nonpecuniary losses in damage
awards. From an insurance standpoint, the inclusion of nonpecuniary losses
is desirable because it provides consumers with insurance that they desire but
generally cannot buy. From a deterrence standpoint, the inclusion of nonpecu-
niary losses is desirable because it optimizes both care levels and activity
levels. Section C explains the first-party insurance externality. Finally, Section
D presents and explains the effects of socio-legal uncertainty on the insurance
market and argues that the recent shift to mutual forms of organization is the
market's efficient response to socio-legal uncertainty. Later, Part IV will
compare the alternative explanation provided in this Part with Priest's unravel-
ling theory.
But before providing an alternative explanation, it is necessary first to
specify clearly the empirical phenomena that require explanation. For fairness
and simplicity, this Article takes the following eight empirical phenomena as
those that require explanation: 69
169. Although Priest does not provide such a list, it is possible to locate at various points in his
scholarship the eight phenomena listed above for which a complete theory of the liability crisis must
account. See Priest, insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1527 (listing the phenomena for which a theory
of the crisis must account); id. at 1563-64 (same); Priest, Understanding the Crisis, supra note 47, at 197
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1. The increase in the number and size of tort awards;
2. The still greater increase in the size of liability insurance premi-
ums; 
170
3. The restructuring of liability insurance contracts (reduction of cover-
age);
171
4. The withdrawal of some lines of liability insurance;
5. The trend toward self-insurance (or industry-wide mutuals);
6. The fact that the above phenomena did not also occur in first-party
insurance markets (for example, life, health, and disability
insurance);
172
7. The decrease in the rate of accidents over time;"7
8. The withdrawal (or curtailment) of certain consumer products from
the market.
This Part offers an alternative explanation for these eight phenomena, an
explanation that suggests there was no crisis at all.
Again, according to this alternative explanation, three factors can account
for all of the phenomena associated with the "crisis": (1) the internalization
of nonpecuniary losses; (2) the internalization of the first-party insurance exter-
nality; and (3) the increase in socio-legal uncertainty. Each factor can be taken
as independent of the others, and each factor can explain a substantial portion,
if not all, of the eight "crisis" phenomena.
B. Internalizing the Nonpecuniary Costs of Product Accidents
As mentioned above, courts expanded manufacturer liability not only by
holding manufacturers liable for product accidents more often, but also by
holding them liable for greater amounts. During the most recent stage in the
evolution of products liability, courts have more often awarded injured con-
(same). Priest's perspective on this matter is not unlike those of other scholars who have offered explana-
tions of the crisis. See, e.g., Winter, supra note 39, at 458.
170. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
171. See also TORT POLICY WORKING GROuP, 1987 UPDATE, supra note 1, at 21-22 (describing the
reduction in coverage).
172. Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1582 ("There are vast lines of insurance that have
been totally untouched by the crisis. All first-party insurance lines-auto, health, life, disability-have been
largely unaffected. Even some third-party lines, such as auto and workers' compensation have been
unaffected.").
173. Priest, Understanding the Crisis, supra note 47, at 198-203; Priest, Risk Control, supra note
47, at 222 (The "data show uniformly, within each field, that accident rates have been declining steadily
over exactly the same period during which claims and claims dollars have been increasingly sharply.").
Priest's evidence that the accident rate has decreased seems inconclusive. Priest acknowledges that there
are some problems with the data but maintains that the data are nevertheless suggestive. Priest, Understand-
ing the Crisis, supra note 47, at 200; see also Priest, Accident Rate, supra note 47, at 195 ("The quality
of empirical data is so poor ... that no confident conclusion can be reached about the success of products
liability in establishing incentives for the manufacture of safer products.").
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sumers damages for the nonpecuniary elements of their losses. 74 This Sec-
tion will consider the effects of nonpecuniary loss awards. Because courts
could have awarded damages for the nonpecuniary costs of accidents whether
or not the liability rule became more expansive (that is, whether or not it
moved from negligence toward strict enterprise liability), this Section will
consider the consequences of awarding damages for nonpecuniary losses in
both a pure negligence regime and a more expanded liability regime.
1. Compensation for Nonpecuniary Losses in a Pure Negligence Regime
It has already been noted that even the negligence regime that Priest
proposes might have led to the insurance "crisis. ""' Priest and others point
to the increase in the number of tort claims and to the increase in the size of
tort awards as evidence that there has been an expansion in liability stan-
dards.' 76 The probability of winning an award'77 and the size of the
award'78 both have increased for plaintiffs. To be sure, an expansion in the
liability standard may help explain these empirical phenomena (and this possi-
bility is examined below),"' but the increase in the number of claims and
the size of awards' may also be explained, in part or in full, by the fact
that courts now include nonpecuniary losses in their negligence determinations
and in damage awards, as deterrence objectives require.' 8' For the same
174. See Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1536 & n.89. Here and throughout, a "nonpe-
cuniary loss" is taken to be a loss of the value of something that the injured party considered irreplaceable,
minus its market value. For example, the loss of a family heirloom of little market value would constitute
a nonpecuniary loss. A fortiori, the loss of a valued object for which there was no market at all, such as
a limb, would also constitute a nonpecuniary loss. So too would intangibles such as happiness, for which
there is no market. Damage awards for "pain and suffering," "emotional losses," "loss of consortium,"
and so on, are subcategories of nonpecuniary losses, just as damages for lost earnings and medical expenses
are subcategories of pecuniary losses. While many if not most losses have pecuniary and nonpecuniary
elements to them, "pecuniary losses" and "nonpecuniary losses" are taken to be exclusive and exhaustive
categories.
175. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text, and Part If(B)(4).
176. See Product Liability Reform Act, S. Rep. No. 422, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1986) ("The number
of product liability cases filed in federal district courts has increased from 1,579 in 1974 to 13,554 in 1985,
a 758% increase. "); see also Litan & Winston, Foreword, in LIABILITY: PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY, supra
note 26, at vii (citing the increase in number of personal injury lawsuits and size of awards as evidence
of tort and insurance crisis); TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP, 1987 UPDATE, supra note 1, ch.3 (same).
177. Peterson & Priest, supra note 47, at 365; M. PETERSON, CIVIL JURIES IN THE 1980S: TRENDS
IN JURY TRIALS AND VERDICTS IN CALIFORNIA AND COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS 17 (Rand Institute for Civil
Justice, 1987) (plaintiffs have roughly doubled the percentage of tried cases in which they prevail before
juries from around one-quarter in 1960-64 to one-half in 1980-84).
178. In San Francisco, for example, the averagejury malpracticeaward adjusted for inflation increased
by 830% from the early 1960s to early 1980s. Over the same period, awards increased by 1016% for
products liability jury awards. M. PETERSON, supra note 177, at 22.
179. See infra Part III(B)(2)-III(D).
180. Cf. TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP, 1987 UPDATE, supra note 1, at 38 ("Since non-economic
damages are far more subjective and open-ended than economic damages, it should by no means be
surprising that a sudden surge in damage awards would be largely attributable to a change in the non-econo-
mic ... component of such damage awards.").
181. Litan, Swire & Winston, supra note 15, at 7-13 (explaining that nonpecuniary component of jury
verdicts appears to account for much of the increase in personal injury awards in products liability cases);
Session Two, Discussion of Paper by Peter Huber, 10 CARDozO L. REV. 2287, 2298 (1988) (remarks by
P. Danzon) ("The size of awards has been increasing more rapidly than the frequency of claims. Aggregate
damage awards are increasing at twice the Consumer Price Index each year. . . . [T]he damage awards
may be one of the engines driving this increase in liability because they strengthen the incentive to pursue
Yale Journal on Regulation
accident, injured plaintiffs are, for two reasons, now more likely to bring
claims. First, because courts now include nonpecuniary losses in their negli-
gence determinations, manufacturers are more likely to be found negligent.
Second, because the damages for preventable accidents now include nonpecuni-
ary losses, courts are awarding higher damages. For both reasons, plaintiffs'
expected tort awards for a given accident have increased.182 Thus, the "cri-
sis" could have occurred even in a pure negligence regime.
To see this more clearly, consider Figure 3. From left to right, the horizon-
tal axis represents a continuum of liability from "no liability" to "enterprise
liability." From bottom to top, the vertical axis represents a continuum of
damages from no damages to pecuniary damages alone to pecuniary and
nonpecuniary damages.
Figure 3
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claims. Understanding what is driving awards might provide some insight into what is driving liability.");
see supra Part I(B)(2).
182. See M. PETERSON, supra note 177, at 26 (from 1960s to 1980s, expected award for jury verdicts
in Cook County increased by 4,254% in malpractice cases and by 445% in products liability cases; in San
Francisco, 1,712% and 927% respectively); JURY VERDICT RESEARCH, INC., INJURY VALUATION:
CURRENT AWARD TRENDS (1987) (also reporting explosive trend in expected verdicts). Cf. P. DANZON,
supra note 22, at 24 (There is evidence to "strongly suggest that the expected award is an important factor
in determining whether a claim is filed."); Viscusi, Product Liability and Regulation, supra note 54, at
113-15 (empirical evidence suggests that claimant's decision to drop claim and parties' decision to settle
or to go to trial are strongly influenced by expected value of the case).
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Assume that courts have always applied a negligence standard in products
liability cases but, until recently, included only pecuniary damages and disre-
garded nonpecuniary losses in both their negligence determinations and their
damage awards (i.e., Approach 4, Table 1, supra Part I(B)(2)). Under this
assumption, manufacturer liability for product-caused injuries would be limited
to Box D. Now assume that courts began to include nonpecuniary losses in
their negligence determinations and in their damage awards (i.e., courts shifted
from Approach 4 to Approach 1, Table 1, supra Part I(B)(2)). Manufacturer
liability would now include product-caused injuries in Boxes A, B, D, and
E. '83 The effect of including nonpecuniary losses (that is, of shifting from
Approach 4 to Approach 1) would be indistinguishable from the effect of the
alleged expansion of liability beyond negligence toward enterprise liability. In
either case, damage awards would increase and manufacturers would be liable
for accidents that they were not liable for prior to the change.
This argument can explain the increase in liability insurance premiums.
Because liability insurers now must pay more for product-caused accidents (in
terms of an increase in both the rate and the severity of claims), they have
raised premiums for their insureds. That is, as depicted in Figure 3, liability
insurers must increase premiums to cover, in addition to Box D, Boxes A, B,
and E.
This greater liability can also explain why commercial liability insurers
reduced the scope of their coverage (for example, by increased policy exclu-
sions). Manufacturers that are covered by liability insurers for the costs of
accidents are likely to disregard the costs of any accidents whenever they do
not internalize those costs. As courts' treatment of nonpecuniary losses
changed, manufacturers began to be held liable for nonpecuniary losses.
Consequently, insurers were required pursuant to their newly outdated con-
tracts to reimburse manufacturers for the manufacturers' liability for increasing
amounts.
Inasmuch as this new moral hazard problem plagued liability insurance
markets, liability insurers responded rationally by increasing copayment
arrangements and excluding coverage for preventable accidents. 84 Where
it was impossible for liability insurers to adjust policies and premiums so as
to overcome (or sufficiently mitigate) the moral hazard problem, the increase
in the contract premiums could have been large enough to force some lines of
insurance off the market. 5 In turn, manufacturers might have chosen to self-
183. Under Approach 2, Table 1, supra Part I(B)(2), manufacturer liability would include Boxes D
and E in Figure 3. Under Approach 3, it would include Boxes D and A.
184. The inclusion of nonpecuniary losses might also have created new adverse selection problems
as insurers would suddenly be uninformed (and perhaps asymmetrically uninformed) about aspects of their
insureds that did not matter before nonpecuniary losses were included. See supra note 160 (discussing why
this problem would be only temporary).
185. See Abraham, Environmental Liability, supra note 32, at 947; see also Pauly, The Economics
of Moral Hazard, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 531, 534 (1968); Epstein, Insurance Market, supra note 1, at 653
("[Tihe problem of moral hazard is all pervasive, and responses to it are infinitely various, including
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insure (or to find some other form of insurance that could better cope with this
heightened moral hazard problem) and/or to withdraw some of their products
from the market. These effects would be similar in kind if not also in degree
to the empirical phenomena that Priest and others take as evidence of a liability
crisis. Yet, these changes are not to be lamented. They represent the unavoid-
able consequences of socially efficient policies-that is, requiring manufactur-
ers to internalize the full costs of accidents that they negligently cause." 6
This discussion helps to bring into focus a number of difficulties with
Priest's argument. Priest characterized changes in the liability insurance market
as an inefficient "crisis." He located the source of the "crisis" in the recent
"expansions" of products liability doctrine. And he suggested that courts solve
the crisis by adopting a negligence regime that compensates consumers for all
losses including nonpecuniary losses. But it is not clear that Priest's proposed
regime is significantly different from the current regime, the putative source
of the crisis. If his proposed regime would be efficient, then so might be the
recent "breakdowns"' in liability insurance markets.
Of course, Priest's analysis is based on the empirical assumption that the
liability standard, holding courts' treatment of nonpecuniary-losses constant,
has expanded to become significantly more strict than negligence. In terms of
Figure 3, Priest's view is equivalent to the view that manufacturer liability has
expanded to include some significant portion of Boxes C and F. This expansion
toward enterprise liability is, according to Priest, the real source of the crisis.
Under the more strict standard, manufacturers are sometimes liable for acci-
dents that they could not have prevented through additional investments in
care. Indeed, Priest seems to assume that under the more strict standard
manufacturers- are liable mostly for accidents that they could not have
prevented-that is, when they were not negligent."8 7 Put differently, Priest
assumes that many of the cases brought under our current regime would not
be brought under an ideal negligence regime. Based on this assumption, Priest
concludes that nonpecuniary-loss damage awards have provided no deterrence
benefits but have generated only deleterious insurance effects." 8
complete withdrawal from the market when the hazard cannot be contained at an acceptable price.").
186. Over time, allowing the amount of manufacturer care to vary, we might expect the number of
claims to decline, because manufacturers would find it worthwhile to raise their level of care to meet the
new standard. It is not clear, however, how much time is enough time. Cf. P. DANZON, supra note 22,
at 66-67 (change in liability will affect number of claims depending on how long until insurers and then
manufacturers react).
187. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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Figure 4
Continuum of Product-Caused Injuries
A B C
But that assumption asks a lot, as Figures 4 and 5 attempt to make clear.
Assume that all product-caused injuries are lined up along the continuum in
Figure 4. Segment A represents the injuries that manufacturers would be liable
or under Priest's proposed negligence regime. Taken together, Segments A
and B represent the product-caused injuries that manufacturers have been liable
for under our strict liability regime. And the injuries along Segments A, B,
and C (i.e., 100% of product-caused injuries) are those that manufacturers
would be liable for under an enterprise liability regime. The relative size of
these three segments is unknown.
Although Priest never employs such a diagram, his view of the empirical
setting that gave rise to the crisis phenomena can be understood as depicted
in Figure 5. Again, Segments A and B represent the injuries that manufacturers
have been liable for under our strict liability regime. In Priest's view, the
expansion toward enterprise liability has been almost complete such that
Segment C is quite small. That is, Priest believes that courts have expanded
strict liability almost to the point of enterprise liability. 189 This view is not
only rejected by several tort scholars who argue that our regime is effectively
a negligence regime, 9' it may also be contrary to recent evidence.""
189. See, e.g., Priest, Enterprise Liability, supra note 1, at 527 ("the distance between prevailing
standards and a standard of absolute liability progressively narrows").
190. See supra notes 16 & 84 and accompanying text.
191. What is perhaps the best available evidence suggests that, in fact, the liability standard was
contracting, not expanding, during the insurance "crisis." See generally Henderson & Eisenberg, supra
note 41. But, for several reasons, this evidence is not dispositive. First, it is difficult to ignore the fact that
many keen observers of our products liability system, Priest included, share the belief that courts have been
expanding liability over the relevant time period. Second, there may be lags between the time when a
liability rule is changed, and the time that plaintiffs take account of that change in their decisions about
whether to litigate, and the time that liability insurers adjust to the changes in their insurance premiums.
If there are such lags, previous expansions in the law may have continued to influence liability insurance
premiums at a time when the liability standard was actually contracting. Third, the increase in the rate of
claims that results from the inclusion of nonpecuniary losses should be only a short-run phenomenon.
Assuming the long run is no more than a couple of years, the number of claims should have tapered off
to previous levels as manufacturers have had a chance to adjust their care levels to the new standard. But
the rate of claims has not decreased to the previous level, though it has decreased somewhat, see Sanders
& Joyce, supra note 41, at 227-28, suggesting that the standard itself did in fact expand such that manufac-
turers are now liable for a greater number of unpreventable accidents.
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Figure 5
Priest's View of Continuum of Product-Caused Injuries
A B C
Although it is unclear what percentage of product-caused injuries manu-
facturers would be liable for under an ideal negligence rule, there is evidence
to suggest that the liability standard giving rise to the "crisis" phenomena may
not have been significantly more strict than Priest's proposed negligence stan-
dard. 92 Indeed, it is entirely possible that the previous regime was less strict
than an ideal negligence regime, so that expansions did nothing more than
move the standard closer to what Priest would consider optimal.'93
Priest also implicitly assumes that manufacturers have been liable mostly
for accidents that they could not have efficiently prevented. He assumes, in
other words, that Segment A is small (Figure 5). Again, this assumption can
be inferred from his conclusion that courts, by awarding nonpecuniary-loss
damages, have created harmful insurance effects, but have not generated
beneficial deterrence effects. 94 Arguably, however, to the extent that the
liability standard has expanded, nonpecuniary-loss damage awards were likely
to have been comparatively low in cases in which the manufacturer could not
have prevented the accident. Put differently, it seems plausible that nonpecuni-
ary-loss damage awards have been disproportionately high for injuries that the
It may be, however, that the increase in average damage awards caused the increase in claims to
stabilize at a higher level than previously, not because the liability rule has expanded, but rather because
a greater number of preventable accidents are now large enough (including nonpecuniary losses) to justify
going to court (that is, high fixed-cost threshold is now met for a greater percentage of accidents).
Accidents that were not worth litigating under the old regime because the outcome was small or uncertain
may be worth litigating under the new regime because the larger expected damages make it worthwhile.
See supra note 99.
192. If the internalization of nonpecuniary losses did cause the crisis phenomena, it may be easier
to understand why many commentators argue that the current liability standard is still the old negligence
rule, see supra notes 16 & 84 and accompanying text, while others insist that liability has been expanding,
see supra notes 1 & 14 and accompanying text. If nonpecuniary losses were included in damage awards
and negligence determinations, manufacturers would be held liable more often than they would under a
negligence rule that included only pecuniary losses in damage awards and negligence determinations.
193. See Priest, Accident Rate, supra note 47, at 221-22 (suggesting that the old negligence regime
was not strict enough).
194. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
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manufacturer could have prevented.195 If this is true, then even if Segment
B is significant in terms of the number of product-caused injuries for which
manufacturers are liable, the overall significance of segment B may neverthe-
less be slight, because nonpecuniary-loss damage awards in those cases would
likely be disproportionately low.19 Yet, as explained below, even if Priest
is correct in his empirical assertion that there has been a significant expansion
in manufacturer liability such that Segment B is non-trivial and Segment A is
small, he may nevertheless be incorrect to conclude that the impact of such
an expansion was deleterious to the insurance and deterrence goals of products
liability.
2. Compensation for Nonpecuniary Losses in a Regime More
Strict than Negligence
a. The Insurance Effects
Priest argues that nonpecuniary-loss damages have not furthered the
deterrence goal and that consumers do not demand insurance against the risk
of nonpecuniary losses, so the law should not force it upon them. 197 Put dif-
ferently, Priest's conclusion that nonpecuniary-loss damages have been harmful
rests on two basic claims: (1) that they have served no deterrence benefit; and
(2) that consumers do not demand insurance for them.'98
195. Cf. S. SHAVELL, supra note 67, at 134-35 (describing when nonpecuniary-loss damages are
awarded). A victim of a product-caused injury may endure greater pain and suffering when the injury-
producing accident was preventable by the manufacturer. That is, an accident victim may suffer more grief
knowing that the accident was not a random act of fate but instead an occurrence that could have been,
but was not, avoided; cf. R. COOTER & T. ULEN, supra note 1, at 335, 338 (suggesting that damages may
vary depending on the degree of "moral opprobrium" attached to the liability); Ellickson, Alternatives to
Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land-Use Controls, 40 U. CH. L. REv. 681, 761 (1973)
(describing losses from zoning regulation; "The situation is aggravated, from a fairness standpoint, by the
aggrieved [party's] knowledge that [the losses] are not random"); Michelman, Property, Utility, and
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of Just Compensation Law, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1165, 1216
(1968) (describing "currently observable social practices pertaining to compensation" in takings cases;
"[o]ne clear characteristic of current practices is their reflection of a special urgency in the demand for
publicly financed compensation when a loss has evidently been occasioned by deliberate ... actions.");
id. at 1233-35 (where a program is obviously cost-justified, it is easier for victims to accept than where
the program is not obviously cost-justified; therefore, compensation in a takings claim should, for fairness
reasons, more likely be mandated when loss was obviously inefficient); Rea, Nonpecuniary Loss, supra
note 77, at 42 (courts more likely to award nonpecuniary losses for accidents that were more obviously
negligently caused); Rheingold, The Expanding Liability of the Product Supplier: A Primer, 2 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 521, 531-32 (1974) (plaintiff more likely to prevail when defendant is shown to have done
something wrong).
196. In terms of Figure 3, the authors are suggesting here that insofar as there has been an expansion
beyond negligence toward enterprise liability, manufacturer liability has looked more like A + B + D +
E + F.
197. Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1553. Many scholars agree. See, e.g., S. SHAVELL,
supra note 67, at 153-54, 228-35, 245-54; Cook & Graham, The Demand for Insurance and Protection:
The Case of Irreplaceable Commodities, 91 Q.J. ECON. 143 (1977); Danzon, Tort Reform, supra note 33,
at 524; Rea, Nonpecuniary Loss, supra note 77. But see S. Croley & J. Hanson, Insuring Against
Nonpecuniary Losses (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter S. Croley & J. Hanson, Nonpecuniary Losses].
198. For further critique of the second proposition, see Hanson & Logue, supra note 73, at 182-89.
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Priest makes the following argument in support of his claim that no con-
sumers would want insurance coverage for nonpecuniary losses:
For purposes of insurance ... an award [including both pecuniary and
non-pecuniary losses such as pain and suffering] is far greater than the
level of compensation insurance benefits that any consumer would
want. . . . [T]here is no consumer demand for pain and suffering
coverage in any insurance market in the world because pain and suffer-
ing losses do not affect the marginal value of wealth which is the
purpose of insurance.' 99
But this claim seems too strong. Some consumers appear not only to want
nonpecuniary-loss insurance, some have actually purchased it.2°" And there
is no dispositive theoretical justification or empirical support for Priest's
assertion that nonpecuniary losses do not affect a person's marginal utility of
wealth. 20
199. Priest, Modem Reform, supra note 17, at 16; see also Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19,
at 1553; Priest, Liability Crisis, supra note 47, at 5; Priest, Compensation, supra note 25, at 139.
200. See Danzon, Tort Reform, supra note 33, at 522-28 (recognizing that insurance for pain and
suffering may well exist). E.g., 1989-90 Student Accident Insurance Protection, underwritten by the
Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States (on file with authors) [hereinafter Student Accident
Insurance plan] (offering death, dismemberment, and loss-of-sight benefits, in addition to health benefits,
to students); 1990 Amex Life Assurance Company, American Express Group Accident Protection Plan
(on file with authors) [hereinafter Amex plan] (offering "loss of life" and "personal bodily loss" insurance
for parents and children); Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance: A Description and Certification of
Enrollment in the FEGLI Program (on file with authors) [hereinafter FEGLI plan] ("Accidental Death and
Dismemberment Benefits" for employees are feature of "Basic Life" plan and are doubled under "Option
A-Standard" plan). Under the FEGLI plan, life insurance benefits are doubled if the death is accidental.
But pecuniary losses are no greater in those circumstances. Perhaps the justification for this otherwise
inexplicable distinction is that accidental deaths are more likely to result from injuries that cause more
significant pain and suffering. The extra "benefits are payable . . . if you receive bodily injuries solely
through violent, external, and accidental means ...
201. Other scholars recognize that pain and suffering might affect an individual's marginal value of
wealth. See S. SHAVELL, supra note 67, at 133-35; Schwartz, Proposals, supra note 10, at 408. The
empirical evidence is consistent with either view. As a theoretical matter, it is unclear whether a nonpecuni-
ary loss will increase, decrease, or leave unchanged a person's marginal utility of income. The answer may
vary according to the person's utility function, the size of the loss, the probability of the loss, the nature
of the loss, and so on. S. SHAVELL, supra note 67, at 228-30; Danzon, supra note 33, at 521; Donahue,
The Law and Economics of Tort Law: The Profound Revolution, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1047, 1065 (1989);
Schwartz, Proposals, supra note 10, at 363-64. Priest bases his claim that there is no consumer demand
for nonpecuniary-loss insurance on his own intuition and on the inference he draws from his empirical claim
that consumers do not have nonpecuniary-loss insurance. But the fact that a consumer has no insurance
may say nothing about whether her marginal utility of income would be unaffected by a costly injury. Based
on analogous reasoning one could argue that pecuniary damages should not be awarded to individuals who
do not carry first-party insurance against pecuniary losses. Cf. Levmore, Self-Assessed Valuation Systems
for Ton and Other Law, 68 VA. L. REV. 771, 810-19 (1982) (courts should use the amount for which
injured plaintiff insured herself when buying accident insurance as the sum to compensate her for tortious
harm).
Moreover, as a theoretical matter it is not clear that a, consumer's insurance goal is to equalize the
marginal value of income across states of the world, as scholars who have argued that rational individuals
would not insure against nonpecuniary losses have assumed. The conventional wisdom is that an insurance
purchaser's aim is to equalize her marginal utility of money across different states of the world, based on
the assumption that a rational individual will seek to maximize her total utility summed across all possible
states of the world. See sources cited supra note 197; see also Arrow, Insurance, Risk, and Resource
Allocation, in ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK BEARING 212-16 (1971). Maximizing total utility across
different states of the world requires equalizing one's marginal utility of money across those states. But,
instead of maximizing total utility summed across different states of the world, individuals might seek to
equalize utility across different states of the world. Such an insurance strategy would require moving money
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Consider the metaphor that Priest offers in support of his claim. Priest
suggests that consumers do not demand nonpecuniary-loss insurance because
money damages for "pain and suffering or other emotional losses" are an
"imperfect anesthetic."202 His point seems to be that rational people would
not spend their money to mitigate pain when the pain reliever is less than
perfect. But there is no such thing as a perfect anesthetic. Still, most patients
do not prefer ex ante that their doctors withhold even expensive pain relievers.
If Priest is correct that juries and judges commonly award damages for nonpe-
cuniary losses even when there is no deterrence benefit to be gained from such
awards, then perhaps juries and judges, and not just plaintiffs, believe that
money relieves the pain resulting from nonpecuniary losses, even if very
imperfectly. If anything, the metaphor suggests that there is consumer demand
for nonpecuniary-loss insurance.
Moreover, the prevalence of nonpecuniary-loss damage awards may contra-
dict Priest's claim that consumers do not, ex ante, demand nonpecuniary-loss
damage awards. Priest contends that the "absence" of first-party nonpecuniary-
loss insurance evidences an absence of consumer demand. But Priest's view
raises difficult questions. If permitting nonpecuniary-loss damages is as harm-
ful as he and others contend, and if the intuition that individuals do not demand
insurance for nonpecuniary losses is widely and strongly held, then why do
judges and juries so commonly award them? Why do jurors not recognize the
supposed dangers to all consumers (including the jurors themselves, their
families, and their friends) of awarding nonpecuniary-loss damage awards? In
short, it is unclear why they would consistently act in a way that conflicts with
social interests as well as their own intuitions and self-interests.2 3
Again, Priest suggests that if consumers demanded insurance against the
risk of nonpecuniary losses, first-party insurers would supply it. This sug-
gestion, however, disregards several significant impediments to a market for
nonpecuniary-loss insurance, impediments that together can explain the lack
of supply. To begin with, consumers ex ante have very little of the information
(via insurance premiums) from the non-injury state of the world to injury states of the world beyond the
amount necessary to insure fully against pecuniary losses. This is true because in an injury state of the
world where an individual has suffered a nonpecuniary loss, the individual's total utility is, because of the
nonpecuniary loss, less than in the non-injury state of the world, even after having recovered for all pecuni-
ary losses. If utility is to be spread more evenly across the non-injury and injury states of the world, "extra"
money must be moved into the injury state of the world. Granted, this may require some "sacrifice" of
total utility summed over the non-injury and injury states of the world. But the extent to which a rational
individual will seek to maximize total utility across states of the world, and the extent to which a rational
individual will seek to equalize total utility across states of the world are, where there is a tradeoff between
the two, unclear. In this light, the conventional argument against awarding nonpecuniary losses on the
ground that consumers would never demand insurance against such losses is attenuated. This issue is
pursued in more detail in S. Croley & J. Hanson, Nonpecuniary Losses, supra note 197.
202. Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1547; see also Epstein, Insurance Market, supra note
1, at 653 ("money is an unsatisfactory substitute for health or wholeness"). See supra note 139.
203. One anticipated objection to this argument is that juries are moved by impassioned appeals to
the plight of an injured plaintiffby the plaintiff's counsel. This may be, but the courtroom-drama explana-
tion goes only so far. In general, consumer groups representing the interests of consumers as a whole rather
than the interests of particular plaintiffs favor the awarding of nonpecuniary-loss damages.
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they would need to write reasonably complete contracts.2 4 There are an infi-
nite variety of accidents that might occur, each of which could lead to an
infinite variety of nonpecuniary losses. And yet it is very unlikely that a given
insured will experience a significant nonpecuniary loss of any type during a
contract period. Ex ante, then, there is a low probability of a nonpecuniary
loss and, should one occur, a great deal of uncertainty about the nature and
severity of that nonpecuniary loss. Insureds have too little information to form
a reasonably complete contract, and the costs of obtaining the information ex
ante may well swamp the benefits.2"5
There are important differences between the market for nonpecuniary loss
insurance and, say, the market for health insurance. First, there is a clear
market for health care, and health insurance premiums can be indexed to price
levels in that market. To put the matter another way, expected health-care costs
may be insurable not because they are pecuniary, but because they are know-
able. In contrast, there is no market and no price index for nonpecuniary
losses.2"6 Insurers have little actuarial data with which to measure consumers'
expected nonpecuniary losses, and have less-than-optimal incentives to collect
such data. This is true not just because there is no market index to refer to,
but also because of the free-rider problem that often plagues insurance mar-
kets."07 Given the contracting obstacles, insurers who want to respond to the
demand for nonpecuniary-loss insurance are left with two choices. They could
offer open-ended coverage, the terms of which would not be clear until the
insured made a claim. A health insurance contract, for example, might be
altered to include compensation for the nonpecuniary element of any insured
loss. Even assuming insurers would know what premium to charge for such
coverage, they would still probably face insurmountable adverse selection and
204. Cf. R. COOTER & T. ULEN, supra note 1, at 380 (describing difficulty of measuring nonpecuniary
losses); A. SCHWARTZ & R. SCOTT, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 194 (1982)
(consumers "may often be unable to estimate accurately the probability of incurring consequential damages
.... Consumers are relatively uninformed about the defects and their potential costs.").
205. Cf. W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 57, at 280 ("[Clontracts are costly to make and...
the costs may well exceed the benefits, relative to regulation by tort law, when the contingencies that would
be regulated by contract-death or personal injury from using a product-are extremely remote."); 0.
WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPrrALISM 70 (1985) (transaction costs of explicitly
contracting for a given contingency may exceed the benefits); MacNeil, Contracts: Adjustment ofLong-Term
Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 854,
900 (1978) (long-term, complex contracts become dysfunctional if too rigid); Schwartz, Proposals, supra
note 10, at 371 (costs of creating nonstandard nonpecuniary-loss insurance contract will almost always
exceed the gain to the insured, and therefore the price he is Willing to pay); Shavell, Damage Measures
for Breach of Contract, 11 BELLJ. ECON. 466, 468 (1980) ("[Blecause of the costs involved in enumerating
and bargaining over contractual obligations under the full range of relevant contingencies, it is normally
impractical to make contracts which approach completeness.").
206. See P. HUBER, supra note 1, at 137 ("no insurer could ever accurately assess [nonpecuniary
losses) in advance.").
207. See generally Hanson & Logue, supra note 73. Cf. J. Hanson, The Market's Failure to Provide
Voluntary Hospitalization Insurance from 1930 to 1940: An Empirical Test of the Retardation Hypothesis
at 26 (unpublished manuscript on file with authors) (insurers were inefficiently slow in responding to
demand for medical insurance, in part because of the disincentive to invest in new data and new ventures
given the threat that free-riding competitors would expropriate the gains).
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moral hazard problems." 8 The moral hazard and adverse selection problems
stem in considerable part from the fact that once a claim is made, insurers are
asymmetrically uninformed about the value of the loss and there are no reli-
able, disinterested appraisers available to measure the nonpecuniary damag-
es. 209
Alternatively, insurers might get around some of these contracting problems
by offering small, fixed amounts of coverage for losses that all insureds value
greatly.210 For example, first-party health insurers might contract to pay, say,
208. See P. DANZON, supra note 22, at 118-36; Schwartz, Proposals, supra note 10, at 365; Session
One, Discussion of Paper by Richard A. Epstein, 10 CARDozo L. REV. 2227, 2233 (1989) [hereinafter
Discussion Session One] (remarks by Epstein) ("Clearly an unbounded recovery of consequential damages
introduces a moral hazard problem of serious dimensions.").
Such problems would arise any time an insurer agreed ex ante to pay more than market value for a
loss. Imagine the difficulties of providing insurance for the amount above market price that, say, teddy-bear
lovers value their bears. If X values his bear at $1000 even though the next highest bidder would only pay
$10 for it, an insurer would not be able to fully compensate X if the bear were destroyed. Because the loss
is nonverifiable, the insurer could pay only $10. If insurers compensated X any more than that, nothing
would prevent Y, an unsentimental opportunist, from buying a bear on the market for $10, buying teddy-
bear insurance, and then torching the bear. Insofar as insurers compensate insureds an amount over market
price, they effectively create an arbitrage opportunity, thereby rendering the insurance unworkable. To
be sure, insurers might-as they do with fire insurance for arson and with life insurance for suicide-limit
recovery to those cases in which the insured item was destroyed "by accident." See, e.g., FEGLI plan,
supra note 200 ("Payment to accidental death or dismemberment will not be paid if your death or loss is
caused ... by or a result of intentional self-destruction or intentional self-inflicted injury . . . . "). But this
is only a partial solution, for it is sometimes difficult to distinguish non-accidental from accidental losses.
209. Reliable, disinterested appraisers sometimes provide a solution in similar contexts. For example,
parties to construction contracts often rely on architects, as independent experts, to determine many aspects
of contractual performance. See MacNeil, supra note 205; cf. Michelman, supra note 195, at 1215-18
(explaining the "problem of appraising demoralization costs."). Professor Ellickson often notes that
disinterested appraisers are rare even in thicker markets such as the real estate market. Robert Ellickson,
Class Lectures (Spring Term, 1990). Cf. Haddock, McChesney & Spiegel, supra note 77, at 1 (the
efficiency of legal rules may depend on "thickness" of underlying market). Appraisal values will tend to
favor the interests of the party that hired and paid the appraiser, especially in markets in which a market
price cannot be readily ascertained. Cooter, The Objective of Private and Public Judges, 41 PUB. CHOICE
107 (1983); see also Wilkinson, Analyzing Third-Parry Neutrals, NAT'L L.J., July 16, 1990, at 15-16
(describing the importance and difficulty of obtaining third-party neutrals for successful alternative dispute
resolution).
With regard to medical care costs, insurers rely in large part on doctors to diagnose and treat injuries.
This may pose a problem, however, insofar as doctors have an interest in maximizing their own profits
and, therefore, in providing more care than is necessary at higher than competitive prices. Indeed, some
believe this problem contributed to the drastic increases in the cost of medical care of late. See generally
A. ENTHOVEN, supra note 126. Still, the problem is not as great for the costs of medical care as it would
be for nonpecuniary costs. First, there is some competition among providers so that there are limits on
a physician's ability to raise prices above the competitive level. R. EVANS, STRAINED MERCY: THE
ECONOMICS OF CANADIAN HEALTH CARE 69 (1984); P. FELDSTEIN, HEALTH CARE ECONOMICS 393-409
(2d ed. 1983); P. STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMEmCAN MEDICINE 379-420 (1982).
Likewise, the insurance companies themselves have enough actuarial information regarding the costs of
various medical treatments (from, for example, diagnostic related groupings and health maintenance
organizations) to place meaningful but reasonable limits on the prices that physicians can charge. Greaney,
Competitive Reform in Health Care: The Vulnerable Revolution, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 179, 185 (1988).
Moreover, physicians themselves are "licensed professionals," who have sworn to abide by certain rules
of ethics and, in effect, to ignore the profit motive. See Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics
of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941, 966 (1963); J. Hanson, A Modified Public-Interest Theory
Explanation of Physician Licensure (unpublished manuscript on file with authors).
210. Some scholars argue that the absence of demand for nonpecuniary-loss insurance is indicated
by the fact that parents do not purchase insurance against the risk of losing a child, although the market
could and would supply such insurance were it demanded. See, e.g., Schwartz, Proposals, supra note 10,
at 365. There are several problems with this argument, however. First, such insurance does exist although
it may be less common than some other forms of first-party insurance. Fourteen percent of all ordinary
life insurance policies are for the lives of children under the age of fifteen, and the average benefit of those
policies is $22,000. LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 12 (1988). See, e.g., policies cited supra note 200.
Second, if such insurance were ubiquitous, these scholars might assert that it was for only pecuniary-loss
insurance. That is, it is possible that some portion of all life insurance is nonpecuniary-loss insurance.
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$2,500 for the nonpecuniary component of losing a hand. Insurers could offer
an assortment of contract options to insureds, and ex ante each insured could
choose within a given range how much coverage they want for any of several
possible losses (e.g., loss of a leg, loss of an eye, and so on) and pay accord-
ingly. In fact, much of the nonpecuniary-loss insurance currently available,
takes precisely that form."' For several reasons, however, even this contract
solution is incomplete. First, to the extent that the insurance coverage must
be reduced to prevent the arbitrage opportunities described above, benefits to
consumers of having the insurance will likewise be reduced."' Second, the
Scholars intent on denying the existence of demand for nonpecuniary-loss insurance, however, tautologically
assert that life insurance only covers pecuniary losses. This claim would seem less plausible with regard
to children's life insurance. Cf. R. COOTER & T. ULEN, supra note 1, at 331 ("The death of a dependent
generally entails no loss of income to the rest of the family; on the contrary, the death of a child saves the
family the expense of raising him or her. This fact once posed a difficult problem for courts: they wished
to confine compensable damages to economic losses that are measurable, and yet there are usually no such
losses for the death of dependent children."). Regardless of whether children's life insurance would be to
cover pecuniary or nonpecuniary losses, such insurance may be less common for unrelated reasons.
The authors' view is that children's life insurance is rare because it would violate certain fundamental
social norms. Cf. G. CAL.AREsi & P. BoBBrrr, TRAGic CHOICES 49 (1978) ("the market sometimes fails
when it too clearly prices that to which we would like to ascribe infinite value"); R. COOTER & T. ULEN,
supra note 1, at 331 ("Are compensatory damages for the wrongful death of a child an amount of money
such that the parents would just as soon have the money as the child? This way of speaking is callous and
offensive to parents. It makes no sense to describe the damages given for the wrongful death of a child
as 'compensation.'"); id. at 379 ("The idea that a person could be 'indifferent' between a sum of money
and a child is repugnant."); id. at 382 (suggesting that there are "legal and moral barriers" to markets for
such nonpecuniary-loss insurance). If parents have enough money to buy life insurance, there is social
pressure on them to buy life insurance on their own lives for the benefit of their children. Cf. A. MARSH-
ALL, PRiNCIPLES OF EcoNoMics 228 (1922) ("men labor and save chiefly for the sake of their families
and not for themselves").
There may be an efficiency explanation for the existence of this social pressure. The pressure helps
ensure that parents provide sufficiently for their children in case the parents pass away prematurely. Society,
then, will not have to pay the costs of raising such children. Life insurance, in essence, forces parents to
internalize the costs of bringing a child into the world even when the probability of their death reduces
the expected costs of raising a child. Hence, society will encourage parents to purchase life insurance of
this sort to optimize the number of children and to reduce the probability that society itself will have to
pay those costs through some administratively costly transfer scheme. Conversely, there are strong social
pressures against parents purchasing life insurance on the lives of their children. This may be true because
society tries to create an atmosphere in which there is no incentive for parents to take inefficient risks with
the lives of their children. Cf. Tyler, Can Law Save the Children? NAT'L L.J., July 16, 1990, at 13-14
(describing tension facing judiciary between "fundamental notions of family autonomy and the necessity
for public responsibility for the most defenseless."). It seems doubtful that many parents would deliberately
take the lives of their children (thereby contravening criminal laws), but parents may take, or allow their
children to take, greater risks with their childrens' lives if such insurance is available. See Epstein,
Insurance Market, supra note 1, at 653. Because society cannot monitor these sorts of decisions very
closely, society wants to avoid giving bad incentives. Therefore, insurers and insurance regulators may
be especially cautious regarding the supply of life insurance on the lives of children, and social forces may
constrain consumer demand. Heightened regulation of markets that might otherwise cause harm particularly
to children is not uncommon. See, e.g., G. EADS & P. REUTER, supra note 145, at 49 n.57 ("[T]he act
creating the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration explicitly accepts the idea that
purchasers can be allowed a choice with respect to the degree of safety in automobile construction. On the
other hand, products affecting infant safety, such as toys, are generally subject to stringent safety stan-
dards."). Consistent with this story is the fact that when insurance companies do offer this sort of insurance
on young children they do so primarily for times when the children are outside of their parents' control.
For example, life insurance is commonly made available to cover children when the children are at school
or summer camp. See, e.g., Student Accident Insurance plan, supra note 200; Athletic Accident Insurance
Program, underwritten by All-American Life Insurance Company (on file with authors) (offering insurance
for death, dismemberment, and medical expenses to parents of student athletes for accidents that occur
during games, practice sessions, fund raisers, picnics, and parades). Absent this explanation, it seems odd
that parents would wantto receive money for the death of their children only when the children die away
from home.
211. See, e.g., policies cited supra note 200.
212. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
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losses must be limited to very clear and discrete categories.2"3 If an insured
loses three fingers, for example, or if an insured's entire hand is severely
burned, the insured cannot collect. To collect, the insured must "lose a
hand.'214 Ex ante, any attempt to write a fully specified contract regarding
nonpecuniary losses or to write what is equivalent in form and function to a
liquidated damages clause would be wildly speculative. One or the other parties
will end up taking an enormous loss. Moreover, most first-party insurance is
provided through group plans in which, potential members need only sign an
application in order to join. The added administrative costs of figuring out and
filling out a section on nonpecuniary losses could very well be cost-
prohibitive.215 In short, ex ante contracting does not seem to provide a satis-
factory solution to these problems.
This analysis may help explain why the nonpecuniary-loss insurance that
does exist takes the particular form that it does.2"6 The contracts are uncom-
plicated, offering low, fixed amounts of compensation for a small and well-
defined set of injuries. The losses to insureds from the injuries seem vastly
greater than the insurance compensation (for example, $2,500 for loss of a
foot). In sum, the fact that nonpecuniary-loss insurance is fairly uncommon,
does not itself imply that consumers do not demand it. Instead, this analysis
suggests that despite consumer demand, ex ante contracting difficulties are
often large enough to prevent nonpecuniary-loss insurance from being marketed
widely.
Fortunately, it may be possible to deal with these contracting difficulties
ex post. With hindsight, it is possible to know exactly who the few unlucky
parties who experience a nonpecuniary loss are and to know the nature and
severity of their nonpecuniary losses.217 The problem ex post is that it is not
clear who can be trusted to measure the damages. In the products liability
context, a manufacturer might offer to pay for the pain and suffering that its
products cause. But then once a consumer is injured, the consumer would have
an incentive to overstate the pain. Alternatively, the manufacturer might offer
to pay if and only if the manufacturer itself assessed the amount to be paid.
213. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
214. See, e.g., Travel Accident Insurance plan, supra note 96 ("loss means severance of the limb at
or above the wrist or ankle or joint"); FEGLI plan, supra note 200, at 8 ("Loss of limb is defined as the
loss of a hand or a foot by severance at or above the wrist joint or ankle joint, respectively. Loss of sight,
either in one or both eyes, must be total and permanent.").
215. See supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text.
216. See, e.g., policies cited supra note 200.
217. This ex post approach is usefully employed in many contracting contexts. For example, cattle
dealers often sell to packers on a "grade and yield" basis. Packers do not pay on delivery, because they
cannot at that point discern the quality and quantity of beef the cattle will yield. Once the cattle are
slaughtered, the price term is calculated and the contract price paid. See A. SCHWARTZ AND R. SCOTT,
supra note 204 (discussing In re Samuels & Co., 526 F.2d. 1238 (5th Cir. 1976)).
The benefits of hindsight may explain why Priest and other scholars prefer a negligence rule to a no-
liability rule. See supra note 76. A consumer may be unable to determine ex ante the extent of precautions
taken by a manufacturer to provide optimally safe products. A negligence regime permits the consumer,
in effect, to rely on a contract that is conditional on the manufacturer taking optimal care. Cf. Rea,
Nonpecuniary Loss, supra note 77, at 41.
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But consumers would be reluctant to accept that option because of the manu-
facturer's incentive to raise their prices ex ante and then to understate the
consumer's loss ex post.
218
To measure nonpecuniary losses ex post, consumers ex ante would want
an individual whose only interest was in maximizing the welfare of all consum-
ers. And rather than one individual, they would prefer a group of individuals
so that the measurement is not skewed by what might be rather idiosyncratic
views of one individual. By relying on a group rather than an individual, the
idiosyncracies of the individuals within the group are likely to average out
somewhat. The variance of awards is thus likely to be reduced.2"9 Ex ante,
consumers would want the group to be composed of individuals reasonably
similar to the likely plaintiffs, such as other consumers, so that the group
could, by observing all the evidence, estimate the plaintiffs' actual pain and
suffering with reasonable accuracy and objectivity.220 In short, what consum-
ers would want is something close to what they already have in the current
products liability system-a jury.2 2 ' The tort system can be viewed as an
218. In response, the market might provide appraisers who would be paid to measure objectively the
amount of pain and suffering endured by an injured consumer. However, appraisers would probably offer
a highly imperfect response. See supra note 209.
219. See Saks, /f There Be a Crisis, How Shall We Know It? 46 MD. L. REV. 63, 76 n.51 (1986)
(all else equal, moving from 12 to 6 jurors created greater variance in awards, perhaps by 41%); see also
Klevorick, Jury Size and Composition: An Economic Approach, in THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC SERVICES:
PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE HELD BY THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION IN TURIN, ITALY
75 (M. Feldstein & R. Inman eds. 1977) (juries should be composed of a "portfolio" of viewpoints).
220. Cf. Schwartz, Proposals, supra note 10, at 392-96 (explaining that although juries cannot measure
a manufacturer's negligence, they can measure the "negligence of real persons").
221. The court system is also used in this way in contract cases. As Ayres and Gertner have noted,
courts sometimes employ "tailored defaults" as a means of giving the parties to a contract precisely "what
they would have contracted for" had contracting costs been lower. Under the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS, courts determine "what the individual contracting parties would have wanted" by deciding
what would have been reasonable "in relation to the 'circumstances' of the individual contracting parties."
Ayres & Gertner, supra note 141, at 91-92 (footnotes omitted).
Some might insist that judges and especially juries are incapable of making rational decisions in such
complex contexts. Cf. Priest, Modem Reform, supra note 17, at 36 ("I am unsure that it is possible to
continue to endorse the system of trial by jury in the context of a serious effort to reduce the accident rate";
Priest challenges the grounds upon which "[t]rial by jury in the complex contexts of modern tort law has
been largely defended."); see also Sanders & Joyce, supra note 41, at 248 ("Beliefs about jury behavior,
more than any other single factor, seem to have fueled tort reform."). Yet, at least for this "gap-filling"
role, juries seem perfectly appropriate. Since individual consumers have so little information ex ante, juries
would seem to have superior information about what a consumer's preferences were ex ante or at least
about what a reasonable consumer's preferences would have been ex ante. Cf., e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279 (1987) (The core of the jury function is to make "the difficult and uniquely human judgments
that defy codification and that 'build discretion, equity and flexibility into a legal system.'"); O'Neill v.
Krzeminski, 839 F.2d 9, 14 (2d Cir. 1988) (acknowledging importance of deferential treatment of jury's
assessment of damages); Jones v. Atlantic Refining Co., 55 F. Supp. 17, 19 (E.D. Pa. 1944) ("Courts
in general are most reluctant to disturb a jury's verdict on the ground of excessiveness where the damages
are unliquidated and there is no fixed measure of mathematical certainty. This is particularly significant
.. .in tort actions for personal injuries."); Armit v. Loveland, 115 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1940); see also
Labaton, supra note 19 (summarizing Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 41; quoting Henderson: the
results of our study "make it clear that the courts are not the savage, horrible system they have been
portrayed as by critics who have called for sweeping tort reforms."); id. (summarizing government study
completed by General Accounting Office; study "takes issue with the view that product liability lawsuits
have become wildly unpredictable and overly generous to victims of defective products;" "damage awards
in five states have been neither erratic nor excessive, but in general are consistent with the kind of injury
suffered by plaintiffs.").
It should be noted that consumers and consumer groups do not appear to object to the inclusion of
nonpecuniary-loss damage awards. Scholars base their claims about what consumers want on arguments
that do not seem to have been articulated by consumers. It is primarily manufacturers and insurers who
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efficient public response to a market failure: the inability of insurance markets
to respond to consumer demand for nonpecuniary-loss insurance.222
In sum, although consumers may demand nonpecuniary-loss insurance, they
cannot satisfy that demand through the market because contracting ex ante for
nonpecuniary-loss insurance would be either incomplete or cost-prohibitive.
Given those contracting difficulties, it is little wonder that nonpecuniary-loss
insurance is marketed in only a limited set of circumstances. Using the tort
system to measure and award nonpecuniary-loss damages ex post may solve
the problem of unsatisfied demand and thereby increase social welfare.
223
b. The Deterrence Effects
As discussed above, Priest's argument that nonpecuniary-loss damage
awards have generated no deterrence benefits fails to the extent that manu-
facturers have been liable to the same extent in the current regime as they
would be in an ideal negligence regime. But even if Priest is correct that the
current regime is more strict than negligence (see Figure 5, supra), the inclu-
sion of nonpecuniary losses in damage awards would still have significant
deterrence benefits.
are lobbying to change the rules. For instance, in 1986, the Insurance Information Institute spent over $6
million in advertising and other efforts to place the blame of the insurance crisis on the tort system.
Herbert, Tort Reform Drive Launched, J. CoM., Mar. 19, 1986, at 1, col. 2.
222. The authors' view of the civil jury is analogous to Churchill's view of democracy: The jury is
the worst of all possible systems for estimating nonpecuniary losses, except for all the others. Cf. Ayres
& Gertner, supra note 141, at 97 n.46 (suggesting that ex post reliance on courts can be efficient);
Klevorick, supra note 219 (suggesting that juries perform a "public service"). Other insurance arrangements
may exist because insurers can rely on some publicly provided disinterested "appraiser." For example,
there are various state and Federal investigators who determine the causes of deaths, fires, and automobile
accidents. Accordingly, life insurers can more easily exclude coverage for suicides, property insurers can
more easily exclude coverage for arson, and automobile insurers can more easily adjust premiums based
on accident rates. Epstein stresses that the availability of commercial flight insurance is made possible in
part because insurers can rely on "the elaborate set of institutional arrangements." Epstein, Insurance
Market, supra note 1, at 662; see also Priest, Warranty, supra note 47, at 1315 n.100 ("The information
on which the medical or accident insurer relies, of course, is frequently a by-product of the activities of
other industries, such as the rendering of medical diagnosis or the administration of the traffic laws.").
223. R. EPSTEIN, C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, supra note 14, at 672; A. SCHWARTZ & R. ScoTlr,
supra note 204, at 194. Some might argue that this analysis proves too much insofar as it extends beyond
the products-liability context and justifies forcing first-party insurers to compensate insureds for nonpecuni-
ary losses against their apparent will. Perhaps, but the argument need not be taken so far. It applies in the
products liability context in a way that it does not in the first-party insurance context. In the products-
liability context, the court system-for deterrence reasons-is already mobilized. The parties are already
in court and the court is already measuring nonpecuniary losses. This is not the case in the first-party
insurance context.
As discussed above, Priest believes that the optimal liability rule would require manufacturers to pay
the total costs, including the nonpecuniary costs of consumer injuries resulting from the manufacturers'
negligence. See supra Part I(B)(2). He also believes that product warranties would, absent the interference
of tort law, optimize deterrence and allocate product risks efficiently between manufacturers and consumers.
See generally, Priest, Warranty, supra note 47. It is worth noting, however, that these two views are in
tension with one another: product warranties have never allocated nonpecuniary-loss damages to manufac-
turers even for accidents they could have efficiently prevented. See S. Croley & J. Hanson, Understanding
Products Liability, supra note 1. Thus, even from Priest's perspective, it is not clear how one can be
sanguine about the quality of manufacturer contracts. Id.
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Priest urges lawmakers to abandon the current "strict liability" regime and
to adopt his proposed negligence regime instead.224 Priest's recommendation
is based in large part on his claim that a cost-benefit negligence standard would
provide optimal deterrence. 225 There are, however, shortcomings in Priest's
approach. To explicate those shortcomings it is necessary to recall the two
types of investments in accident prevention: care-level investments and activity-
level investments.226 Consider, for example, automobile accidents. Drivers
can prevent auto accidents in two ways: They can take greater care when they
drive, and they can drive fewer miles. Priest, however, recognizes as "pre-
ventable" only "care preventable" accidents. 227 Thus he acknowledges that
when drivers can reduce by some amount, x, the expected cost of accidents
by investing some amount, y, in care (e.g., reducing the average speed
driven), then so long as x is greater than y, such care-level investments should
be made. But he does not acknowledge that, when drivers can reduce by some
amount, x, the expected cost of accidents by investing some amount, y*, in
activity (e.g., reducing the number of miles driven and thereby foregoing some
benefits of driving), then so long as x is greater than y*, such activity-level
investments should be made as well. 221 Yet these two methods of cost-
effectively preventing accidents are analytically identical. They are two compo-
nents of the same general cost-benefit analysis. 229 If the benefits-in the form
of a reduction in expected accident costs-exceed the costs of additional care
or of reduced activity, then deterrence considerations require that cost-justifi-
able investments in accident prevention be made.
Legal economists have observed that courts, when conducting negligence
analyses, typically ignore the activity levels of defendants and consequently
too often spare defendants from liability when the defendants in fact could have
efficiently prevented the accident by reducing their activity levels. 20 It is
primarily for this reason that legal economists sometimes recommend enter-
prise liability over negligence, especially when the number of accidents is
thought to depend in considerable part on the defendants' activity levels. And
224. See supra Part I(A).
225. Priest, Modem Reform, supra note 17, at 7. Indeed, Priest suggests that deterrence under a
negligence rule would be superior to that under our current regime. Id. at 23.
226. See Shavell, Strict Liability, supra note 27, at 2. The activity-level effect of a liability rule is
the change in the total cost of accidents resulting from a change in the frequency with which the injurer
engages in an activity, holding care-levels constant. The care-level effect is the change in the costs of
accidents resulting from 'a change in the amount of care taken by the injurer, holding activity levels
constant. See generally R. COOTER & T. ULEN, supra note 1, at 368-69; A. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION
TO LAW .AND ECONOMICS ch. 6 (2d ed. 1984); S. SHAVELL, supra note 67, at 5-32 (same); Landes &
Posner, Products Liability, supra note 1, at 538. For earlier discussions of the distinction between activity-
level and care-level effects, see Landes & Posner, Tore Law, supra note 27, at 871-77, 904-08; Polinsky,
Strict Liability versus Negligence in a Market Setting, 70 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS) 363
(1980); see also G. CALABRESi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 73-75 (1970).
227. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
228. Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1536 n.90; Priest, Modem Reform, supra note 17,
at 10-11.
229. Donahue, supra note 201, at 1059-63.
230. See, e.g., R. COOTER & T. ULEN, supra note 1, at 368-69; S. SHAVELL, supra note 67, at 25.
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it is because negligence is viewed by legal economists as deficient in this
respect that Priest (in order to maintain that negligence and strict liability are
equivalent in deterrence terms) must argue that activity-level considerations
should be ignored when choosing among products liability standards.
With activity-level deterrence in mind, it is revealing to examine Priest's
description of how a negligence regime would optimize deterrence:
If the principal goal of modern law is to be accident control, how can
it best be achieved? Controlling the accident rate is a very simple
proposition. There is now a voluminous literature in the law and eco-
nomics field unanimous in its conclusion that the accident rate can be
reduced to the level optimal for the society by asking at trial one simple
question: Is it possible to identify any specific cost-effective action that
either the injurer or victim could have taken which would have
prevented the accident? If so, then liability should be placed on the
party that could have prevented the accident most effectively in order
to create incentives to take such actions in the future. If no specific
action can be identified, then the issue in the case becomes totally one
of insurance for the loss. The only question relevant at trial should be,
"Could this accident have been practicably prevented prior to its
occurrence?" . . . [F]or the objective of accident reduction, everything
else is irrelevant. 231
Priest's focus shifts from "accident control" to "controlling the accident rate."
But these two phrases do not seem to mean the same thing. "Controlling the
accident rate" involves controlling only care-level investments. The accident
rate is optimized, in other words, when the cost of accidents per use of a given
product is minimized. 2 And this will be the case whenever all cost-justified
investments in care have been made. In contrast, "controlling accidents" (that
is, deterring accidents) 233 involves both care-level and activity-level invest-
ments. Accidents are optimally deterred only when both the accident rate and
the number of product uses are optimized. 4 Having shifted the focus from
231. Priest, Modem Reform, supra note 17, at 20-21 (citation omitted).
232. Although Priest never explicitly defines "accident rate," that definition is clearly implied.
Moreover, other prominent contributors to the law and economics literature to which Priest refers do
explicitly define "accident rate" in this way. See, e.g., W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 57, at 280
n.6 ("accident rate" equals "the number of accidents divided by some measure of use of the product
involved in the accidents").
233. Priest, Compensation, supra note 25, at 127 (defining "accident control" as synonymous with
"deterrence").
234. Elsewhere, Priest seems to acknowledge the distinction between the number of accidents and
the rate of accidents. Priest, Accident Rate, supra note 47, at 222 ("There is no empirical evidence
whatsoever of an effect of the tremendous expansion of products liability on the number or rate of product-
related accidents. "). The following quote further illustrates Priest's emphasis on the accident rate rather
than on accident reduction in general:
The simple way to reduce the accident rate in all product- and service-related contexts is
to ask "Was there a specific act that could practicably have been taken that would have
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"accident control" to "control of the accident rate," Priest has removed
activity-level considerations from his analysis. Priest offers a two-part justifica-
tion for that omission:
There has been some increasing attention in modern decisions to
employing liability rules to affect the level of injurer activity by inter-
nalizing costs .... With respect to the basic structure of modern tort
law, however, [this] effectf easily can be put aside. [I]nternalizing
costs to affect activity levels can only be shown to improve social
welfare after a study of supply and demand conditions that would dwarf
any previously known antitrust investigation. . . . Perhaps at some later
point in the refinement of a novel tort law regime, effects on activity
levels ... may become relevant. In the current context, however, they
are trivial sidelights in comparison to the central importance of defining
a legal regime to control the accident rate and to provide coherent com-
pensation insurance.235
Thus, according to Priest, activity-level effects should be disregarded when
choosing among liability rules first because they are costly to measure and
second because the benefits of taking them into account are trivial. The latter
claim is unsubstantiated; no one knows how empirically significant activity-
level effects would be. 6 Though perhaps not easily demonstrated, the activi-
ty-level effects of a liability rule may well be orders of magnitude greater than
the care-level effects that Priest emphasizes.7
The remainder of this Section considers the claim that activity-level consid-
erations are too costly to measure. First, this Section will examine Priest's
prevented the accident?" If such an action cannot be shown, then attaching liability in the
case will not affect the accident rate. The only effect of liability will be an insurance effect
for what must be unpreventable loss. For example, if it cannot be shown that the officers
of a municipality could have practicably prevented a child from falling off a playground
slide, then the accident rate will not be affected by holding the municipality liable for the
child's injuries. If it cannot be shown that a pharmaceutical company could have practica-
bly prevented an adverse reaction to a drug, then the rate of adverse reactions will not be
affected by holding the manufacturer liable for the injury. If it cannot be shown that an
asbestos manufacturer could have practicably lessened the chances of contracting cancer
from wartime use of asbestos, then the rate of asbestos injuries will not be influenced by
holding the manufacturer liable, nor will the future injury rate from the use of other
substances causing cumulative disease, because there will be nothing manufacturers of
these substances can do to reduce it.
Priest, Modem Reform, supra note 17, at 21-22.
235. Id. at 9-10; see also Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1537 & n.90.
236. Indeed, Priest himself has recently noted: "Almost every human action will increase the
probability of some loss by some amount; empirically, it would be extremely rare for an action to contribute
zero toward the probability of occurrence of all losses in all contexts." Priest, Risk Control, supra note
47, at 215.
237. Consider, for example, the personal injuries that stem from smoking cigarettes. To be sure, a
smoker's failure to take care may lead to fires and bums, but it seems likely that the greater costs of
cigarette smoking stem from smokers engaging in too much activity. A smoker's risk of contracting lung
cancer, for example, probably depends more on the number of cigarettes that person smokes than on the
care she takes in smoking them.
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claim that courts should disregard activity-level considerations in most tort
contexts because of the high costs of determining the efficient activity levels
for the parties involved. Second, this Section will show that while his claim
may be relevant in other tort contexts, it is irrelevant in the products liability
context, except insofar as it undermines arguments in favor of a negligence
rule. For simplicity, the remainder of Part III proceeds under the assumption
that care levels are optimized.
Outside the products liability context," courts, in choosing among liabili-
ty regimes, face the option of either altering potential victims' activity levels
(under a negligence or a no-liability standard) or altering potential injurers'
activity levels (under a strict liability standard)." In an ideal negligence
regime, courts would alter the activity levels of potential injurers by taking
activity levels into account in their negligence determinations. But as mentioned
above, scholars of law and economics agree that, in practice, courts do not or
cannot take activity levels into account in their negligence analyses.24'
Accordingly, these scholars sometimes recommend strict liability as a means
of optimizing the activity levels of potential injurers especially when accident
costs are believed to be highly responsive to injurer activity levels.241
For example, consider manufacturer-caused accidents where the costs fall
only on third parties (that is, persons other than the consumer or the manufac-
turer). If a manufacturer of electricity provided power to Region A but, as a
function of its activity level, spewed noxious fumes into the lungs of third
parties in Region B, then under a negligence rule the manufacturer would not
internalize those costs. Some scholars have argued that to produce a more
efficient outcome courts should hold manufacturers strictly liable for the costs
of such injuries.
2 42
Figure 6 illustrates how such a rule would lower the costs of accidents by
reducing the manufacturer's activity level. A firm's marginal private costs are
drawn as the MPC curve, which represents the manufacturer's costs excluding
those costs imposed on third parties. The firm's marginal social costs are
drawn as the MSC curve. The MSC curve represents the total social costs
caused by the firm including the marginal private costs and, c, the costs to the
injured third parties in Region B. Finally, demand for the firm's product is
drawn as the MSB curve, representing the marginal social benefit associated
with each unit of output (activity).
238. Perhaps this is what Priest means when he writes: "With respect to the basic structure of tort
law.. . ." See supra text at note 235.
239. R. COOTER & T. ULEN, supra note 1, at 369; W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 57, at 107-
12.
240. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
241. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 67, at 163; S. SHAVELL, supra note 67, at 23.
242. See e.g., Spence, Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure and Producer Liability, 44 REV.
ECON. STUD. 561 (1977); Polinsky, supra note 225; cf. A. PiGoU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th
ed. 1948) (arguing that manufacturers should be required to pay a tax equal to the costs they impose on
others).
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Figure 6
Effect of Activity Levels on Costs of Accidents
0 Qe Q*
Figure 7
Effect of Activity Levels on Costs of Accidents
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A social loss results because the manufacturer produces beyond the point
where the marginal social benefits equal the marginal social costs (that is,
beyond the point where MSB intersects with MSC). For each unit of produc-
tion between Q, and Q*, the social loss is measured by the difference between
the marginal social costs and the marginal social benefits (i.e., MSC - MSB)
so that the total social loss can be measured by the shaded triangle DEF. By
placing upon the manufacturer the total costs imposed by the manufacturer's
activity, the MSC curve effectively becomes the manufacturer's marginal
private cost curve. Under such a rule, the manufacturer would-because it has
"internalized" the total costs of its activity-produce only up to Q, units of its
product. In other words, the manufacturer would reduce its activity levels until
reaching the socially efficient level.
Priest's point seems to be that this analysis presumes that courts can
determine the relative, long-term values to potential injurers and potential
victims of conflicting activities. But as Priest and others have correctly noted,
this basic activity-level analysis is incomplete.243 Courts cannot easily deter-
mine whether in the long run there should be less electricity in Region A or
fewer people in Region B. Put differently, there seems to be no basis for the
conclusion that the manufacturer and not the population of Region B should
be required to reduce its activity. Under strict liability, Region B would, in
effect, impose a cost upon the manufacturer by forcing the manufacturer to
reduce its activity level. And the population of Region B would not internalize
that cost as part of its own marginal private cost curve. Unless courts can
measure the utility functions of the affected parties, they cannot know which
liability rule will lead to the optimal result. Therefore, since courts cannot
measure utility functions, they should disregard altogether this efficiency
justification for strict liability.
One immediate problem with this argument, however, is that the central
point-that courts are incapable of accurately estimating utility functions and
supply and demand conditions-is as strong an indictment of Priest's proposal
as it is of a standard under which courts must attempt to take activity levels
into account. 2" That is, the information required by courts to determine the
marginal costs of accident prevention to injurers and victims in the form of
increased investments in care is no less expensive or inaccessible than the
information required to determine the marginal costs of accident prevention
to injurers and victims in the form of increased investments in reduced activity.
In either case, courts must, to do their job well, estimate and compare supply
243. See, e.g., W. LANDS & R. POSNER, supra note 57, at 48; R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS,
supra note 67, at 162-63; S. SHAVELL, supra note 67, at 29. See generally Coase, The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (explaining how costs that were traditionally viewed as "external" to
defendant activity could instead be viewed as "internal" to plaintiff activity).
244. Cf. Donahue, supra note 201, at 1059-63.
and demand schedules under alternative liability rulings.245 Thus, if Priest
is correct to criticize scholars and courts for employing activity-level justifica-
tions in support of strict liability, then he is wrong to ignore the relevance of
the same criticism to his proposed cost-benefit negligence standard.
There is a second problem with Priest's reasoning on this issue. He argues
that because courts cannot readily measure utility functions, they cannot decide
whether the manufacturer or the population of Region B should have to reduce
activity levels. However, he draws the conclusion that lawmakers should
therefore ignore the issue of cost internalization when making the choice
between strict liability and negligence in the products liability context, where
there is a market nexus between manufacturers' activity levels and consumers'
activity levels. And he applies this conclusion where consumers, not third
parties, are the victims of product accidents. Insofar as the activity levels of
consumers and manufacturers are linked, however, Priest's application of this
conclusion to claims made by a product's consumers is misplaced.2' For
claims stemming from injuries to a product's consumers, courts need not
choose between the consumer's activity level and the manufacturer's activity
level in their application of a liability rule.247 This conclusion follows only
for any product whose useful life is a function of a consumer's activity level
(everything from hamburgers to typewriter ribbons to automobiles). For any
product whose useful life is unrelated to a consumer's activity level (a compact
disk, for example), activity-level considerations are as difficult for courts to
take into account as care-level considerations are. Of course, if consumers are
well informed about product risks and if insurance mechanisms do not distort
parties' incentives, then any liability rule will generate optimal consumer and
manufacturer activity levels.
Figure 7 illustrates this proposition. MB* represents consumers' marginal
total benefits when consumers do not have to pay for the marginal cost of
product accidents, c, in addition to a given market price. If, in addition to a
given market price, consumers must also bear c, then their marginal benefits
would be reduced by c to MB'. That is, MB' represents the amount consumers
are willing to pay for the product if in addition to the market price they must
also pay c. P* is the total price or marginal cost (MC*) of the product includ-
ing c. P' is the price or marginal cost (MC') excluding c.
Under either a no-liability regime or a negligence regime, manufacturers
will not be liable for c. Therefore, under either regime, they will charge P'
(= MC'). The consumers' demand under this regime is MB' reflecting the fact
245. Recognition of this fact underlies Alan Schwartz's preference for strict liability over negligence.
Under strict liability, this costly-if not impossible-analysis need not be conducted. Schwartz, Proposals
supra note 10, at 384-92; see Hanson & Logue, supra note 73, at 169-70.
246. Note that this shall be a fundamental qualification of Priest's argument, because most product-
caused injuries occur to consumers. See Hanson & Logue, supra note 73, at 135 n.29.
247. See Shavell, Strict Liability, supra note 27, at 4-6 (making a similar point).
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that consumers must, in addition to the market price, bear c, the expected cost
of product accidents. The equilibrium activity level (i.e., where MC' = MB')
is Qe, which, as was true in the previous example, is the efficient activity level
for the manufacturer.
In an enterprise liability regime (that is, a strict liability regime in the
products liability context), manufacturers will be liable for c. As a result, the
manufacturer's costs will increase to MC* and, accordingly, price will rise
to P*. Under this regime, consumer demand will be MB*, and, .again, the
equilibrium activity level (i.e., where MC* = MB*) will be Qe. Again, Q,
represents the efficient activity level for manufacturers and consumers.
Assuming that consumers know perfectly their expected losses from con-
suming each product, any products liability rule will optimize activity levels
because of the price nexus between manufacturers and consumers. Courts
could flip a coin to choose between liability rules and still ensure optimal
activity levels. It is therefore irrelevant whether courts have the ability to
determine what the optimal activity levels are.
Priest is mistaken, then, in concluding that courts should disregard the
activity-level effects of a liability rule. Because consumers do not know
perfectly their expected nonpecuniary losses, the only rule that will optimize
activity levels, and hence the only rule that will optimize deterrence, is enter-
prise liability. 4 Only under enterprise liability will manufacturers and con-
sumers, bound together by the price mechanism, both internalize the full costs
of their activities.249
248. See Hanson & Logue, supra note 73; Schwartz, Proposals, supra note 10, at 405-06.
249. There are several reasons that consumer product markets fail to optimize activity levels or care
levels with respect to nonpecuniary losses. First, consumers may tend systematically to underestimate the
risk of nonpecuniary loss. Cf. G. CALABRESI, supra note 226, at 56-58; R. COOTER & T. ULEN, supra
note 1, at 416; Calabresi & Klevorick, supra note 84, at 617 n.88; JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEuRISTICs AND BIASEs (D. Kahneman, P. Slovic & A. Tversky eds. 1981). Second, because of the small
probability to each consumer of significant nonpecuniary losses, the information and transactions costs of
estimating expected nonpecuniary losses (especially when they would be small) may exceed the benefits
to each consumer. Cf. W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 57, at 274; R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS,
supra note 67, at 166; Landes & Posner, Products Liability, supra note 1, at 544. Third, even if consumers
do not systematically misestimate the risk that products pose, there may still be adverse selection and
unravelling problems that lead to suboptimal deterrence. See, e.g., Hanson & Logue, supra note 73, at
176-77; Akerlof, supra note 117. In recommending that nonpecuniary losses be included in his proposed
negligence regime, Priest implicitly acknowledges that there exists a market failure with regard to nonpecu-
niary losses. See supra notes 76 & 223 and accompanying text. Otherwise there would be no reason to
include them in the negligence determination or damages calculus.
Most legal economists believe that product warranties are efficient, not exploitative, when allocating
between manufacturers and consumers the risk of product failures that do not lead to personal injury. From
this, they have concluded that contracts allocating the risk of personal injury between manufacturers and
consumers would also be efficient, if such contracts were enforceable. See generally S. Croley & J.
Hanson, Understanding Products Liability, supra note 1. But this conclusion may be unwarranted. Most
pecuniary elements of personal injuries are already covered by first-party insurers, so we should not expect
consumers to demand (or manufacturers to supply) insurance against such losses with the product. See infra
notes 252-53 and accompanying text. And the nonpecuniary component of personal injuries would also
be very costly to contract for ex ante. See supra notes 203-23 and accompanying text.
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C. Internalizing the First-Party Insurance Externality
The above section argued that an expansion in liability standards toward
enterprise liability may very well have produced desirable deterrence effects
with regard to nonpecuniary losses. This Section, considering only pecuniary
losses, shows how such an expansion in liability may have had the effect of
shifting the insurance burden from consumers and their first-party insurers to
manufacturers and their liability insurers. This Section argues that this shift
of the insurance burden produced still more desirable deterrence effects and
that the "crisis" phenomena that resulted from the shift were efficient.
As described above, Priest's characterization of the "crisis" phenomena
as inefficient, and his advocacy in favor of greater reliance on first-party
insurance mechanisms, greatly depend upon his assumption that first-party
insurance is efficient.50 It has recently been argued, however, that first-party
insurance, unlike manufacturer-provided insurance, removes from consumers
and manufacturers incentives necessary for efficient investment in accident
prevention. Consumers are insured through first-party mechanisms against most
of the pecuniary risks of product accidents." First-party insurers rarely and
imperfectly adjust premiums according to each individual consumer's decisions
concerning exactly what products are purchased, how many of each product
are purchased, and how carefully those products are consumed. The failure
of first-party insurers to adjust premiums according to those "consumption
choices" gives rise to the "first-party insurance externality. "" Through first-
party insurance, injured consumers are compensated for many of their losses
stemming from product-caused injuries. And to the extent that first-party
insurers do not adjust premiums according to consumers' expected accident
costs, injured consumers will ignore those costs, externalizing them upon their
fellow first-party insureds.
This first-party insurance externality may seriously undermine the deter-
rence effects of products liability. To the extent that consumers are compen-
sated through first-party insurance, a products liability rule can have only an
attenuated effect on consumers' willingness to invest in accident prevention.
Consequently, to the extent that manufacturers are not held liable through
products liability for all preventable accidents, manufacturers will have little
or no incentive to invest in accident prevention. Care levels will be too low,
and activity levels too high:
[T]he deterrence implications of this externality . . . can be loosely
summarized as follows. Under a negligence regime, manufacturers will
250. See supra Section I(A).
251. See generally Hanson & Logue, supra note 73.
252. See id.
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make suboptimal investments in product safety, and activity levels will
be inefficiently high. Under an enterprise liability regime, on the other
hand, manufacturers will efficiently invest in product safety and activity
levels will be optimal. Enterprise liability, then, eliminates the insur-
ance externality for these deterrence variables."
If correct, this argument suggests that under the previous regime products were
inefficiently maintained on the market owing to the first-party insurance
externality. As the law shifted toward an enterprise liability regime, consumers
and manufacturers were forced to internalize the costs of those products.
The "crisis" phenomena can thus be explained as the inevitable and desir-
able consequence of internalizing the first-party insurance externality. By
expanding the liability rule toward enterprise liability, as Part III(B)(2)(b)
explained deterrence considerations require, courts increased the number of
successful claims made against manufacturers. Liability insurers were made
liable for accidents that they were not liable for prior to the expansion. Conse-
quently, liability insurance premiums have increased. Because some of the
product accidents occurring prior to the expansion were preventable, it is
understandable that liability insurers not only raised their premiums, but also
restructured their contracts, and even withdrew some lines of coverage to
induce manufacturers to optimize investments in prevention. 5 4 And some
manufacturers, responding to escalating insurance costs, sought alternative
forms of insurance. 255
In light of the first-party insurance externality, it is illuminating to consider
the various empirical phenomena that Priest argues can be explained only by
his unravelling theory. Priest writes: "No one doubts that [recent expansions
of corporate tort liability have led to] substantial increases in tort claims, trials,
and damage judgments .... 256 He then argues that the increase in legal
judgments "does not explain what it is about the expansion of tort liability that
has led to the withdrawal of insurance capacity":"
The question is especially puzzling because of the curious empirical
context of the recent crisis. Two phenomena, in particular, are impor-
tant here. First . . . there is no evidence of an increase in the rate or
severity of accidents for the principle set of activities affected by the
crisis."
253. Id. at 189-90. This demonstration depends in part on the inability of courts to optimize activity
levels or to implement an efficient negligence regime.
254. See infra Part IV(C).
255. See infra Part IV(D).
256. Priest, Tort Reform, supra note 47, at 526.
257. Id. at 527.
258. Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1551.
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Indeed, in virtually all product and service contexts the injury rate has
been steadily declining over time. 9
Moreover, the extension of tort liability has not generated totally new
insurance coverage. 6
If there has been no increase in the accident rate and if the largest
majority of tort law claimants already possess first-party insurance,
then the expansion of corporate legal liability has chiefly shifted cover-
age from (private and government) first-party sources to corporate
defendant third-party insurance sources.
26
1
But these phenomena are easily explained by the internalization of the first-
party insurance externality. Because the majority of consumers had first-party
insurance, and because that insurance permitted consumers and manufacturers
to externalize the pecuniary costs of product accidents, expanding the liability
of manufacturers toward enterprise liability has had several major effects.
First, under the previous regime, to the extent that the courts did not hold
manufacturers liable for accidents that they could have prevented,62 the first-
party insurance externality led to suboptimal investments in manufacturer
care. 26' By shifting the previously externalized accident costs to manufactur-
ers, consumers and manufacturers have been forced to internalize those
costs-manufacturers through their increased liability costs and consumers, in
turn, through higher product prices. Expanded liability encouraged manufactur-
ers to increase investments in manufacturer care toward the optimal level.
Product prices rose to reflect the increased investments in safety and also the
risk of unpreventable product-caused injuries. Consequently, activity levels
moved closer to the optimal,2 64 and products not worth their true costs were
withdrawn. That is, products that had been inefficiently subsidized through the
first-party insurance externality were either curtailed or removed altogether.
259. Priest, Puzzles, supra note 47, at 501.
260. Priest, Insurance Crisis, note 19, at 1552.
261. Priest, Liability Crisis, supra note 47, at 5.
262. See supra notes 244-45 and infra notes 263 & 321-29 and accompanying text.
263. This may have been the case for several reasons. For instance, the negligence standard preceding
the expansion may have held manufacturers liable too rarely even as compared to a cost-benefit negligence
standard. If that were true, expanding liability would have the effect of increasing the percentage of initially
preventable accidents for which manufacturers were liable. But the negligence standard need not have
systematically favored manufacturer-defendants for the manufacturers to have had suboptimal incentives
to invest in care prior to the expansion. So long as the negligence regime was sufficiently random such
that a court's finding of negligence was sufficiently independent of whether the manufacturer was actually
negligent, products liability would have little influence on manufacturer decision-making. This would be
the result if courts were unable to apply a negligence standard. See S. SUGARMAN, supra note 39, at 7;
Schwartz, Proposals, supra note 10, at 386-88 (arguing that courts cannot apply negligence standard);
Hanson & Logue, supra note 73, at 169-70 (same); see also supra notes 244-45 (explaining how Priest
has unwittingly argued that courts cannot apply negligence standard). The evidence appears to comport
with this view. See G. EADS & P. REUTER, supra note 145, at 17-18, 124; Rea, Nonpecuniary Loss, supra
note 77, at 41-42; see also Priest, Accident Rate, supra note 47, at 221-22.
264. See supra Part llI(B)(2)(b).
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The internalization of the externality could well be responsible for any
decrease in the accident rate, an empirical phenomenon that Priest often high-
lights, but for which his theory does not readily account. Indeed, Priest's
analysis may confuse cause and effect.265 He maintains that because the acci-
dent rate has decreased, there is no good reason for the increase in the number
of tort awards. The authors' view is that precisely because of the increase in
the number of tort awards, the accident rate has decreased. That reduction
helps justify the expansion inasmuch as it reflects improved deterrence.
Consider Priest's empirical description and assessment of the process of
product withdrawal:
The insurance changes generated drastic responses from product manu-
facturers and service providers. Prices were increased to offset
increased premiums. Firms and entities denied insurance coverage were
forced to curtail operations .... Even the nation's largest corporations
were affected-those whose size and self-insurance capacity make them
least vulnerable to changes in commercial insurance markets. A survey
of the 500 largest public corporations revealed that twenty-five percent
had removed products from markets for liability reasons.266
The point is that, for some products and services, insurance pools
could be maintained on a first-party basis that could not be maintained
on a third-party basis . . . . It is for these products and services that
the expansion of tort liability . . . is most harmful. 267
The failure of the insurance enterprise in these commercial lines...
is an artifact of the form of-insurance delivery .... [The problem has
arisen because insurance markets which could be supported by a first-
party insurance mechanism, cannot be supported by a third-party tort
law mechanism.268
The large number of products and services that have been totally with-
drawn from markets demonstrates the severity of the effects of contem-
porary tort law's shift to third-party insurance mechanisms. 269
265. Huber appears to do the same. See P. HuBER, supra note 1, at 161 ("There is hardly a product
in use today . . . that is not many times safer than its counterpart of a generation or even a decade ago.").
266. Priest, Liability Crisis, supra note 47, at 2; see also Priest, Understanding the Crisis, supra note
47, at 196; Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1567 ("Very recently, a Conference Board survey
of the nation's 500 largest corporations showed that twenty-five percent had removed products or services
from markets.").
267. Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1569.
268. Priest, Compensation, supra note 25, at 140.
269. Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1567.
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Priest's empirical description here may be unexceptionable. It does not follow,
however, that products maintained under the previous regime but withdrawn
under the expanded regime reflect a shift from efficient to inefficient insurance
mechanisms and provide a measure of the severity of the "crisis." Indeed, the
fact that products had been maintained under the previous regime but not after
the expansion may instead evidence the deterrence benefits of a more expansive
liability regime and provide a measure of the severity of the first-party insur-
ance externality. Part IV below examines this possibility further.
D. Socio-Legal Uncertainty
Unpredicted changes in liability can create socio-legal uncertainty that is
independent of the size of risk pools and that is not easily diversified even
through the stock market. Most commentators contend that this increase in
socio-legal uncertainty may be responsible for many of the "crisis" phenom-
ena.27 The authors do not dispute this. Socio-legal uncertainty may help
explain many of the "crisis" phenomena that are related to changes in liability
insurance markets. While there may be some canceling out of risk terms the
more firms and industries there are represented in any given insurance pool,
if the liability standard becomes more strict, risk terms may not cancel insofar
as they move systematically. If there has been an unpredictable shift toward
enterprise liability, then, insurers are faced with significant socio-legal
risk.271 If they charge insureds according to each insured's expected liability,
the insurers face roughly a fifty percent chance of losing significantly on all
their contracts. Because of that risk, liability insurers must withdraw coverage
270. See P. DANZON, supra note 22, at 91 (describing effects of socio-legal risk on medical malprac-
tice insurance market); Epstein, Insurance Market, supra note 1, at 664 ("[Tjhe present law exposes the
manufacturer to systematic risk. One obvious concern is that any shift in the liability rules, such as we have
just witnessed, can impose an enormous undiversifiable risk on products liability insurers that is not found
in, for example, life insurance."); Trebilcock, Insurance-Deterrence Dilemma, supra note 38, at 929;
Viscusi, Wading Through. supra note 16, at 17-18 (making a related point about the difficulty of insuring
highly correlated risks, as in the asbestos industry); Winter, supra note 39, at 456 ("The feature of the
liability insurance market that is critical for explaining the [crisis] is the substantial uncertainty that insurers
face in predicting claims."); see also TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP, 1987 UPDATE, at app. 19-22
(discussing socio-legal risk).
271. Liability insurers' reaction to this risk may be a function of the types of decision-makers that
are in the insurance industry. That is, the insurance industry was historically a relatively risk-free industry.
Accordingly, there may have been a sort of self-selection into the industry of individuals not interested in,
and not good at, dealing with risk. Insurance executives, in other words may be lacking in entrepreneurial
zeal. This hypothesis is consistent with the fact that some of the industries first to leave the stock insurance
pools and to self-insure were industries where high levels of risk are common. The authors are indebted
to Guido Calabresi and Henry Hansmann for raising this possibility.
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altogether or increase their premiums to a level beyond the increase in
expected payouts.272
But the observation that socio-legal uncertainty may account for some of
the crisis phenomena does not further the debate over what makes for the
optimal liability regime. If it is true that the unpredictability of the changes
in the liability regime is to blame for "crisis" phenomena, that fact does not
tell courts and legislatures which liability rule to adopt in response. It argues
only that courts should not change the liability rule unpredictably, all else
equal. In this light, it seems ironic that commentators concerned with the
effects of socio-legal uncertainty have called for dramatic changes in the
liability rule.2 73 Arguably, if socio-legal uncertainty is a problem, commenta-
tors should be trying to minimize rather than to instigate change.
As explained below,274 in the authors' view the long-term harm stemming
from socio-legal uncertainty is de minimis because manufacturers can eliminate
(and have eliminated) its effect at reasonably low cost. To the extent that socio-
legal uncertainty remains undiversifiable, however, the best policy response
may well be for lawmakers to adopt and stick with an enterprise liability
regime.275
E. Summary of Part III
Part III has offered an alternative, efficiency explanation for the so-called
liability crisis. This Part has argued that there was really no crisis at all, and
that the recent events associated with the "crisis" can be explained as the
market's reaction to the internalization of the nonpecuniary costs of product
accidents, the internalization of the first-party insurance externality, and an
increase in socio-legal uncertainty. Section A outlined those phenomena which
any account of the liability crisis must explain, and Sections B through D
explained the insurance and deterrence consequences of including nonpecuniary
losses in damage awards, the effects of internalizing the first-party insurance
externality, and the effects of socio-legal uncertainty, respectively. It is now
necessary to evaluate the alternative explanation vis-h-vis Priest's explanation
by comparing the competing theories' explanatory powers.
272. Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1544; see also TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP, 1987
UPDATE, supra note 1, at 51 ("Because insurers cannot assess their risk with any degree of certainty, and
in light of the general deterioration of the tort system, their tendency often is to view such risks on an
almost 'worst case' basis. As a result, many risks are far more difficult or expensive to insure if the insurer
also is faced with the possibility of an open-ended liability which may be virtually impossible to assess and
which may expose the insurer to massive, unplanned for liability."); id. at 58 ("Increasingly, insurers and
potential defendants find it extremely difficult, if not virtually impossible, to predict liability.").
273. See, e.g., supra note 46.
274. See supra Part II(C)(3).
275. Priest recognizes that socio-legal uncertainty increased as a result of expanding liability rules,
and may therefore have contributed to the "crisis." However, he does not empnasize this risk. Priest,
Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1563 ("Most important in [this] analysis ... is the effect of the increase
in . . . corporate liability ... on adverse selection."). Other commentators, however, view socio-legal
uncertainty as the most important factor in explaining the "crisis."
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IV. Comparing the Unravelling Theory and the Internalizing Theory
A. Introduction to Part IV.- The Competing Theories Compared
Priest includes in his discussion of consumer risk pools the bold claim that
only his explanation of adverse selection and the resulting unravelling of
consumer risk pools can explain the withdrawal of consumer products from
the market. He writes:
Adverse selection in consumer risk pools explains why the increase
in insurance premiums has been extreme for products and services in
recent years. It also provides the only explanation of why increases in
corporate tort liability compel providers to withdraw products and
services from markets altogether .... [I]f there were no adverse selec-
tion, increases in insurance premiums or self-insurance costs could
largely be passed on to consumers. . . . There is a different effect,
however, where a price increase derives from increasing risk pool
variance. Increasing variance generates adverse selection by low-risk
consumers who successively drop out of the pool. The pool, as a conse-
quence, unravels. At some point, demand for the product sold with the
necessary insurance premium simply disappears.276
Priest's assertion that only risk pool unravelling can explain the withdrawal
of products notwithstanding, perhaps the most natural explanation is one that
he briefly alludes to but otherwise disregards. 27 Priest points out that
it is important to distinguish, at least analytically, between products and
services withdrawn for insurance reasons and for deterrence . . .
reasons. Some products or services may simply generate so many
injuries that continued production is infeasible. A legal standard that
attached liability where the marginal expected injury costs exceeded the
marginal costs of preventing the injury (here, the bare cost of produc-
tion) would be sufficient to drive such products and services from the
market and, thus, increase social welfare.
278
276. Id. at 1566.
277. The alternative explanation is natural in the sense that it is precisely what the "founders"
predicted and hoped would happen following a shift toward enterprise liability. See, e.g., G. CALABRESI,
supra note 226, at 68-94 (describing general deterrence). Yet Priest sets aside this explanation while
accusing the founders of having misunderstood the insurance implications of their proposals. It is also the
most natural explanation given that generally when economists describe a product being withdrawn from
the market they speak of a manufacturer's costs increasing until those costs exceed the product's market
price.
278. Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1569.
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Here Priest recognizes not only that an alternative explanation for the with-
drawal of products exists, but also that, were this the best explanation, product
withdrawals could be characterized only as socially beneficial-the result of
consumers' substitution of relatively unsafe, more expensive products for safer,
less expensive products. Priest acknowledges that in the absence of adverse
selection liability premiums could have increased and products could have been
withdrawn from the market simply because the cost of certain products had
risen relative to that of their substitutes.
According to a basic principle of microeconomics, a firm will cease
production whenever the average variable costs of producing a product exceeds
its market price, even in the short run.279 Priest recognizes that firms behave
this way and that such behavior yields a net efficiency gain.280 However,
Priest does not say why this alternative explanation for the withdrawal of
consumer products is implausible. Instead, he disposes of this efficiency
explanation by concluding that, except perhaps for asbestos, it is difficult to
believe that products and services recently withdrawn were withdrawn because
of the danger they present. 281 By asserting that only adverse selection can
explain the withdrawal of products and services, Priest assumes what he claims
to be proving, namely, that recent product withdrawals were inefficient. 2
He states, for instance, that "[tihe effect on national income of increased prices
and the withdrawal of products and services is obvious." 213 Obvious? This
is the very question. As Part III explained, it is entirely possible that higher
prices and fewer products have led to fewer accidents and, therefore, to a net
increase in the national income.
This Part challenges Priest's claim that only unravelling can account for
rising premiums and product withdrawals. It compares the explanatory powers
of Priest's theory of unravelling risk pools-labeled the "unravelling
theory"-with the alternative theory set forth in Part III-the "internalizing
theory." Sections B, C, and D reinterpret the empirical evidence that Priest
attempts to explain. Section B challenges Priest's account of unravelling
consumer risk pools by arguing that the withdrawal of the particular consumer
279. See, e.g., P. SAMUELSON & W. NORDHAUS, ECONOMics 543-44 (13th ed. 1989) (discussing
supply behavior of competitive firm); R. LIPSEY & P. STEINER, ECONOMics 227 (6th ed. 1981) (same).
280. In discussing the aims of antitrust laws, for instance, Priest writes: "Our society wants to remove
those products from markets whose production costs (and thus prices) are greater than what consumers
are willing to pay in order to reallocate resources to goods whose value to consumers exceeds their [costs]."
Priest, Antitrust Suits, supra note 47, at 1025.
281. Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1570; see also Priest, Liability Costs, supra note 47,
at 323 ("A central objective of the legal system is to compel the withdrawal of excessively risky products
and prevent the introduction of new ones. But is it plausible that 47% of our manufacturers suddenly
discovered in 1986 that their products were too dangerous for modem society?").
282. Elsewhere Priest asserts that "[clonsumers do not benefit from having fewer products and service
choices . . . ." Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1568; see also Epstein, Unintended Revolution,
supra note 1, at 2214 ("ITihere is little reason to think that there are any positive outcomes that result in
forcing products off the market that consumers are prepared to purchase.") (emphasis in original). Again,
that claim depends on an unstated assumption that such withdrawals were inefficient.
283. Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1522.
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goods and services Priest mentions is largely attributable to the dangers those
goods and services present. Section C challenges his account of the unravelling
of manufacturer risk pools by arguing that the increase in policy exclusions
and copayment mechanisms are largely attributable to insurers' increased
attempts to ensure that their insureds prevent all accidents that they can prevent
cost-justifiably. Section D also challenges Priest's account of the unravelling
of manufacturer risk pools, arguing that the recent rise of mutuals as the
desirable form of insurance organization is largely attributable to insureds'
response to socio-legal uncertainty.
B. The Withdrawal of Consumer Products and Services
As explained in Part II(B) above, Priest believes that products and services
were withdrawn from the market as a result of high variance of risks within
consumer risk pools. The variance of the risks that consumers within a given
product's risk pool posed, not the average size of those risks, led to consumer
risk pool unravelling. In other words, variance, not product danger, was the
determinant. Thus, a product that caused many consumer injuries, for which
the average risk of the consumer risk pool would therefore be high, would not
have been withdrawn from the market if the variance within that pool was
small. If, on the other hand, risk pool variance for a given product was
substantial, that product should have been withdrawn from the market even
though it may have been a relatively safe product-that is, a product for which
the average risk posed by its consumers was relatively small.
The examples Priest offers of withdrawn products and services might be
expected to provide convincing evidence for his unravelling theory. In fact,
however, Priest's examples fit the internalizing theory very well, but are not
easily accounted for by the unravelling theory. As explained above, Priest
attributes the withdrawal of many consumer products and services to risk pool
unravelling284 and denies the possibility that it was because consumers were
no longer willing to pay for those products and services once their total costs
were internalized through higher market prices. It seems undeniable, however,
that most if not all of the products and services that he lists are particularly
dangerous relative to other goods and services. Perhaps Priest's position would
be more tenable had he provided examples of products that have been with-
drawn from the market and that were both reasonably safe-thus ruling out
the possibility they were withdrawn because of their danger-and used by
consumers fairly evenly across all income levels-thus corroborating the risk-
pool variance story.
284. Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1566; see also R. COOTER & T. ULEN, supra note
1, at 373 (offering these product withdrawals as evidence of tort "crisis"); Epstein, Insurance Market, supra
note 1, at 648 (same).
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Moreover, the examples of withdrawn products and services that Priest
provides subject the unravelling theory to an anomaly: according to the unrav-
elling theory, low-risk manufacturer-insureds exited risk pools in response to
increased premiums, because low-risk, not high-risk, manufacturer-insureds
were on the wrong end of an insurance subsidy. Indeed, according to the
unravelling theory, the higher the relative risk a given manufacturer posed,
the greater the insurance subsidy that manufacturer enjoyed, and thus the
longer that manufacturer would have desired to remain in its insurance pool,
all else equal. Priest's empirical examples, however, draw heavily on instances
in which relatively high-risk products and services were withdrawn.285 The
fact that relatively high-risk products were most affected by the changes in
products liability is more readily explicable by the internalizing theory.
Consider the specific product and service examples Priest provides. Take
first playground and. swimming pool equipment.2"6 Priest does not discuss
in specific terms how his consumer risk pool unravelling story explains the
decrease in the number of park slides and diving boards. And, given that most
injuries from those products probably occur to young children, it is hard to
imagine that the lost-income component of damage awards could create suffi-
cient variance in damage awards to generate unravelling. The more plausible
explanation is that such equipment was withdrawn simply because it was very
hazardous. Empirical evidence confirms that playground slides and swimming
pools are extremely dangerous.287 Given that consumers and manufacturers
had externalized many of the costs of product accidents under the old regime,
it is no surprise that once prices rose to more accurately reflect the injury costs
of this equipment, consumers (or municipalities purchasing on behalf of con-
sumers)288 found they were no longer willing to pay market prices.
285. See also Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1582 ("By my count, the industries that have
been most seriously affected by the current insurance crisis are those dealing with hazardous materials,
including toxic wastes, asbestos, and chemicals; manufacturers of pharmaceuticals and related products;
hospitals, physicians in certain specialties such as obstetrics and anesthetics, and related practitioners such
as nurse midwives; municipalities and other governmental entities; assorted general and machine manufac-
turers; general aircraft manufacturers; ski lift operators; day care centers; corporate directors and officers;
liquor establishments; and publishers.").
286. See Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1522, 1552, 1570; see also Priest, Antitrust Suits,
supra note 47, at 999.
287. There were 178,000 injuries from playground equipment and 124,000 from swimming pools,
that required hospital emergency-room treatment. Of the eleven products listed by the U.S. Consumer
Products Safety Commission, playground equipment and swimming pools were associated with the most
injuries, together constituting 40% of all product-related injuries. See U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY
COMM'N, U.S. PRODUCT-RELATED INJURIES: ANNUAL REPORTS (1983). It is little wonder that comedian
Bill Cosby maintains that the placement of playground equipment on otherwise "perfectly good play-
grounds" was part of a conspiracy by adults to "bump off" children, costing children arms, legs, and lives.
Cosby's survival technique as a child, he explains, was "never to play on nothing I never saw no grown-ups
playing on." Cosby, The Playground, from B. COSBY, WONDERFULNESS (Warner Bros. Records, 1970).
288. At times Priest lists municipal swimming pool and playground equipment as an example of,
products withdrawn due to expanded liability. But even setting aside the criticisms of the theory of
unravelling risk pools made in Part II above, it is difficult to imagine how the unravelling theory could
on its own terms begin to account for the withdrawal of municipal recreational equipment. First of all, it
is not clear whether injured individuals recover from municipalities or manufacturers, and if the former,
whether municipalities seek indemnification. Furthermore, it is not clear just what a low- or high-risk
municipality would be. Finally, Priest uses the example even for self-insured municipalities, who presum-
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For another example, consider the withdrawal of most intrauterine devices
(IUDs) from the market. 289 If the unravelling theory is correct, the with-
drawal of IUDs was due to the unravelling of risk pools consisting of IUD
purchasers. But it seems unlikely that there was much variance in the damage
actually awarded given that many of the claimants litigated their claims through
large class-action suits and thus received similarly sized awards. 290 But even
assuming there was significant variance in actual damage awards, it is difficult
to imagine how the unravelling of that pool would proceed. It is not clear how
low-risk and high-risk IUD users would know ex ante their respective positions
in the risk pool. Even if they had this knowledge, it is unclear why high-risk
users would remain in the pool, given the extent to which the losses associated
with IUD injury are of a nonpecuniary and therefore non-compensable
nature.29'
Moreover, a person's choice of contraceptive is typically based, at least
in part, on the recommendation or advice of a physician or health professional.
Physicians, in effect, act as intermediaries between their patients and the
market.292 Their recommendations are probably based primarily on risk
considerations and only secondarily on price considerations. Thus, it seems
unlikely that patients would adversely select or unravel in the market for
contraceptives.
Besides being difficult to imagine, the unravelling theory's explanation for
the withdrawing of IUDs from the market gives short shrift to some of the
alarming facts about IUDs.293 A.H. Robins' Dalkon Shield, marketed from
1971 until 1974, injured tens of thousands of women. Responding to fears of
a similar fate for its IUDs, G.D. Searle removed its devices from the market
after several hundred claims had been filed against the company.294 Surely
the withdrawal of consumer products of this kind is not obviously undesirable.
It seems clear that relative to other contraceptives, IUDs are particularly
ably would be unaffected by unravelling in insurance markets given that they would constitute the only
member of their insurance "pool."
289. See, e.g., Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1521 (refusal of liability insurers to provide
coverage to manufacturers of IUDs "forced" them to withdraw IUDs from the market); id. at 1567 (liability
costs prevent the IUD from being price-competitive with other contraceptives). The bulk of the IUD
litigation has been directed at three IUD manufacturers: A.H. Robins & Co., which produced the "Dalkon
Shield"; G.D. Searle & Co., which produced the "Copper-7" and "Tatum-7"; and Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp., which produced the "Lippes Loop." A.H. Robins took the Dalkon Shield off the market in 1974,
and in 1986 declared bankruptcy in the face of approximately 200,000 products liability suits. G.D. Searle
& Co. took its IUDs off the U.S. market in 1986, having made approximately $80 million from sales of
the Copper-7. Ortho Pharmaceutical has also taken its IUD off the U.S. market. Only one firm, Alza Corp.,
now markets an IUD-the "Progestasert"-in the U.S.
290. See Barrett, Over 25% of the Dalkon Shield Claimants Agree to Payments of $725 or Less, Wall
St. J., Jan. 10, 1989, § 2, at 8.
291. See supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
292. See supra note 209.
293. For one telling of the story of the hurried development and marketing of the Dalkon Shield, see
M. MINTZ, AT ANY COST: CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN, AND THE DALKON SHIELD (1985). See also
Hawkinson v. A.H. Robins, 595 F. Supp. 1291, 1295-1306 (D. Colo. 1984).
294. See Searle's Copper-7 IUD Loses Its Day in Court, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 26, 1988 (reporting 490
cases pending against G.D. Searle); IUD Discontinuation Seen as Unlikely to AffectLitigation, NAT'L L.J.,
Feb. 17, 1986 (reporting 300 cases pending against G.D. Searle and 450 settlements).
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dangerous.295 Priest recognizes the harm caused by the Dalkon Shield in
particular, 296 but nevertheless considers the withdrawal of IUDs in general
to be an unfortunate result of changes in products liability law.297 But given
that IUDs are quite dangerous and that less dangerous contraceptives are
available, it seems unlikely that the withdrawal of several IUDs from the
contraceptive market resulted in a net loss of consumer welfare.
Priest also emphasizes the withdrawal of certain vaccines. 2 ' Given their
benefits, the withdrawal of vaccines for whooping cough and polio appears at
first glance to be a particularly unfortunate result of expanded liability, and
hence a clear confirmation of Priest's view. Apparently relying on the assump-
tion that for any given consumer product, a consumer's willingness to pay for
that product depends on whether the benefits of its consumption outweigh the
costs, Priest credibly concludes that because the social benefits of vaccines
exceed the social costs, consumer unwillingness to buy them must have
resulted from some inefficient source of interference with the market, namely,
products liability. Accordingly, he argues that the withdrawal of vaccines must
have been the result of enormous variance within consumer risk pools and the
attendant unravelling such variance causes.
There is a simpler explanation for consumers' unwillingness to purchase
vaccines, however. Following the liability expansion, the benefits of some vac-
cines, from each individual consumer's perspective, no longer outweighed their
price. Once manufacturers and, in turn, consumers were made to internalize
the full cost of a vaccine, including the costs of injury to those who developed
a crippling disease as a result of taking that vaccine, consumers were less
willing to pay the price. But that they were unwilling to pay the full price
stems from the public-good nature of vaccines. Although the social benefits
may well exceed the social costs of vaccines, the private costs may neverthe-
less exceed the private benefits. The benefit to any individual consumer of a
vaccine is the reduced probability of acquiring the disease that the vaccine is
intended to prevent.299 In an unvaccinated population, that reduction may be
significant. In a vaccinated population, however, the reduced probability may
be trivial. Thus, from the perspective of an individual in a vaccinated popula-
tion, the private benefit of a vaccine may well not outweigh its full cost. The
social benefits of vaccines are externalized. The removal of vaccines from the
295. The injuries resulting from the use of lUDs include, among, others, pelvic inflammatory disease,
perforation of the uterine wall, and ectopic pregnancy.
296. Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1552.
297. See supra note 289. Huber also suggests that the withdrawal of IUDs was an unfortunate result
of the expansion of manufacturer liability. P. HUBER, supra note 1, at 9, 41-42, 103-04, 141, 162.
298. Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1521, 1569; see also P. HUBER, supra note 1, at 8,
11, 103-05, 182. Other scholars have also pointed to the withdrawal of vaccines. See, e.g., R. COOTER
& T. ULEN, supra note 1, at 452-54; Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk
Management in the Courts, 85 COLUm. L. REV. 278 (1985); Kitch, Vaccines and Product Liability: A Case
of Contagious Litigation, REGULATION 11, 17-18 (May/June 1985).
299. R. EVANs, supra note 209, at 57-58; Leffler, Physician Licensure, Competition and Monopoly
in American Medicine, 21 J. POL. EcON. 399 (1974).
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market, therefore, may.be less attributable to the increasing costs from tort
liability and more attributable to the fact that consumers do not internalize the
full benefits of consuming vaccines."°
With respect to consumer services, Priest offers obstetrics as an example
of a service that was withdrawn from the market as a result of the liability
expansion. Priest argues that "[t]he malpractice premium is extremely high for
obstetricians because of the extraordinary variance that results from the attribu-
tion of subsequent physical or emotional ailments to problems of delivery. "30
But the unravelling theory does not easily explain that observation. First,
obstetricians certainly know better the risks of medical complications and long-
term emotional ailments than their patients do. Without such information,
patients have no incentive to exit out of or adversely select into risk pools.
Second, it seems doubtful that an obstetrician's patients vary tremendously
according to income. More likely, they come from a relatively homogenous
subset of the population.3 2 And without high variance, there is nothing to
precipitate unravelling. Third, and most important, because obstetricians deal
with their patients face-to-face and routinely gather information about the risks
facing their patients, obstetricians can, for the purpose of segregating patients
into narrow risk pools, easily obtain more data than first-party insurers pos-
sess.
Another service the withdrawal of which Priest attributes to consumer risk
pool unravelling is charter bus transportation to ski areas.33 But it seems
clear that this service too would be likely consumed by a relatively homoge-
neous socio-economic group of consumers. The necessary condition for
unravelling to occur-high variance of income among consumers-does not
seem to be present with respect to buses chartered to ski resorts. Instead of
unravelling, charter service to ski areas was likely withdrawn due to the high
expected accident costs of the service, for buses are not at their safest on steep,
tortuous, icy roads.
While the unravelling theory does not accommodate Priests's product and
service examples very well, the internalizing theory copes readily with each
example. It predicts that the withdrawal of a product (or service) from the
300. The solution to this public good "problem" is not to refuse compensation to the victims of
vaccines. Instead, the solution is to either subsidize vaccine purchases so that consumers, no longer
internalizing the full costs of vaccines, will more readily purchase them, or perhaps to subsidize the costs
of compensation so that manufacturers will not have to charge consumers prices as high as real costs.
Congress has done both. See, e.g., National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300aa-
1 to -34 (federal compensation program).
301. Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1566.
302. In arguing that low-income consumers spend less on medical care than do high-income consum-
ers, see supra note 130 and accompanying text, Priest corroborates this point.
The observation about the extent to which product and service purchasers often constitute homogenous
groups might be made with respect to Priest's repeated invocation of wine tasting as an example of a service
removed from the market as a result of expanded tort liability. See, e.g., Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra
note 19, at 1521. It seems difficult to imagine a group of wine tasters so heterogeneous so as to precipitate
unravelling.
303. Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1566-67.
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market depended on the product's relative danger measured in both pecuniary
and nonpecuniary terms. Forcing manufacturers and, in turn, consumers to
internalize expected accident costs created the deterrence benefits described
in Part III above. Once nominal prices rose to reflect true costs, consumer
demand levels shifted, and the market for some products simply disappeared.
Playground equipment, diving boards, and IUDs-hardly run-of-the-mill
consumer products-are examples of relatively dangerous products for which
consumers were unwilling to pay prices reflecting true costs.
Perhaps it is because Priest can offer only a few examples of products that
Sv..re withdrawn as a result of the "crisis," and because the examples he does
offer are of products that were unusually dangerous, that he makes the follow-
ing argument:
The large number of products and services that have been totally with-
drawn from markets demonstrate the severity of the effects of the
contemporary tort law's shift to the third-party insurance mechanism.
Except for a few particularly notorious examples, product and service
withdrawal tends to be effected silently, ignored as consumers shift to
alternative sources that are higher priced or less convenient for their
needs ....
Product and service withdrawal, however, has extended far beyond
the limited examples reported in the press. Very recently, a Conference
Board survey of the nation's 500 largest corporations showed that
twenty-five percent had removed products or services from the markets.
... Consumers do not benefit from having fewer products and service
choices .... Of course, it is even more difficult to estimate the extent
to which new products and services were never introduced because of
the expansion of liability. 3o
Ironically, the evidence of the significant "silent" effects of the "crisis" pro-
vides little support for the unravelling explanation, but much support for the
internalizing theory. The Conference Board report to which Priest refers
concluded as follows: "Where product liability has had a notable
impact-where it has most significantly affected management decision mak-
ing-has been in the quality of products themselves. Managers say products
have become safer, manufacturing procedures have been improved, and labels
and use instructions have become more explicit."" Almost one third of the
manufacturers surveyed reported that products liability had led them to improve
304. Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1567-68 (footnote omitted); see also Priest, Antitrust
Suits, supra note 47, at 999 n.2.
305. N. WEBER, PRODUCT LIABiLrrY: THE CORPORATE RESPONSE 14 (Conference Board, Report No.
893, 1987).
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the safety design of their products. 3" "[R]espondents were asked how much
of the final price of their products can be attributed to the cost of liability
insurance. For 66 percent of the firms, the answer was 1 percent or less. For
another 11 percent of the companies, liability insurance accounted for only 2
or 3 percent of the final price. "307 This evidence suggests that for most prod-
ucts the expansion of liability is having only a minor effect on prices, and for
a significant number of products the expansion is having the beneficial deter-
rence effects that the alternative explanation predicts. That is, some dangerous
products that had been marketed before the expansions of liability were made
safer while others were withdrawn from the market altogether.
Moreover,. it is unclear how the unravelling theory can explain the reluc-
tance of manufacturers to introduce new products that they would have intro-
duced had there been no expansion in liability. The internalizing theory
suggests that after the expansion in liability, manufacturers would have a good
reason to avoid introducing new products that are likely to be inefficiently
dangerous. But Priest's theory does not explain how adverse selection and
cycles of unravelling could possibly have occurred in consumer risk pools that,
by definition, never even existed. Notwithstanding Priest's assertion to the
contrary, it appears that consumers have benefited from having fewer products
and fewer services on the market.
C. Exclusions and Copayment Mechanisms
Priest explains that following the expansion of manufacturer liability, there
were changes in commercial insurers' policy terms, changes which included
higher deductibles and higher levels of coinsurance.308 The purpose of those
changes, he argues, was to mitigate the problem of adverse selection."° He
explains: "[Dleductibles and coinsurance narrow the level of risks brought to
an insurance pool by discriminating against high-risk in favor of low-risk
members of a pool."310 And "these changes reflect an effort to make the




308. Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1570-76.
309. Id. at 1576. ("Each of these major changes in insurance availability, then, is a method to narrow
insurance risk pools in the face of the increasing legal risk generated by modem tort law. Specifically, these
contractual devices reduce variance in risk for the purpose of making insurance available to low-risk parties
in the population of insureds. They are efforts to reduce adverse selection, and thus to prevent the
unraveling of insurance markets that would occur if low-risk members of insurance pools were to exit.");
id. at 1574 ("An insured that knows that its liability coverage will be reduced by the amount of the insurer's
legal expenses may itself strive to reduce those expenses, by handling more case management tasks within
the firm ... or, of course, by reducing the incidence of litigation-generating activity.").
310. Id. at 1572.
311. Id. at 1571.
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This explanation for the increase in coinsurance and deductibles seems
incomplete. To understand how, it is useful to examine what Priest means by
"high-risk" and "low-risk" members of a pool. Assuming first that all pool
members have the same expected losses, "high-risk pool members" would be
those who face a highly unlikely but large loss; and "low-risk pool members"
would be those who face a relatively small but more probable loss. 312 These
definitions are consistent with the view that expanding liability law has
increased the variance of risk faced by individual insureds. "High-risk pool
members," in other words, would face a high variance in possible outcomes,
whereas "low-risk pool members" would face a low variance. Yet, given these
definitions, higher deductibles would benefit the high-risk pool members at the
expense of the low-risk pool members, just the opposite of what the unravel-
ling theory argues would happen. Low-risk insureds would be much more
likely to file a claim than high-risk insureds would, and the size of the deduct-
ible relative to the size of those claims would be relatively large.
Perhaps by "high-risk" Priest instead means high expected losses, and by
"low-risk," low expected losses-a different use of the word "risk." There
probably is some variation in expected losses among the insureds of any given
insurance pool. And Priest does argue that such variation increased as a conse-
quence of expanding liability rules.313 But using this understanding of the
term "risk" does not rescue the unravelling theory, because coinsurance and
deductibles would not necessarily be disproportionately borne by "high-risk"
insureds (that is, insureds with comparatively high expected losses). For
example, suppose that insured A will ten times next year face a ten percent
chance of losing $10,000. A, under this assumption, has expected losses of
$10,000. Now suppose insured B will twice face a ten percent chance of losing
$52,000. B, then, has expected losses of $10,400. Now suppose A and B, as
co-members of the same insurance pool, are required by the terms of their
policy to pay the first $2,000 of a claim as a deductible and ten percent of the
balance of any claim as coinsurance. On whom does the heavier copayment
burden fall? After paying the premium that all pool members pay, A expects
to pay (because of deductibles and coinsurance) a total of $2,800 (i.e., $2,000
+ $800). B, the insured with the higher expected losses, expects to pay only
$1,400 (i.e., $1,000 + $400), half of whatA expects to pay. In this example,
the party with the higher expected losses expects to bear a significantly smaller
amount and percentage of liability costs than the party with lower expected
losses expects to bear.
Priest may instead be arguing that high-risk insureds are those with the
greatest probability of making a claim. This would find support in the above
312. Legal economists commonly employ these definitions. See A. POLINSKY, supra note 226, at 79-
81. 313. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 146.
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example in which insured A has the greater probability of making an insurance
claim and expects to pay more in copayments.3 4 But this argument also has
problems. First, the result in the example above is not generalizable. For
instance, suppose that the deductible was eliminated and the coinsurance was
raised to thirty percent. In that case, A would expect to pay $3,000; B would
expect to pay $3,120. Therefore, the burden of copayments will not always
fall more heavily on the insured with the greater probability of making a claim.
Second, it is not clear how an insured's probability of making a claim (or
claim frequency) is relevant to Priest's discussion of increased variance in
expected costs, adverse selection, and unravelling.315
These numerical examples reveal the incompleteness of the unravelling
theory's explanation for the increase in coinsurance and deductibles. There is
no reason to be confident that higher copayment requirements would be borne
disproportionately by high-risk insureds. Moreover, Priest's description of
precisely how insurers changed policies also does not clearly support his
contention that the changes were adopted to control adverse selection. Instead,
the rise in copayment requirement seems to support an alternative view, which
Priest seems to agree with but never clearly expresses, that insurers adopted
these changes to help control moral hazard.3 16 Priest writes:
Deductibles and coinsurance narrow the level of risks brought to an
insurance pool by discriminating against high-risk in favor of low-risk
members of a pool. The identical deductible will be less costly to an
insured who can control the probability of loss than to an insured who
cannot. The incentives created by deductibles and coinsurance trans-
form those members who are relatively more able to control losses into
low-risk insureds, and those members relatively less able, into high-risk
insureds. Put slightly differently, the recent increases in deductible and
coinsurance levels increase the effective insurance costs paid by high-
risk members (because they must pay the premium plus the increased
deductible or retention) while constraining the effective insurance costs
paid by the low-risk members. They are a way to keep low-risk mem-
bers in an insurance pool.317
314. Alan Schwartz, for example, adopts this position. Schwartz, Proposals, supra note 10, at 405
("Deductibles . . .reduce the adverse selection problem. A purchaser who agrees to a large deductible
is telling her insurance company, in a credible way, that she believes she is unlikely to incur frequent
losses. The insurance company then is more willing to insure her because it can plausibly believe she is
a low risk.").
315. According to Priest, the rise in copayments "reflects an effort by insurers to fight off modern
tort law's stimulus of adverse selection." Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1571.
316. Cf. Abraham, Environmental Liability, supra note 32, at 952 (arguing that the principal purpose
of many exclusions is to combat moral hazard).
317. Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1571-72.
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Priest, though he suggests here that insurers were segregating low-risk insureds
from high-risk insureds, is actually describing how insurers were transforming
some high-risk insureds into low-risk insureds. They did so by encouraging
insureds to prevent preventable accidents. The same is true regarding the
extensive exclusions that liability insurers have recently added to their policies.
Insurers would not have adopted those changes to help adverse selection.
If adverse selection had been the problem, insurers would have sold policies
with coverage exclusions for reduced premiums and policies without exclusions
for higher premiums. High-risk insureds would have willingly paid the higher
premium because of their greater exposure to risk. Low-risk insureds would
have bought the less expensive insurance in keeping with their lower expected
claims. In this way, then, insurers would have segregated insureds into appro-
priate risk pools (thereby effectively overcoming the asymmetric information
problem) and maximized their sales and profits. But as Priest emphasizes-in
his defense of liability insurers against allegations of antitrust violations-these
exclusions were universal." 8 High-risk insureds were entirely unable to
obtain certain forms of insurance:
Excluding insurance coverage to provide lower premiums to low-risk
members facing greater self-insurance alternatives is consistent with this
aim [of segregating low-risk from high-risk members of commercial
casualty pools]. But it is not consistent, indeed it is contradictory, to
exclude coverage to the high-risk rather than to reprice these forms of
coverage at greater than competitive levels. The ambition of price
discrimination is to charge a greater than competitive price to consum-
ers reflecting high price elasticities, such as high-risk insureds. The
exclusion of pollution, occurrence, and defense cost coverage cannot
be a means of illegally maximizing profits because no revenues can be
generated where the insurance product is kept from the market. Again,
excluding coverage is not a rational means of maximizing profits.319
Priest's defense of liability insurers poses a problem for his argument that
policy exclusions were adopted in response to adverse selection. Just as exclud-
ing coverage would be an irrational means of maximizing profits, so would
it be an irrational means of coping with adverse selection. For instance,
insurers would forego profits if, in response to adverse selection, they totally
excluded pollution coverage in all their policies. Instead, they could increase
profits by offering two types of policies. One type would include pollution
coverage at a price that would be acceptable only to high-risk insureds, and
318. Priest suggests that high-risk insureds could have obtained more insurance by paying more. See
Priest, Antitrust Suits, supra note 47, at 1030, 1035. Ultimately, however, he denies that possibility by
stressing that coverage for those sorts of risks was completely withdrawn from the market. Id. at 1038-39.
319. Id. at 1038-39.
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the other type would exclude pollution coverage. Or similarly, some insurers
would offer the former type of policy exclusively and other insurers would
offer the latter. In either case, insurers would segregate low-risk and high-risk
insureds and maximize both insurance coverage and insurance availability.32
Thus, the more plausible explanation for why pollution coverage was
eliminated in all policies is that moral hazard problems rendered insurance
coverage unmarketable-that is, a large percentage of claims made under those
policies could have been efficiently prevented. This raises a question: Why
would insurers have not used the same devices before the crisis? The answer
may well be that the old liability regime protected manufacturers from their
own negligence.321 If manufacturers were often not held liable for accidents
that they could have cost-justifiably prevented, then liability insurers would
have suboptimal incentives to encourage their insureds to take optimal precau-
tions. The reason for the increase in exclusions as manufacturer liability has
expanded might well be that previous, less expansive liability rules did not,
or were significantly less likely to, hold manufacturers liable for preventable
accidents.322
If a liability rule could provide optimal deterrence it would, by definition,
hold manufacturers liable for all accidents that they could have cost-justifiably
prevented at least cost. Similarly, if insurers and insureds could costlessly
write and enforce fully specified contracts, they would not contract to cover
liability costs that the insured could prevent. Ideally, then, insurance would
exclude all preventable accidents from coverage and the tort system would hold
injurers liable for all preventable accidents. But insurance policies, because
of prohibitively high contracting and monitoring costs, are not fully specified.
Instead, insurers and insureds contract to cover all liability except where the
liability was obviously preventable-that is, where the liability very clearly
resulted from the insured's negligence." For instance, insurance policies
320. Priest maintains that all insurers have adopted policy exclusions and limitations so that low-risk
insureds would continue to demand insurance at the going ,ate. He sees this as consistent with the goal
of maximizing insurance availability in society. He writes: "Few people would contest the importance of
insurance in modern life. Indeed, few would dispute that a central ambition of a civilized society is to
maximize the availability of insurance against all forms of prospective loss." Priest, Antitrust Suits, supra
note 47, at 1000. But by adopting the goal of maximizing insurance "availability," Priest does not fully
consider another social goal of maximizing insurance coverage. If insurers raised coinsurance rates to 99%,
they would lower the costs of insurance to all insureds and would attract extremely low-risk individuals
who might otherwise go without insurance. But coverage would be extremely thin. Insureds would be left
with very little insurance whatsoever. It appears that Priest would nevertheless endorse this result because
it serves the social goal of maximizing insurance availability. In short, he does not consider the trade-off
resulting from the fact that increasing copayment arrangements reduces insurance coverage though it may
increase insurance availability. Attracting low-risk insureds at the expense of high-risk insureds may not
be welfare maximizing.
321. See supra notes 262-63 and accompanying text.
322. Others have offered this explanation for why there continues to be negligent conduct in the face
of what should in theory be optimal incentives under a negligence regime. See, e.g., S. SHAVELL, supra
note 67, at 83-84; W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 57, at 72-73.
323. Put differently, the burden of proof required to shift the costs of an accident to a defendant-
insured is significantly higher in the liability insurance context than it is in the tort context. A possible
reason that insurers contract to cover almost all losses and not just negligently caused accidents is that they
want to signal to manufacturers that in the event of a claim, the insurer will have the same incentive as
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commonly exclude coverage against insureds' intentional harms, and often
exclude coverage against injuries caused by insureds' recklessness. 24
The recent increase in insurance contract exclusions, however, probably
does not reflect a sudden increase in the obviousness of insureds' ability to
prevent certain forms of liability. Although those forms that have been
excluded do seem readily preventable, that fact was no less obvious to insurers
before the crisis. It seems more plausible that the new exclusions have emerged
because the previous regime did not hold manufacturers liable for as many
preventable accidents as the current regime does." 2 In other words, the most
plausible explanation for the increase in copayment arrangements and exclu-
sions seems to be that both the consumer product market and the previous
products liability regime fell significantly short of optimizing deterrence.
3 26
Manufacturers (and ultimately their liability insurers) were too rarely held
the insured when choosing whether to litigate or to settle. Cf. G. EADS & P. REUTER, supra note 145, at
134 n.27 (making this point with regard to punitive damages).
324. Standard-form comprehensive general liability policies usually provide that an insurer will not
pay for those liabilities that the insured "intended" to incur. See Rynearson, Exclusion of Expected or
Intended Personal Injury or Property Damage under the Occurrence Definition of the Standard Comprehen-
sive General Liability Policy, A.B.A. SEC. TORT & INS. PRACTICE, reprinted in TIE COMPREHENSIVE
GENERAL LIABiLrrY POLICY 3, 3 (A. Liederman ed. 1985). For judicial interpretation of "intended," see
City of Johnstown v. Bankers Standard Ins. Co., 877 F.2d 1146, 1150 (2d Cir. 1989) ("Recovery will
be barred only if the insured intended the damages, or if it can be said that the damages were, in a broader
sense, 'intended' by the insured because the insured knew that the damages would flow'directly and
immediately from its intentional act." (citations omitted)); see also R. KEETON & A. WIDiss, INSuRANCE
LAW 493 (1988) ("[L]osses which are intentionally caused by an insured generally are not covered by
liability insurance"); id. at 492-93 (discussing exclusions based on reckless conduct or gross negligence).
Priest emphasizes this point: "[l]nsurance markets cannot be sustained when there is substantial range for
moral hazard. This is the reason that virtually all policies, including first-party policies, exclude coverage
of intentional or reckless acts." Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1583 n.244.
325. On one level, the liability insurance "crisis" provides evidence of how well third-party insurance
works. Preventable accidents are precisely the kinds of accidents for which we want the manufacturer-not
the insurer-to bear the losses. By lowering aggregate coverage, raising deductibles, and providing
exclusions, third-party insurers are controlling moral hazard. Gary Schwartz has recently written:
There is a tendency for people to assume that for liability insurance to be unavailable signifies
some breakdown in the overall functioning of the tort system. But such an assumption may well
be misguided. The unavailability of insurance-far from revealing that the system is malfunction-
ing-may verify that it is functioning very effectively as a deterrence regime: that is, that it is
targeting for liability precisely those forms of conduct that are so readily controllable by defen-
dants as to render unacceptable to insurers the moral hazard prospect of insurance policies.
Admittedly, I should be careful in not pushing this point too far. It is difficult to interpret the
mid-1980s crisis in insurance availability as a consequence of moral-hazard considerations: for
it is implausible that the prospect of moral hazard had become vastly more serious, in any general
way, between 1980 and 1985. Nevertheless, at least selected aspects of the recent insurance crisis
do not invite being interpreted along the lines of moral hazard. The refusal of insurance compa-
nies to write policies for [certain] torts ... may well be due to insurers' assessments that [those
torts] are so within the defendants' control as to render inadvisable a regime of insurance.
Gary Schwartz, Ethics and Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 313, 343-44
(1990). Schwartz is correct to suggest that recent exclusions were largely in response to moral hazard
problems. He may be mistaken, however, not to pursue the argument further. For reasons explained below,
it appears that the prospect of moral hazard did suddenly "become vastly more serious" and did lead to
the "crisis" phenomena.
326. Priest agrees that the previous negligence regime was ineffective from a deterrence standpoint.
See Priest, Accident Rate, supra note 47, at 221-22 (The old negligence standard "was crude and paid no
careful attention to the determinants of the accident rate. There is little reason to believe that the negligence
standard required even cost-effective investments by manufacturers. The adoption of the strict liability
standard may very likely have improved accident prevention incentives."); see also id. at 202-07.
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liable for the full costs of accidents that they could have prevented. 27 If
courts had held manufacturers liable for all of the accidents that manufacturers
could have prevented, liability insurers, if they worked perfectly, would have
disallowed coverage against such liability. That we now see new insurance
exclusions for preventable liability suggests that the old negligence rule was
not holding manufacturers liable for some preventable accidents, and consum-
ers were absorbing the costs associated with manufacturers' inefficient behavior
in the form of less than optimally safe products. Not surprisingly, incentives
from the product market were not, by themselves, sufficient to force manufac-
turers to provide optimally safe products.32 In the absence of market-
correcting tort law, consumers externalized the risk of nonpecuniary losses and
externalized pecuniary costs to first-party insurers.329
In his discussion of the effects of the "crisis" on day-care centers, for
example, Priest recognizes that new exclusions serve deterrence goals, and thus
he argues that courts should enforce such exclusions:
There is every reason that insurers should exclude coverage of [certain]
claims, and that their exclusions should be enforceable. Sexual abuse
of children is not the form of probabilistic loss for which the insurance
function is appropriate. It is unclear, however, whether courts will find
these exclusions enforceable in the compelling context of a suit by an
abused child against a day-care center with low assets and an insurer
with substantial assets where the motivating judicial objective is to
maximize insurance coverage. The complete withdrawal of insurers
from day-care coverage is strong evidence that judicial efforts to force
coverage of uninsurable risks of this nature are short-sighted, reducing
the effective insurance levels.330
Even if it is agreed that courts should not force insurers to cover excluded
losses,33' this does not support Priest's larger argument that courts should
327. Cf. P. DANZON, supra note 22, at 4 ("[Tihe incidence of malpractice [in 1974 was] much higher
than the frequency of malpractice claims."); id. at 24 ("[A]t most 1 in 25 negligent injuries resulted in
compensation through the malpractice system."); id. at 83.
328. Of course, if product markets were perfect, there would be no need for products liability laws
of any kind. See supra notes 76, 249 & 263. See generally S. Croley & J. Hanson, Understanding Products
Liability, supra note 1.
329. See supra Parts III(B)-(C).
330. Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19 at 1572, n. 198; see also Priest, Antitrust Suits, supra note
47, at 1043-44 (arguing that changes in insurance policies-such as "the pollution exclusion"-have
beneficial deterrence effects).
331. As an aside, the authors do not accept the view that such contract exclusions should always be
enforced. As a general matter, the authors would agree with Priest that courts should not force third-party
insurers to pay for losses that are explicitly excluded from liability insurance policies. Presumably, the
insurer and the insured have bargained over the terms of the insurance policy such that the risks are
distributed efficiently between insurer and insured. In some instances, however, where a potential defendant
is essentially judgment-proof-inasmuch as its potential liability losses exceed the value of its assets-it
may be efficient to require the defendant to purchase (and insurers to provide) third-party insurance
coverage for all losses. Day-care centers might be an example of a set of potential defendants who should
be required to purchase liability insurance. Cf. Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 47, at 1572 (suggesting
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not hold day-care centers liable for all such losses. In fact, as already dis-
cussed, many of the exclusions in liability insurance policies are for prevent-
able losses.332 Even under Priest's proposed cost-benefit negligence regime,
manufacturers should be held liable for preventable losses. Policy exclusions
function to ensure such liability.
D. The Shift to Mutuals333
1. The Unravelling Theory's Explanation for the Shift to Mutuals
As Priest observes, there has been a "tremendous increase in self-
insurance" "since the early 1970s.""' Because "[t]here [were] no general
accounts of the determinants of the shift from market insurance to self-
insurance," Priest offers his own.335 He argues that adverse selection causes
low-risk manufacturers to drop out of stock insurance pools and to form or join
mutuals or similar non-traditional stock companies such as "risk retention
possibility that day-care centers have "low assets"). Under such a rule, third-party insurance premiums
would be adjusted to internalize to the insured the cost of the insured's behavior. Also, requiring third-party
insurers to cover those losses, which they would otherwise exclude from coverage, would give the insurer
the incentive to monitor the behavior of the insured in this circumstance where the insured itself does not
have the appropriate incentives. Cf. Abraham, Environmental Liability, supra note 32, at 955 (explaining
that insurers can have "the same behavioral impact as regulation" over the insureds). Day-care centers
offer an excellent example of this phenonomenon. Indeed, Priest's discussion suggests that third-party
insurers, who are being forced by courts to cover the insureds' preventable accidents, are intervening to
ensure that those losses will be prevented. "Day-care insurers reportedly now make unannounced inspec-
tions to monitor day-care centers' operations." Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1572.
Of course, market forces might be sufficient to induce day-care centers to obtain full insurance if,
in fact, consumers demand it. Under the current legal regime, however, we would not see that demand
expressed insofar as insurers are already required to supply it, albeit against their apparent contractual will.
But even if the law were not as it is, consumers would find it difficult to express their demand for full
insurance. To see why, imagine a world where consumers prefer that their day-care centers be fully insured
and where courts permit day-care centers to obtain whatever level of insurance they desire. Under perfect
market conditions, day-care centers would all be fully insured. The market is imperfect, however, to the
extent that consumers cannot know which day-care centers, if any, are actually fully insured. If consumers
are asymmetrically uninformed, the profit-maximizing strategy for insureds is to obtain as little insurance
as possible but to signal that they have full insurance. If day-care centers can credibly and inexpensively
signal to consumers their true level of insurance, that asymmetric information obstacle will readily be
overcome. However, no such signaling device may be available. Consumers do not routinely make
investigations ofa service-provider's insurance status and probably lack the expertise to evaluate the policies
and other relevant data. And the costs of acquiring such expertise probably exceed the benefits for
consumers. Day-care centers will not invest in educating consumers because it would be difficult to capture
the returns of such investments. In sum, it may be socially efficient for courts to disregard insurance policy
exclusions when the insurer could ensure the prevention of accidents through cost-justifiable premium
adjustments and/or monitoring and when the insured would otherwise externalize those costs through
bankruptcy and, hence, not prevent them.
332. See supra notes 321-24 and accompanying text. Again, a "preventable" accident is one that can
be prevented cost-justifiably.
333. The authors are grateful to Henry Hansmann for his helpful comments regarding this Section.
Throughout this Section, the term "mutuals" is used in a general sense to denote organizational arrange-
ments where owners and insureds are one and the same. In other words, "mutuals" is used as a convenient
synonym for "risk retention groups and the like." Strictly speaking, mutuals are one of three subspecies
of risk retention groups.
334. Priest, Antitrust Suits, supra note 47, at 1010. This dramatic shift may explain the vociferous
opposition of liability insurers to changes in tort law. Cf. id. (the shift reduces insurance industry profits).
335. Id.
groups" instead.336 Priest argues further that by exiting commercial insurance
pools, low-risk members initiated unravelling, but he does not explain why the
exodus of low-risk insureds from commercial liability pools was necessarily
undesirable.
If it is true that by abandoning existing insurance pools low-risk insureds
could obtain superior insurance for themselves, then the "unravelling" that
ensued as a consequence of their leaving must have been efficient. Cross-
subsidization within insurance pools is efficient on net only if the net benefits
enjoyed by low-risk insureds exceed the allocational inefficiencies resulting
from the cross-subsidy. If low-risk insureds can obtain those same benefits
absent the cross-subsidy, efficiency considerations require that they do so.
When low-risk insureds exit a given pool, the range of risks presented by the
remaining members of that pool is narrowed. Or, put differently, the pool of
remaining insureds contains a more homogeneous set of risks. And those who
remain are charged premiums more proportional to the risks they pose. Conse-
quently, there is less cross-subsidization among pool members.
Priest seems to assume that when insureds "unravel" from the pool they
must either go entirely without insurance or else make do with some
purportedly inferior form of insurance such as mutual insurance. Based on the
observation that there has been a shift to mutuals, Priest claims that the total
amount of insurance coverage enjoyed by manufacturers has been reduced.337
By implicitly assuming that mutual insurance is tantamount to no insurance,
Priest can implicitly analogize the liability insurance market to Akerlof's well-
known "market for lemons."'3 That is, he can argue that low-risk insureds
have the same problem that owners of high-quality used cars have in Akerlof's
model: there is no alternative market in which high-quality vehicles (low-risk
insureds) can obtain a high-quality price (low-risk premium).
336. Id. at 1012. At present, there is little data on the size of the shift away from stock insurance
toward new forms such as mutual insurance. It is widely believed, however, that the shift has been
substantial and rapid. See P. DANZON, supra note 22, at 93; Sorry, Your Policy Is Canceled, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 8, 1986, at 35, col. 3; Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1570; see also G. EADS & P.
REUTER, supra note 145, at x ("Our interviews suggest that the insurance industry is likely to play a
declining role with respect to the large manufacturers that produce most of the consumer goods in the
nation. The manufacturers have shifted largely to either self-insurance or policies involving high deductibles
or significant coinsurance."). See generally Priest, Antitrust Suits, supra note 47, at 1002-14 (documenting
"the dramatic shift toward self-insurance that appears to have begun in the early 1970s"); id. at 1006-10
(reviewing evidence of "steadily increasing shift away from market insurance toward corporate self-
insurance of expected liability exposure"); id. at 1009 (estimating that by 1986 at least 60% of all products-
liability layouts were financed by self-insurance).
The Risk Retention Act amendments of 1986 made possible the shift toward risk retention groups or
mutuals. See 15 U.S.C §§ 3901-3904 (1988).
337. Priest claims that there has been a decrease in total insurance coverage, and he uses as evidence
the reduction in stock insurance. Priest uses the phrases "the drying up of insurance" and "the disappear-
ance of insurance," Priest, Understanding the Crisis, supra note 47, at 196, and he claims that "between
1984 and 1986 the insurance capacity available to United States citizens for these types of injuries shrank
dramatically," suggesting that other forms of insurance besides commercial insurance do not constitute
insurance. Id. at 197; see also Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1539 ("[T]he modem regime
somehow has led to the reduction of insurance availability.").
338. Akerlof, supra note 117.
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But as the rest of this Section will argue, insureds exited stock insurance
pools to join industry-wide mutuals simply because mutual insurance over-
comes several potential problems inherent in stock insurance, problems that
were heightened as a result of the recent changes in products liability law.
Because of changes in products liability, mutuals have become the lowest-cost
bearers of manufacturer risk in some industries.
Priest explains that high-risk insureds formed mutuals in response to
changes in tort law. Although he does not explain their motivations, Priest
seems to argue that, as a means of postponing inevitable bankruptcy, high-risk
insureds withdrew from commercial casualty insurance pools to join mutual
insurance pools wherein they could pay premiums ex post rather than ex ante.
Priest writes:
High-risk mutuals . . . are formed as basically the last option prior to
the termination of activity. . . . In my view, the recent increase in
adoption of the mutual form derives from the different way mutuals
diversify risks, and illustrates again how modern tort law has impaired
the insurance function .... Industry-wide mutuals ... aggregate risks,
but in an ex post fashion. Mutuals wait for losses actually to occur and
then set an effective premium to cover them. . . . [T]he chief differ-
ence between common stock and mutual insurance companies is that
common stock companies charge premiums according to expected loss
and mutuals according to actual loss ....
[A]doption of the mutual form allows firms to continue operation until
judgments are rendered bankrupting the industry, instead of paying
debilitating premiums ex ante equal to expected lossA3 9
There are several problems with this argument, however. One problem with
the unravelling theory's treatment of the rise of mutuals is its suggestion that
mutuals arise so that member firms can postpone their inevitable bankruptcies
by paying the premium at the end of the insurance period rather than at the
beginning. Priest seems to be arguing that mutuals are established to allow
failing firms to play a timing game. But 4on the contrary, the members of
mutuals pay premiums at the beginning of the period, not at the end. 3"
Moreover, the mutual insurance arrangements relevant to Priest's description
are regulated, and there is no reason to think that regulation of mutuals is
systematically different from regulation of stock companies. Thus, it is not
clear why mutuals would charge any lower premium ex ante than their stock
339. Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 19, at 1579-80.
340. It is not uncommon, however, for pool members to receive a refund at the end of the period if
the period's claims do not exhaust the premiums. As explained below, the refunding of excess premiums
to insureds gives mutuals an important efficiency advantage over stock insurers. See infra Part IV(D)(2)(e).
insurance counterparts would. 4' Moreover, as an empirical matter, there is
some evidence that members of mutuals pay roughly the same premiums as
their stock-insurance counterparts do.342
Even if members were required to supplement their premium during or at
the end of the insurance period, it seems clear that under Priest's assumptions
the mutuals-who would know that their member insureds are on the verge
of bankruptcy-would make every effort to avoid underestimating the firms'
liability costs. They would take little comfort in the fact that, if necessary, they
could request more money ex post. Accepting the view that firms joining
mutuals are firms at bankruptcy's door, the expectation would be that a mutual
would require of such firms at least as high of a premium ex ante as a stock
insurance company would. Thus, if a firm's goal is to avoid paying a premium
at the beginning of the period, a mutual would be of no help.
Indeed, if, as Priest suggests, a firm's goal were to avoid paying liability
claims until claims were made, the firm would have no reason to go to the
effort and expense of forming or joining a mutual. Instead, it would go bare.
In that case, the firm would be certain not to pay until after claims were made
against it, and there would be some chance that bankruptcy would protect the
firm from having to pay at all. Thus, although Priest concludes that the trend
toward mutual insurance "illustrates how modern tort law has impaired the
insurance function," his arguments do not clearly support his conclusion.
2. The Internalizing Theory's Explanation for the Shift to Mutuals
3 43
As Henry Hansmann has explained, the market tends to select the most
efficient forms of ownership. 3" This selection process will be most effective
in industries where the barriers to entry of new forms of organization are low,
341. Cf. R. KEETON & A. WiDiss, supra note 324, at 33-34 ("Historically mutual insurers often issued
assessable policies, under which policy holders were subject to being assessed in the event the insurers did
not have sufficient funds to pay claims. . . . [But] policies currently sold by mutuals usually are non-
assessable. . . .The nonassessable arrangement is made possible by the fact that, before nonassessable
insurers are licensed to operate in a particular state, they must meet, in general, the same financial
requirements stipulated for stock insurers. Instead of having capital, however, the minimum surplus of
nonassessable mutuals must equal the combined capital and surplus requirements of stock companies.").
342. P. DANZON, supra note 22, at 103 (medical mutuals often charged rates "comparable to those
of stock companies they replaced").
343. Kevin M. Quinley, Vice President of Risk Services, Hamilton Resources Co., provided helpful
information for this Section. Telephone interview with Kevin M. Quinley (Nov. 15, 1990) [hereinafter
Quinley interview].
344. Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law Firms, Codetermination, and
Economic Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1749, 1755-56 (1990) [hereinafter Hansmann, Worker Ownership].
According to Hansmann,
efficiency will best be served if ownership is assigned so that total transaction costs for all patrons
are minimized. This means minimizing the sum of both the costs of market contracting for those
patrons who are not owners, nd the costs of ownership for the class of patrons who are assigned
ownership.
Hansmann, Ownership of the Firm, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 267, 273 (1988) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter
Hansmann, Ownership of the Firml.
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as they appear to be in the commercial liability insurance industry.345 Accord-
ing to the internalizing theory, changes in products liability altered the relation-
ship between liability insurers and their insureds such that for some insureds
mutuals became the most efficient form of insurance. To explain why firms
moved from stock to mutual insurance, it will be useful to describe the primary
difference between these two forms of liability insurance.
Broadly speaking, mutual insurers are owned as cooperatives by their
policy holders. The insurers and the insureds are one and the same. The typical
mutual risk pool is composed of a relatively small number of relatively homo-
geneous insureds, all of whom come from a single industry.3" Stock insur-
ance companies, in contrast, are owned by investors in capital and usually
cover many insureds representing many industries.
As explained below, because of these basic differences, the mutual form
of liability insurance may have several advantages over the stock form. This
is not to deny that the mutual form is without disadvantages. Indeed, if that
were the case, then one would expect products liability insurance to have been
always offered through the mutual form. This is simply to argue that, because
of the changes in products liability, the advantages of mutuals now outweigh
the disadvantages. Mutuals may be better able than stock insurance companies
to cope with the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. In addition,
mutuals more easily cope with the problem of socio-legal uncertainty and
imperfect contracts. Each of these advantages is considered in turn. 47
345. Priest, Antitrust Suits, supra note 47, at 1003-05.
346. Quinley interview, supra note 343. See Abraham, Environmental Liability supra note 32, at 948
n.21.
347. One possible "advantage" that stock insurance might have over mutual insurance is that stock
insurance diversifies across industries, whereas mutual insurance diversifies only across firms within an
industry. This is true because stock insurers bring members of different industries together into a single
insurance pool. Under mutual insurance, however, the industry-specific risk is not diversified because all
members of the insurance pool are also members of the same industry. P. DANzON, supra note 22, at 86
(stating that joint-stock companies should be more efficient risk-bearers than mutuals). Therefore, firms
of a given industry may not find mutual insurance as attractive as stock insurance inasmuch as the latter
can help reduce the risk that is peculiar to the industry. However, even stock insurers are not always able
to provide much diversification, see infra notes 366-71 and accompanying text, and thus firms may sacrifice
little or none of that benefit by moving to the mutual form. G. EADs & P. REUTER, supra note 145, at
110-11, 132, 134-37. Because mutuals tend to have small numbers of insureds, they may have more trouble
diversifying even firm-specific (i.e., non-industry-specific) risks. They may be less able, that is, to exploit
the law of large numbers than they would be if they had more insureds. P. DANZON, supra note 22, at
89-90. However, the number of insureds need not be large for insurance pools to reap most of the benefits
of the law of large numbers. For instance; studies of stock portfolios indicate that few stocks are required
to obtain diversification roughly equivalent to the market as a whole. See, e.g., R. BREALEY, AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO RISK AND RETURN FROM COMMON STOCKS 115-31 (1969). Moreover, mutual insurers, like
stock insurers, can diversify their pools further through reinsurance arrangements. See, e.g., G. EADS &
P. REUTER, supra note 145, at 111. Reinsurance, in effect, brings the risks of several different pools
together into a larger, more diversified pool. Through reinsurance, therefore, mutuals can diversify their
industry-specific risk and can further diversify their firm-specific risk.
In sum, the comparative abilities of a stock insurer and a mutual to diversify risks is not clear and
probably will vary depending on the industry. Even if it were universally true that stock insurance provided
superior risk diversification, however, that would not imply that stock insurance would always be preferred
to mutual insurance. As argued below, there is more at stake than risk diversification, and mutual insurance
has efficiency advantages unrelated to risk diversification.
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a. The Benefits of Size
Because insurers cannot monitor insureds perfectly, insurance arrangements
suffer from the problem of "moral hazard." Insurers cannot always know
whether an insured is making relatively high levels or relatively low levels of
efficient investments in avoiding liability. Insofar as insurers are uninformed
in this respect, insureds have an incentive to invest suboptimally in avoiding
liability irrespective of any contractual agreements to the contrary and of any
premium discounts they enjoy as a result of such agreements. Consequently,
insurers have an incentive not to offer premium discounts even for insureds
who agree to contractual provisions mandating high levels of investment. That
is, insurers will have no choice but to assume that all insureds will not make
high-level investments in avoiding liability. This will be true even if insurers
and insureds would both prefer a contract in which insureds received lower
premiums and made greater investments in avoiding liability.3 4 The more
difficult it is for insurers to monitor insureds, the more severe this moral
hazard problem will be.
In general, one would expect mutuals to be superior to stock companies
at reducing insurance losses that stem from moral hazard. As noted above,
compared to stock insurers, mutuals insure a relatively small group of
insureds. As the number of insureds in an insurance pool decreases, so does
the gain from free-riding.349 In large insurance pools, for example, insureds
will have a strong incentive to disregard their own liability costs inasmuch as
those costs are spread evenly across the pool such that a given insured pays
only a tiny fraction of them (i.e., z/n, where z = the liability costs resulting
from a given insured's decision to invest less than optimally in avoiding
liability, and n = the number of insureds in the pool). As the number of
insureds in a given pool decreases, however, the fraction of the additional cost
ultimately paid by the insured increases (i.e., as n decreases, z/n increases).
In other words, as the size of an insurance pool decreases, all else equal, so
does the magnitude of the free-rider (or moral hazard) problem. In smaller
pools, every insured bears a greater portion of the liability costs stemming
from inefficiently low levels of investment. This raises the cost of liability to
any pool member and leads each pool member to invest a higher and more
efficient amount in avoiding liability. Furthermore, because a mutual has only
a small number of insureds and because, therefore, the costs that free riders
impose on each of their fellow pool members are relatively high, the mutual
form may encourage each insured to monitor her fellow pool members,
348. See Akerlof, supra note 117 (providing classic statement of this phenomenon).
349. "[Mutuals] are typically small-to keep within bounds [each member/firm's] incentive to free-ride
on the monitoring efforts of [the] other [members/firms]." Hansmann, The Organization of Insurance
Companies: Mutual versus Stock, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 125, 127 (1985) [hereinafter Hansmann, Orga-
nization of Insurance]. See generally Pauly, supra note 185.
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pressure her non-cooperating (free-riding) pool members to cooperate, and
provide the insurer with techniques and information that might aid the insurer
in selecting insureds for membership, in detecting free-riding pool members,
and in adjusting premiums accordingly. The relatively small size of mutuals
may reduce moral hazard, not only because the benefits of monitoring may be
large, but also because the costs of monitoring the members of a small pool
may be relatively low. Economists tend to believe that in arrangements that
require cooperation, the average cost of monitoring increases as the number
of parties to be monitored increases and likewise that the average cost
decreases as the number decreases.35 This assumption is often made, for
instance, in cartel theory and public-good theory.35'
In sum, because mutuals are composed of a relatively small number of
insureds, mutuals both reduce the incentives for moral hazard and reduce the
costs of monitoring. Mutual insurance may thus offer an important efficiency
advantage over stock insurance, especially in contexts where monitoring
insureds is important but difficult. Given that the moral hazard problem would
probably have increased significantly in liability insurance pools following the
inclusion of nonpecuniary losses accompanying the expansions of manufacturer
liability,352 the shift to the mutual form of insurance is understandable.
b. Lower Information Costs
The potential insureds for any type of insurance are likely to vary in the
degree of risk they present. Each potential insured may have more information
than the insurer has about the degree of risk it poses. Indeed, it is this type
of asymmetric information that Priest believes undercut the viability of the
commercial liability insurance market. To some extent, Priest may be right.
But as argued in Part III above, it seems doubtful that this led to harmful
"unravelling." Instead, the shift of insureds out of stock insurance pools into
mutual insurance pools appears to have occurred simply because the mutual
form can cope with the problem of asymmetric information more effectively
than stock insurance can. There are several reasons to believe that problems
stemming from such asymmetric information-namely moral hazard and
adverse selection-can be substantially overcome through mutual insurance
mechanisms even though they might be fatal to stock insurance pools.353
350. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 195, at 725 ("It will help to place the risk on the class of parties
likely to have the lowest organization costs, usually the one with the fewest members.").
351. See, e.g., D. GREER, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 275-77 (1980); J.
HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 473-77 (1970); R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 53-54 (1976); F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 199-200 (2d ed. 1980).
352. See supra note 160 and notes 183-86 and accompanying text.
353. Cf. G. EADS & P. REUTER, supra note 145, at 135.
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Given that mutual insurance pools are composed of similarly sized members
of a single industry, one would expect the variance in the degree of risk
presented by pool members to be less in a mutual than in a stock company
wherepool members represent entities of various size from various industries.
For many risks, insurers can provide more complete insurance and/or reduce
the cost of insurance if they can assess the relative riskiness of prospective
insureds through the application process, and if they can monitor the behavior
of insureds who are part of the risk pool. An effective application process
allows insurers to reduce adverse selection, and an effective monitoring mecha-
nism permits insurers to discourage moral hazard and to suggest to insureds
additional means of reducing risks. To have an effective application process,
however, insurers need to know which of (and to what extent) an applicant's
characteristics will reflect its relative riskiness, and they must be able to verify
the data that applicants furnish. Similarly, to monitor insureds effectively,
insurers need to make close and frequent inspections of insureds, and they
must be able to investigate and verify the claims that insureds make.
First, firms of a given industry organized as a mutual may, as an incident
to their participation in and knowledge of the industry, often be better able than
a stock company to create effective application and monitoring processes."'
Firms in the industry will have specialized knowledge about their industry in
part because they have incentives, beyond a desire to minimize liability claims,
to become informed about the industry.355 To succeed in their business, they
are encouraged to garner information about every aspect and dimension of it.
Moreover, as members of the industry, they have comparatively easy access
to relevant information.356 In other words, firms receive many benefits from
becoming industry experts, and it is relatively inexpensive for them to do so.
Stock insurers, in contrast, worry only about a few, general aspects of the
many industries they must insure, because their interest is uni-dimensional and
their access to information is relatively limited. Insurers do not already have
354. Because they are composed of a single industry, mutuals may also have more specialized
knowledge and better predictions of the products liability that is relevant to their industry than stock
companies do. Cf. Epstein, Product Liability Reform, supra note 69, at 314 ("Products liability law is an
extremely complex and diffuse body of law. An apricot with a pit inside is a product, but so too is a
complex nuclear reactor. The type of reforms that will benefit some product manufacturers and sellers are
often of no concern, or less concern, for others."). For those reasons, the mutual form may lower the
administrative costs of processing claims, see supra notes 70 & 160 and accompanying text, and reduce
socio-legal uncertainty.
355. Hansmann's description of mutual property and liability insurance companies in the 1800s
supports this claim:
[T]hose firms within an industry that knew themselves to be unusually good risks [joined]
together to form a mutual insurance company to insure themselves: the firms could recognize
each other as good risks but would have difficulty convincing an insurance company from outside
the industry that they deserve especially low premiums. Or, put differently, the cost of informa-
tion about the riskiness of individual insureds was lower to firms within the industry than to those
outside of it.
Hansmann, Organization of Insurance, supra note 349, at 146.
356. See Hanson & Logue, supra note 73, at 148-49.
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all of the information necessary for successful monitoring, and, because they
cannot benefit from the information in other ways, they have fewer incentives
to acquire it.357 Not only do mutuals have lower information costs, but, for
at least two reasons, mutuals may be more willing than stock insurance compa-
nies to invest in discovering ways in which their insureds could minimize the
costs of liability.358
c. Overcoming the Problem of Inducement Costs
A stock insurance company will have a reduced incentive to invest in
discovering efficient methods for preventing liability. This is true because in
order to induce insureds to adopt this behavior insurers will have to pass some
portion of the benefits of such discoveries on to their insureds through
premium discounts.359 Otherwise, the insureds have no incentive to take the
liability-reducing action. Consequently, stock insurers have suboptimal incen-
tives to induce their insureds to adopt efficient practices.
It is because of the different forms of ownership that mutuals can overcome
this problem while stock insurance companies cannot. In stock insurance
companies, the stockholders are the residual claimants (that is, those to whom
the net profits are distributed). Their collective interest conflicts with the
insureds' with regard to who receives how much of the gains from the
insurer's discovery. The more the insureds receive through discounted pre-
miums, the less the shareholders will receive in dividends, and visa versa.
With mutual insurance, in contrast, the residual claimants and the insureds are
the same. There is no conflict of interest between insureds and insurers. Thus,
if the mutual gives all of the benefits of the discovery to the insureds in the
form of reduced premiums, that is tantamount to giving dividends to the
mutual's owners. Mutuals, then, have optimal incentives to invest in making
these sorts of discoveries.
d. Overcoming the Problem of Asset Specificity
A second reason why mutuals may be more willing than stock insurance
companies to invest in discovering ways in which their insureds could (and in
encouraging insureds to) minimize the costs of liability stems from the fact that
such investments are often asset specific. Once an insurer has invested in
357. Cf. G. EADS & P. REUTER, supra note 145, at x ("Several factors may explain the shift [away
from stock insurance]. Differences in the incentives of insurers and insureds lead the latter to seek more
control over decisions to litigate or settle. The flow of information may be better when the firm controls
more of these activities."). See, e.g., id. at 134 ("The expertise developed in dealing with the regulatory
agency also provides the basis for litigation expertise.").
358. Some of the theoretical points in this section are analogous to points made by Hansmann in his
historical analysis of mutual property and liability insurance. See Hansmann, Organization of Insurance,
supra note 349, at 129-48.
359. See Hanson & Logue, supra note 73, at 165-66.
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determining how a particular firm could reduce its expected liability costs,36 °
the firm has an incentive to behave opportunistically by threatening to find
insurance elsewhere unless the insurer lowers its rate to some level below what
would be necessary for the insurer to recoup its sunk investments. Ex ante,
therefore, stock insurers will be unwilling to make such research investments
because they know they cannot recover the costs. This is true, in large part,
because contracts in liability insurance need to be short-term contracts. Fre-
quent changes in the law and other relevant variables make it necessary to
renegotiate contracts at relatively short intervals. Because contracts are short-
term, insureds would have the opportunity to defect after one contract period,
leaving insurers unable to obtain sufficient returns to justify making the asset-
specific investments in the first place.
Opportunism is mitigated under the mutual form first because each insured
benefits by some amount when the mutual in general benefits, and, conversely,
each insured suffers when the mutual suffers. Hence, insureds will have a
reduced incentive to behave opportunistically because they themselves will have
to absorb some of the costs of doing so. To be sure, even in a mutual, insureds
will maintain some incentive to behave opportunistically. The point here is only
that incentive will be less under the mutual form than it would be under
common stock insurance.36' A second reason that insureds may have less
incentive to behave opportunistically is that insureds in mutuals generally have
no alternative mutual insurance pool that they canjoin. Industry-wide insurance
mutuals often face comparatively little competition from other mutuals.362
If there are significant benefits to mutual insurance over stock insurance in a
given industry, the threat of an insured in a mutual to leave and join a stock
insurance pool is not, therefore, particularly credible. To leave the mutual,
insureds would have to sacrifice the other benefits of the mutual form to shift
to a stock company's insurance pool. Even under short-term contracts, then,
insureds have other incentives to stay with their mutual for the long term.
Insureds in stock insurance pools, on the other hand, can make credible threats
that they will leave their stock insurer for another, since there are other stock
insurers on the market to whom the insured could turn. 63
360. Priest would probably not dispute the assumption that insurers must make significant asset-specific
investments. See Priest, Antitrust Suits, supra note 47, at 1006 ("Much of the insurance coverage implicated
in the antitrust suits and in the recent crisis consists of what is called special risk underwriting: the provision
of insurance in a highly individualized manner to insured firms, with premiums set according to the
particular characteristics of the insured firm itself.").
361. See supra notes 349-50 and accompanying text. See generally Klein, Crawford & Alchian,
Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & EcON. 297,
298-302 (1978) (vertical integration can mitigate problems caused by opportunistic behavior of contracting
parties).
362. Because a mutual is owned by its insureds, pricing policies will reflect the fact that there is no
conflict of interest between the insurer and the insureds. Even if a mutual had monopoly power, it would
not exact monopoly rents from its insureds. See generally Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise,
89 YALE L.J. 835, 889-94 (1980).
363. See generally Priest, Antitrust Suits, supra note 47, at 1007-15 (noting that the commercial
casualty industry is highly competitive, even within individual states).
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e. Coping with Socio-Legal Uncertainty and Imperfect Contracts
Many scholars emphasize the fact that the expectation of unpredictable
changes in liability law makes an insurer's task difficult and risky. In the
context of increasing socio-legal uncertainty, liability insurers try to estimate
the expected liability costs of each of their insureds, but there is an increasing
probability that the actual liability costs will vary considerably from their
estimate. Although the individual risk terms may cancel out somewhat the
more firms and industries there are represented in the insurance pool, if the
liability standard becomes more strict "across the board," those risk terms will
not cancel insofar as they move systematically. Insurers, therefore, are faced
with significant risk. If they charge insureds according to their best estimate
of what the standard of liability would be in the next period, the insurers,
assuming their estimates have a normal distribution, would face a fifty percent
chance of losing on all their contracts. And because their estimates could be
wildly wrong, their losses could be enormous.
One solution to this problem would be for an insurer to recoup such losses
by charging extra premiums in the future to those firms or industries on which
the insurer lost money in the past. Over time the bad years would wash out
with the good. The difficulty with such a strategy, however, is that the insurer
can never recoup past losses in the current year, because if it tries to price
over the competitive rate it will lose its insureds to other insurers who did not
suffer losses in previous years or who recently entered the market in response
to such above-competitive pricing.364 Ultimately, each insurer must view the
previous year's losses as sunk costs and must concern itself only with the
future and with covering its costs at the margin. Every insurer, that is, has no
choice but to price competitively.365
This all suggests that stock insurance companies face significant risks which
they cannot fully diversify.366 In response to undiversifiable risk, stock insur-
ers have had to add a "kicker" to the premium that they would otherwise have
364. This risk may well have been especially costly to stock insurers who could not rely on actuarial
data to assess expected payouts, but had to set premiums according to individual judgments of liability costs.
"Discovering that they were being charged 'judgment made' rates, firms evidently decided that they were
as well (if not better) equipped than insurance companies to make these judgments and began to do so."
G. EADs & P. REUTER, supra note 145, at 111.
365. TORT POLICY WORKINo GROUP, 1986 REPORT, supra note 25, at 28 ("Insurers, like all profit
maximizing companies, charge the price which maximizes their profits .... The argument that insurers
are charging higher premiums to recoup past losses suggests that absent such losses their premiums would
be lower-that is they would not be charging premiums that maximize their profits. That makes little
sense. ). Cf. P. DANZON, supra note 22, at 103 ("[R]ecoupment of past losses is feasible only in a monopo-
listic or cartelized market with barriers to entry, and neither of these conditions characterizes the...
[commercial liability insurance] market."). For evidence that the market for commercial liability insurance
is highly competitive, see Priest, Antitrust Suits, supra note 47, at 1003-14.
366. This, risk cannot be easily diversified through the stock market. See R. Winter, "Crises" In
Competitive Insurance Markets (Working Paper in Economics E-86-74, Hoover Institution, Stanford
University) (Dec. 1986) (showing that where there is a positive net opportunity cost to raising additional
equity, diversification of insurers risk through the stock market will be incomplete); Danzon, Tort Reform,
supra note 33, at 521.
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charged based solely on their estimation of the expected liability of their
insureds.367 The greater the uncertainty, the larger the kicker needs to be for
an insurer to accept this risk. If insurers significantly underestimate the number
and size of claims, the losses will be offset in part or in full by the extra
premiums. Thus, the presence of socio-legal uncertainty may explain why
insurers have charged more than their expected liability costs would suggest,
and why insurers experienced higher profits on average during the height of
the crisis."'
Risks general to an industry that stock insurers cannot fully diversify,
including socio-legal uncertainty, pose less of a problem to industry-wide
mutuals.369 Firms may be relatively indifferent to increases in their liability
costs so long as all firms in their industry bear the same costs. Mutual insur-
ance becomes increasingly attractive as socio-legal certainty to an industry
increase, because no matter the change next period in liability rules, consumers
will be the ones to absorb much of the increase in costs through higher prices
across the industry, and each firm will maintain its market share. Mutual
insurance, unlike stock insurance, may provide an industry with a form of
market-share insurance.37 This difference alone may give mutuals some
advantage over stock companies, particularly for industries that face significant
socio-legal risk.371
367. P. Danzon, Second Look at Tort Reform, supra note 33, at 10; see also supra Part II(C)(4)
(discussing Priest's argument that premium increases have outstripped expected increases in claims).
368. See Winter, supra note 39, at 457 ("The reconciliation of the increased profits of the industry
over the period of the crisis and the larger magnitude of premium increases as compared to insurers' costs
is critical for the assessment of government policy . . ").
369. See Hansmann, Organization of Insurance, supra note 349, at 148-49.
370. Id. This is not a case of firms simply increasing their prices in the future to cover past losses.
After all, mutuals are formed in industries in which, by hypothesis, there is significant socio-legal risk.
Because of their uncertainty over what their average liability will be in the next period, members of that
industry mutual will not compete away this period what may turn out to be excess premiums next period.
This will be true even in a competitive industry. Although socio-legal risk may appear to create above-
normal profits ex post, there will be no entry because, from an ex ante perspective, manufacturers in the
industry are merely being compensated for absorbing socio-legal risk.
371. Quinley interview, supra note 343.
There may be several reasons why mutual insurance in this area came to be viewed as a viable alterna-
tive to stock insurance only fairly recently, after the expansions in liability.
(1) Following the increase in liability costs, the value of liability insurance increased, making it
worthwhile to search for other means of insurance and also worthwhile to set up and run mutuals. Cf.
Hansmann, Organization of Insurance, supra note 349, at 126-27.
(2) The interests of manufacturers within any given industry coincided more closely following the
increase in systematic risk than they were before it, because, by definition, systematic risk applies to
everyone. Thus, the change in law made their interests more homogeneous. In addition, they designed risk
pools to ensure that the interests were relatively homogeneous. See generally Hansmann, Ownership of
the Firm, supra note 344 (explaining why homogeneity of interests within a cooperative is important);
Hansmann, Worker Ownership, supra note 344 (providing evidence of the importance of homogeneous
interests among joint owners); Hansmann, Organization of Insurance, supra note 349, at 150 (mutuals in
property and casualty insurance industry commonly insure in only one line of business because "costs of
operating a cooperative increase dramatically when all the members are not purchasing the same thing from
the firm and thus may have conflicting interests."); see also Hansmann, Worker Ownership, supra note
344, at 1796 (making similar point with regard to other types of cooperatives).
(3) Manufacturers may have left stock insurance pools to gain control over the decision to litigate or
settle claims. See generally G. EADs & P. REUTER, supra note 145, at 110-11 (offering three arguments
for why manufacturers would have wanted to gain such control).
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But probably the more important difference is that mutual insurance avoids
the conflict of interest between policyholders and shareholders that may result
from the tendency of insurers to add a kicker to insurance premiums in
response to undiversifiable, socio-legal uncertainty.7 2 Mutuals do not suffer
the contracting difficulties that stem from the problem of how to allocate the
increased residual earnings that tend to accrue from the increased
premiums.373 Hansmann has attributed an analogous advantage to mutual life
insurance in the 19th century:
A mutual company can set a ... premium rate that is high enough to
provide reserves adequate for the most pessimistic forecasts . . .
[T]hen, if and when events turn out better than a worst-case forecast,
the excess reserves can be liquidated and returned to the policyholders
as dividends. The difficulty of market contracting between companies
and policyholders is eliminated simply by eliminating the market and
replacing it with an ownership relationship.374
In sum, the rise of mutuals appears to reflect not a crisis but rather an
efficient response to a changing legal environment. This is not the first time
the market selected for the mutual form of insurance over the stock form.
Consider, for example, Hansmann's description of the rise of mutual property
and liability insurance companies in the 19th century:
In order to understand the other factors that have given rise to mutual
companies in the property and liability field, it is helpful to understand
the circumstances of their origin ....
.. . [T]he circumstances in which the successful mutuals arose
were remarkably uniform. The stylized facts are roughly as follows:
owners of firms within a particular industry and a particular
region-say, cotton textile mills in Rhode Island . . .- who believed
they presented unusually low risks of fire would find themselves paying
fire insurance premiums to stock companies that they considered
excessive. After trying unsuccessfully to persuade the stock companies
to lower their fire insurance premiums, they would finally band
together to form a mutual company to insure themselves. The resulting
372. Abraham calls this an "uncertainty tax." Abraham, Environmental Liability, supra note 32, at
958.
373. P. DANZON, supra note 22, at 86 ("It should be little surprise that given the contracting problems
that arose from stock insurance following the expansion of liability that mutuals have emerged and have
'flourished.'"); id. ("bedpan mutuals," owned and controlled by physicians, "have flourished" and now
write more than 40% of premium volume nationwide); id. at 110 (the mutual avoids what would be costly
contracting problems under stock insurance).
374. Hansmann, Organization of Insurance, supra note 349, at 134; see also Mayers & Smith,
Contractual Provisions, Organizational Structure, and Conflict Control in Insurance Markets, 54 J. Bus.
407, 425-28 (providing similar explanation for evolution of mutual insurance).
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net premiums would be far below those charged by stock companies.
Unlike the stock companies, the mutual would (1) insure only the better
risks in the industry and (2) have a regular program of inspecting the
firms they insured, both to assess the risk and to recommend loss
prevention measures .... 375
Hansmann's description seems to be equally applicable to the more recent rise
of mutual liability insurance companies.376
Conclusion
The liability crisis seems to have been merely a phantom. The recent events
now commonly associated with the "crisis" may be better understood as the
inevitable and efficient consequences of desirable changes in products liability.
The policy prescriptions voiced by members of the tort reform movement may
therefore constitute an ill-considered and potentially harmful response to those
events.
Part I of this Article presented the prevailing explanation for the increases
in commercial liability insurance premiums and the withdrawal of some forms
of coverage. That view attributes those increases to the high administrative cost
of the tort system relative to first-party insurance schemes, the inefficiencies
of nonpecuniary-loss damage awards, and the inability of product manufactur-
ers to combat moral hazard. Part I offered three counter-arguments to the
prevailing view. First, the total administrative costs of accident recovery
through both the tort and first-party insurance systems may well be less under
an enterprise liability regime than they would be under a cost-benefit negli-
gence regime. Second, because nonpecuniary-loss damage awards are clearly
desirable on deterrence grounds, the existence of such awards is consistent with
efficiency goals. Third, manufacturer-provided insurance can and does employ
mechanisms analogous to the deductibles and copayment mechanisms of first-
party insurance.
Part II focused on the scholarship of Professor Priest. Whereas Part I
analyzed that portion of Priest's scholarship that is common to the scholarship
of virtually all members of the crisis movement, Part II scrutinized that portion
of his scholarship that more clearly constitutes his original contribution to the
crisis literature and upon which the other contributors to that literature com-
monly rely. Part II argued that Priest's explanation for how consumer and
manufacturer risk pools have "unravelled" rests on unconvincing empirical and
theoretical premises.
375. Hansmann, Organization of Insurance, supra note 349, at 145.
376. One distinction is that in the 1800s the rise in mutuals was primarily among property insurers
(e.g., fire), whereas the current rise in mutuals is among liability insurers.
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Part III offered the "internalizing theory" as an alternative explanation for
the crisis. According to the internalizing theory, recent events in consumer
product markets are best explained not as the consequence of risk pool unravel-
ling but rather as a result of the internalization of the nonpecuniary costs of
product accidents, the internalization of the first-party insurance externality,
increased socio-legal uncertainty, and the insurance market's efficient response
to those three developments.
Part IV compared this internalizing theory with Priest's "unravelling
theory" and argued that product withdrawal was best predicted not by risk pool
variance but instead by product danger and the extent to which manufacturers
and first-party insurers externalized the costs of product accidents. Part IV
further argued that the increase in policy exclusions indicates not that insurers
have attempted to segregate manufacturers, but rather that insurers have
attempted to ensure that manufacturers prevent all preventable accidents.
Finally, Part IV argued that the recent rise of mutual insurance reflects the
market's efficient response to increased problems of moral hazard and socio-
legal uncertainty. According to the internalizing theory, phenomena such as
the increase in insurance premiums and the withdrawal of certain goods and
services from consumer markets are not undesirable. They are simply the
consequences of the internalization of pre-expansion externalities, and they
evidence the deterrence advantages of enterprise liability.
To be sure, other explanations for the liability "crisis" besides the pre-
vailing unravelling theory have been offered (for example, insurance industry
collusion). In contrast to those explanations, the internalizing theory accepts
the widely held view that products liability is responsible for recent develop-
ments in the liability insurance markets. It concludes, however, that these
developments evidence the success of the products liability revolution, not its
failure.
By calling into doubt the prevailing view of the liability crisis, the goal of
this Article has been to promote careful reconsideration of the liability reforms
urged by members of the counter-revolutionary movement. Admittedly, the
authors' alternative explanation may contain its own shortcomings. But given
the many criticisms now confronting the prevailing view, would-be reformers
should rethink the arguments underlying their previously unchallenged policy
prescriptions. Meanwhile, courts should move toward enterprise liability,
unashamedly. On both deterrence and insurance grounds, enterprise liability
appears to be the superior products liability regime. Moving closer toward
enterprise liability, we should pause not to reconstruct the citadel, but only to
commemorate its destruction.

